DIRECTORATE OF DISTANCE EDUCATION

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH BENGAL


**MASTER OF ARTS-HISTORY**

**SEMESTER -III**

# HISTORY OF IDEAS (ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL)

**CORE 302**

## BLOCK-1

**UNIVERSITY OF NORTH BENGAL**
Postal Address:
The Registrar,
University of North Bengal,
Raja Rammohunpur,
P.O.-N.B.U., Dist-Darjeeling,
West Bengal, Pin-734013,
India.
Phone: (O) +91 0353-2776331/2699008
Fax: (0353) 2776313, 2699001
Email: regnbu@sancharnet.in ; regnbu@nbu.ac.in
Wesbsite: www.nbu.ac.in

First Published in 2019

All rights reserved. No Part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without permission in writing from University of North Bengal. Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this book may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages.
This book is meant for educational and learning purpose. The authors of the book has/have taken all reasonable care to ensure that the contents of the book do not violate any existing copyright or other intellectual property rights of any person in any manner whatsoever. In the even the Authors has/ have been unable to track any source and if any copyright has been inadvertently infringed, please notify the publisher in writing for corrective action

# FOREWORD

The Self Learning Material (SLM) is written with the aim of providing simple and organized study content to all the learners. The SLMs are prepared on the framework of being mutually cohesive, internally consistent and structured as per the university's syllabi. It is a humble attempt to give glimpses of the various approaches and dimensions to the topic of study and to kindle the learner's interest to the subject

We have tried to put together information from various sources into this book that has been written in an engaging style with interesting and relevant examples. It introduces you to the insights of subject concepts and theories and presents them in a way that is easy to understand and comprehend.

We always believe in continuous improvement and would periodically update the content in the very interest of the learners. It may be added that despite enormous efforts and coordination, there is every possibility for some omission or inadequacy in few areas or topics, which would definitely be rectified in future.

We hope you enjoy learning from this book and the experience truly enrich your learning and help you to advance in your career and future endeavours.

# HISTORY OF IDEAS (ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL)

## BLOCK-1

**Unit 1: Ideas Of Polity: OLIGARCHY, Republicanism, Emergence Of Monarchy In Ancient India, Different Approaches Of Study .......6**

**Unit 2: Legitimacy Of Political Power: Texts And Practice.............57**

**Unit 3: Rights And Duties Of Subjects.............................................100**

**Unit 4: Formation Of Religious Ideas In Early India- Vedas, Upanishads And Vedanta .................................................................123**

**Unit 5: Six Schools Of Indian Philosophy .......................................191**

**Unit 6: Jainism......................................................................................228**

**Unit 7: Buddhism ..................................................................................273**

## BLOCK-2

Unit 8: Social Ideas: Varna, Jati

Unit 9: Social Issues :Women

Unit 10: Political Ideas (Medieval Period) : Monarchy

Unit 11: Philosophy of Islam

Unit 12: Formation of religious thought and cultural synthesis: Bhakti movement: Shaivite and Vaishnavite,

Unit 13: Regional Developments, Sikhism, Din-I-llahi.

Unit 14: Intellectual traditions, Identity Formations, Temple Desecration and the Indo-Muslim States, Rhetoric of State- Building

# BLOCK 1 HISTORY OF IDEAS (ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL)

**Introduction to the Block**

Unit 1 deals with the Ideas of Polity: Oligarchy, Republicanism, Emergence of Monarchy in Ancient India, Different approaches of Study. The political thought of Sri Aurobindo is more of the nature of political philosophy than of political science.
Unit 2 deals with the Legitimacy of Political Power: Texts and Practice. Political legitimacy is a virtue of political institutions and of the decisions—about laws, policies, and candidates for political office—made within them.
Unit 3 deals with the Rights and duties of subjects. The discourse on rights is linked with the rise of liberal individualism. The language of rights permeates and dominates all walks of modern political, social and economic life.
Unit 4 deals with the Formation of Religious Ideas in Early India- Vedas, Upanishads and Vedanta. The historical Vedic religion (also known as Vedism or ancient Hinduism[a]) refers to the religious ideas and practices among most Indo-Aryan-speaking peoples of ancient India after about 1500 BCE.
Unit 5 deals with the Six Schools of Indian Philosophy. Indian philosophy refers to ancient philosophical traditions of the Indian subcontinent. The principal schools are classified as either orthodox or heterodox – āstika or nāstika – depending on one of three alternate criteria: whether it believes the Vedas as a valid source of knowledge; whether the school believes in the premises of Brahman and Atman; and whether the school believes in afterlife and Devas.
Unit 6 deals with Jainism. Jainism (/ˈdʒeɪnɪzəm/), traditionally known as Jain Dharma, is an ancient Indian religion. Followers of Jainism are called "Jains", a word derived from the Sanskrit word jina (victor) referring to the path of victory in crossing over life's stream of rebirths by destroying karma through an ethical and spiritual life.
Unit 7 deals with Buddhism. This unit, the philosophy of Buddhism, introduces the main philosophical notions of Buddhism. It gives a brief and comprehensive view about the central teachings of Lord Buddha and the rich philosophical implications applied on it by his followers.

# UNIT 1: IDEAS OF POLITY: OLIGARCHY, REPUBLICANISM, EMERGENCE OF MONARCHY IN ANCIENT INDIA, DIFFERENT APPROACHES OF STUDY

**STRUCTURE**

1.0 Objectives

1.1 Introduction

1.2 Oligarchy

1.3 Republicanism

1.4 Emergence of Monarchy in Ancient India

1.5 Different approaches of Study

1.6 Let us sum up

1.7 Key Words

1.8 Questions for Review

1.9 Suggested readings and references

1.10 Answers to Check Your Progress

## 1.0 OBJECTIVES

After this unit, we can able to know:

- To describe Oligarchy
- To understand the Republicanism
- To know Emergence of Monarchy in Ancient India
- To understand Different approaches of Study

## 1.1 INTRODUCTION

The political thought of Sri Aurobindo is more of the nature of political philosophy than of political science. It is important to note that Sri Aurobindo's political thought forms only a part of his more comprehensive social thought, which again forms a part of his general philosophic system. Sri Aurobindo's political thought is invariably stated in the larger more comprehensive context of his thought, and his

treatment of political issues always takes full account of their interrelation and interaction with other spheres of social life .1 One of the basic ideas of Sri Aurobindo's social philosophy is his conception of social development fully elaborated by in his great work, The Human Cycle. According to him social change is a movement of upward evolutionary progress. Sri Aurobindo maintains that cyclic development of human society passes through a sequence of three stages which he terms the infrartional, the rational and the supraratational. The sequence is based on a subjective or psychological criterion because it is determined by the state of consciousness which man and society have reached in their psychological evolution. The political forms and institutions of society, being a part of the total social system, also pass through the same three stages in their evolutionary development partake of their changing characteristics. In the first stage the political institutions are organic , communal where the people are not yet intelligently self conscious of reason. The second is the rational age when the communal mind becomes more and more intellectually self-conscious, guided by the power of critical and constructive reason. The third stage belongs to the future and would be marked by greater stress on the supra-rational subjective consciousness. Here man's collective life was governed not by the needs, instincts but by the power of unity, sympathy, spontaneous liberty, supple and living order of his discovered greater self and spirit in which the individual and the communal existence have their law of freedom, perfection and oneness. He thinks that stage can not " any where found its right conditions unless it is reorganized and followed out as the imperative need of his being and its true and right attainment the necessity of the next step in the evolution of the race.''

According to Sri Aurobindo the rational age of political evolution has to pass through a sequence of three stages. As he says "If we may judge from the modern movement, the progress of the reason as a social renovator creator, if not interrupted in its course, would be destined to pass through three successive stages which are the very logic of its growth, the first individualistic increasingly democratic with liberty for its principle, the second socialistic, in the end perhaps a government communism with equality the State for its principle, the third_ if that

ever gets beyond the stage of theory- anarchistic in the higher sense of that much-abused word, either a loose voluntary cooperation or a free communalism with brotherhood or comradeship not government for its principle." There are three phases of evolution in the socio-political life of India. The first stage of evolution was infra- rational and is marked by the dominance of instincts, communal existence, impulses. The Jatidharma and Kula dharma of ancient India is the product of this age. In this age rationalism as a social force is only implicit and it can be called the age of natural society. This early framework of polity and society continued in the next age with farther shaped, development and systemized. Thus in Sri Aurobindo's political thought the modern political systems of democracy, socialism and anarchism are treated and evaluated not merely as different forms of government but as successive stages of the rational curve of human evolution in which the reason of man tries to create a perfect political order in the image of one or the other of its rational ideals.

## 1.2 OLIGARCHY

An oligarchy is a power structure that allows a few businesses, families, or individuals to rule. They have enough power to turn the country to benefit them to the exclusion of other members.

They maintain their power through their relationships with each other. Oligarchy is from the Greek word oligarkhes, and it means "few governing."

**Well-Known Oligarchies**

Three of the most well-known countries with oligarchies are Russia, China, and Iran. Other examples are Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and apartheid-era South Africa.

A plutocracy is a subset of an oligarchy. In a plutocracy, the leaders are rich. The leaders in an oligarchy don't have to be rich, even though they usually are. For example, a high school ruled by a popular clique is an oligarchy. A plutocracy is always an oligarchy, but there could be some oligarchies that aren't plutocracies.

An oligarchy can occur in any political system. In a democracy, oligarchs use their relationships and money to influence the elected officials. In a

monarchy or tyranny, they have enough power and money to influence the king or tyrant.

The iron law of oligarchy states that any organization or society will eventually become an oligarchy. That's because the people who learn how to succeed in the organization gain a competitive advantage. The larger and more complicated the organization becomes, the more advantages the elite gain.

Oligarchs only associate with others who share those same traits. They become an organized minority as opposed to the unorganized majority. They groom protégés who share their values and goals. It becomes more difficult for the average person to break into the group of elites. The following pros and cons summarize some of the benefits and issues:

**Pros**

Power is centralized within a leadership team, rather than involving everyone in every decision.

People can participate in activities, relationships, and work while the group in power handles the larger issues of the society.

An oligarchy strives to keep the status quo, which breeds conservatism instead of taking on risky ventures.

**Cons**

The ruling class controls policies and legislation, and ends up with much more wealth than the rest of society.

As the ruling class gains more expertise, it tends to exclude outsiders, making it tough for people to break in.

**Prevents new perspectives and diversity.**

Can limit available supplies to certain classes, fix prices, provide selective benefits, and restrict the economy by hindering basic supply and demand functions.

Causes rebellion when people feel they can't join the ruling class, and disruption and war when people no longer follow the rules.

**Pros of an Oligarchy**

Oligarchies exist in any organization that delegates power to a group of expert insiders so that the organization can function. It's not efficient for everyone to make all the decisions all the time.

An oligarchy allows most people to focus on their day-to-day lives. They can ignore the issues that concern society as a whole. They can spend their time doing other things, such as working on their chosen career, cultivating relationships with their families, or engaging in sports.

The oligarchy allows creative people to spend the time needed to innovate in new technologies. That's because the oligarchy manages the society. They can be successful as long as their inventions and success benefit the oligarchy's interests as well.

The decisions made by an oligarchy are conservative since the goal is to preserve the status quo. It’s therefore unlikely that any single strong leader can steer the society into ventures that are too risky.

**Cons of an Oligarchy**

Oligarchies increase income inequality. That's because the oligarchs siphon a nation's wealth into their pockets. That leaves less for everyone else.

As the insider group gains power, it seeks to keep it. As their knowledge and expertise grow, it becomes more difficult for anyone else to break in.

Oligarchies can become stale. They pick people who share the same values and worldview. This can sow the seeds of decline since they can miss the profitable synergies of a diverse team.

If an oligarchy takes too much power, it can restrict a free market and agree informally to fix prices, which violates the laws of supply and demand.

If people lose hope that they can one day join the oligarchy, they may become frustrated and violent. Consequently, they may overthrow the ruling class. This can disrupt the economy and cause pain and suffering for everyone.

**Causes of Oligarchies**

An oligarchy forms when leaders agree to increase their power regardless of whether it benefits society.

The people in charge are very good at what they do; otherwise, they wouldn't have risen to that level. That's how they can continue to take more wealth and power from those that don't have those skills or interests.

A monarchy or tyrant system can create an oligarchy if the leader is weak. The oligarchy increases its power around this person. When the leader leaves, the oligarchs remain in power. They select a puppet or one of their own to replace the leader.

Oligarchies can also arise in a democracy if the people don't stay informed. This happens more often when a society becomes extremely complex and difficult to understand. People are willing to make the trade-off of allowing those with the passion and knowledge to rule to take over.

**U.S. Oligarchies**

Is the United States an oligarchy? Many economists, such as France's Thomas Piketty and Simon Johnson, a senior fellow of the Peterson Institute for International Economics, say if it isn't already, it's headed that way. One sign is that income inequality is worsening. The incomes of the top 1% of earners rose 157% between 1979 and 2017 and the top 0.1% of the population has more than tripled its share of earnings in that period.

The top 0.1% represents the corporate executives, hedge fund, and other financial managers, lawyers, and real estate investors. They go to the same schools, travel in the same social circles, and sit on each others' boards.

American oligarchs are not within the same families. They don't all support the same causes. Instead, they are very wealthy people who donate to campaigns and causes that help their businesses.

The Washington Post found that just 10 mega-donor individuals and couples contributed nearly 20% of the $1.1 billion raised by super PACs in 2016. Super PACs are political action committees that can shield the identity of their donors. The top givers were split roughly equally along party lines.

For example, Charles Koch and his late brother David made their wealth by investing in oil derivatives and support conservative politics through the Koch foundations. Another is Harold Hamm, owner of Continental Resources, who opened up the Bakken shale oil fields. He supported Republicans who approved the Keystone XL pipeline.

Comcast lobbyist David Cohen is a millionaire who donates to Democrats. He also successfully lobbied the government for the merger of Comcast and NBC. S. Donald Sussman is a hedge fund manager who supports liberal candidates.

Research conducted by Northwestern and Princeton universities supports the oligarchy claim. It found that the nation's economic elite dominate federal policies.

It reviewed 1,800 federal policies enacted between 1981 and 2002. The researchers compared them to the preferences of four groups. It found that the policies most frequently aligned with the wishes of the elite and special interest groups rarely aligned with those of average citizens or mass interest groups.

**Americans Feel Disenfranchised**

As a result, most Americans feel disenfranchised. If not, they feel helpless in influencing their society. A 2018 Gallup poll found that 63% feel dissatisfied with the way things are going right now. Also, 68% are dissatisfied with income distribution. As a result, 37% feel that there is not much opportunity to get ahead. That's up from 17% in 1997.

These attitudes have led to populist protest groups such as the Tea Party and the Occupy Wall Street movement. However, the Tea Party directed people's anger toward the federal government, not the oligarchy. The Occupy Wall Street movement didn't carry out any real change.

This dissatisfaction became a critical force in the 2016 presidential campaign. It created momentum for candidates on both ends of the political spectrum. Bernie Sanders railed against those policies that perpetuated income inequality. Donald Trump lumped the Tea Party, traditional Republicans, and Democrats into the same "swamp." Trump used the anger at the status quo to win the election.

President Trump then filled his Cabinet positions with many of the same elite he had campaigned against. He also granted waivers to former lobbyists to direct policy in areas they had once lobbied for.

Oligarchy (from Greek ὀλιγαρχία (oligarkhía); from ὀλίγος (olígos), meaning 'few', and ἄρχω (arkho), meaning 'to rule or to command') is a form of power structure in which power rests with a small number of people. These people may be distinguished by nobility, wealth, education or corporate, religious, political, or military control. Such states are often controlled by families who typically pass their influence from one generation to the next, but inheritance is not a necessary condition for the application of this term.

Throughout history, oligarchies have often been tyrannical, relying on public obedience or oppression to exist. Aristotle pioneered the use of the term as meaning rule by the rich, for which another term commonly used today is plutocracy. In the early 20th century Robert Michels developed the theory that democracies, as all large organizations, have a tendency to turn into oligarchies. In his "Iron law of oligarchy" he suggests that the necessary division of labor in large organizations leads to the establishment of a ruling class mostly concerned with protecting their own power.

This was already recognized by the Athenians in the fourth century BCE: after the restoration of democracy from oligarchical coups, they used the drawing of lots for selecting government officers to counteract that tendency toward oligarchy in government. They drew lots from large groups of adult volunteers to pick civil servants performing judicial, executive, and administrative functions (archai, boulē, and hēliastai). They even used lots for posts, such as judges and jurors in the political courts (nomothetai), which had the power to overrule the Assembly.

Minority rule

The exclusive consolidation of power by a dominant religious or ethnic minority has also been described as a form of oligarchy. Examples of this system include South Africa under apartheid, Liberia under Americo-Liberians, the Sultanate of Zanzibar, and Rhodesia, where the installation

of oligarchic rule by the descendants of foreign settlers was primarily regarded as a legacy of various forms of colonialism.

The modern United States has also been described as an oligarchy because economic elites and organized groups representing business interests have substantial independent impacts on U.S. government policy, while average citizens and mass-based interest groups have little or no independent influence.

**Putative oligarchies**

A business group might be defined as an oligarch if it satisfies the following conditions:

(1) owners are the largest private owners in the country

(2) it possesses sufficient political power to promote its own interests

(3) owners control multiple businesses, which intensively coordinate their activities.

**Russian Federation**

Main article: Russian oligarch

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and privatization of the economy in December 1991, privately owned Russia-based multinational corporations, including producers of petroleum, natural gas, and metal have, in the view of many analysts, led to the rise of Russian oligarchs.

**Ukraine**

The Ukrainian oligarchs are a group of business oligarchs that quickly appeared on the economic and political scene of Ukraine after its independence in 1991. Overall there are 35 oligarchic groups .

**Zimbabwe**

The Zimbabwean oligarchs are a group of liberation war veterans who form the Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front, a colonial liberation party. The philosophy of the Zimbabwean government is that Zimbabwe can only be governed by a leader who took part in the pre-independence war. The motto of ZANU-PF in Shona is "Zimbabwe yakauya neropa", meaning Zimbabwe was born from the blood of the

sons and daughters who died fighting for its independence. The born free generation (born since independence in 1980) has no birthright to rule Zimbabwe.

**United States**

Further information: Wealth inequality in the United States and Income inequality in the United States § Impact on democracy and society

Some contemporary authors have characterized current conditions in the United States as oligarchic in nature. Simon Johnson wrote that "the reemergence of an American financial oligarchy is quite recent", a structure which he delineated as being the "most advanced" in the world. Jeffrey A. Winters wrote that "oligarchy and democracy operate within a single system, and American politics is a daily display of their interplay." The top 1% of the U.S. population by wealth in 2007 had a larger share of total income than at any time since 1928. In 2011, according to PolitiFact and others, the top 400 wealthiest Americans "have more wealth than half of all Americans combined."

In 1998, Bob Herbert of The New York Times referred to modern American plutocrats as "The Donor Class" (list of top donors) and defined the class, for the first time, as "a tiny group—just one-quarter of 1 percent of the population—and it is not representative of the rest of the nation. But its money buys plenty of access."

French economist Thomas Piketty states in his 2013 book, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, that "the risk of a drift towards oligarchy is real and gives little reason for optimism about where the United States is headed."

A study conducted by political scientists Martin Gilens of Princeton University and Benjamin Page of Northwestern University was released in April 2014, which stated that their "analyses suggest that majorities of the American public actually have little influence over the policies our government adopts." The study analyzed nearly 1,800 policies enacted by the US government between 1981 and 2002 and compared them to the expressed preferences of the American public as opposed to wealthy Americans and large special interest groups. It found that wealthy individuals and organizations representing business interests have

substantial political influence, while average citizens and mass-based interest groups have little to none. The study did concede that "Americans do enjoy many features central to democratic governance, such as regular elections, freedom of speech and association, and a widespread (if still contested) franchise." Gilens and Page do not characterize the US as an "oligarchy" per se; however, they do apply the concept of "civil oligarchy" as used by Jeffrey Winters with respect to the US. Winters has posited a comparative theory of "oligarchy" in which the wealthiest citizens – even in a "civil oligarchy" like the United States – dominate policy concerning crucial issues of wealth- and income-protection.

Gilens says that average citizens only get what they want if wealthy Americans and business-oriented interest groups also want it; and that when a policy favored by the majority of the American public is implemented, it is usually because the economic elites did not oppose it. Other studies have questioned the Page and Gilens study.

In a 2015 interview, former President Jimmy Carter stated that the United States is now "an oligarchy with unlimited political bribery" due to the Citizens United ruling which effectively removed limits on donations to political candidates.

## 1.3 REPUBLICANISM

Republicanism is a representative form of government organization. It is a political ideology centered on citizenship in a state organized as a republic. Historically, it ranges from the rule of a representative minority or oligarchy to popular sovereignty. It has had different definitions and interpretations which vary significantly based on historical context and methodological approach.

Republicanism may also refer to the non-ideological scientific approach to politics and governance. As the republican thinker and second president of the United States John Adams stated in the introduction to his famous Defense of the Constitution, the "science of politics is the science of social happiness" and a republic is the form of government arrived at when the science of politics is appropriately applied to the creation of a rationally designed government. Rather than being

ideological, this approach focuses on applying a scientific methodology to the problems of governance through the rigorous study and application of past experience and experimentation in governance. This is the approach that may best be described to apply to republican thinkers such as Niccolò Machiavelli (as evident in his Discourses on Livy), John Adams, and James Madison.

The word "republic" derives from the Latin noun-phrase res publica (thing of the people), which referred to the system of government that emerged in the 6th century BCE following the expulsion of the kings from Rome by Lucius Junius Brutus and Collatinus.

This form of government in the Roman state collapsed in the latter part of the 1st century B.C., giving way to what was a monarchy in form, if not in name. Republics recurred subsequently, with, for example, Renaissance Florence or early modern Britain. The concept of a republic became a powerful force in Britain's North American colonies, where it contributed to the American Revolution. In Europe, it gained enormous influence through the French Revolution and through the First French Republic of 1792–1804.

## Classical antecedents

### Ancient Greece

In Ancient Greece, several philosophers and historians analysed and described elements we now recognize as classical republicanism. Traditionally, the Greek concept of "politeia" was rendered into Latin as res publica. Consequently, political theory until relatively recently often used republic in the general sense of "regime". There is no single written expression or definition from this era that exactly corresponds with a modern understanding of the term "republic" but most of the essential features of the modern definition are present in the works of Plato, Aristotle, and Polybius. These include theories of mixed government and of civic virtue. For example, in The Republic, Plato places great emphasis on the importance of civic virtue (aiming for the good) together with personal virtue ('just man') on the part of the ideal rulers. Indeed, in Book V, Plato asserts that until rulers have the nature of philosophers

(Socrates) or philosophers become the rulers, there can be no civic peace or happiness.[3]

A number of Ancient Greek city-states such as Athens and Sparta have been classified as "classical republics", because they featured extensive participation by the citizens in legislation and political decision-making. Aristotle considered Carthage to have been a republic as it had a political system similar to that of some of the Greek cities, notably Sparta, but avoided some of the defects that affected them.

**Ancient Rome**

Both Livy, a Roman historian, and Plutarch, who is noted for his biographies and moral essays, described how Rome had developed its legislation, notably the transition from a kingdom to a republic, by following the example of the Greeks. Some of this history, composed more than 500 years after the events, with scant written sources to rely on, may be fictitious reconstruction.

The Greek historian Polybius, writing in the mid-2nd century BCE, emphasized (in Book 6) the role played by the Roman Republic as an institutional form in the dramatic rise of Rome's hegemony over the Mediterranean. In his writing on the constitution of the Roman Republic,[4] Polybius described the system as being a "mixed" form of government. Specifically, Polybius described the Roman system as a mixture of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy with the Roman Republic constituted in such a manner that it applied the strengths of each system to offset the weaknesses of the others. In his view, the mixed system of the Roman Republic provided the Romans with a much greater level of domestic tranquility than would have been experienced under another form of government. Furthermore, Polybius argued, the comparative level of domestic tranquility the Romans enjoyed allowed them to conquer the Mediterranean. Polybius exerted a great influence on Cicero as he wrote his politico-philosophical works in the 1st century BCE. In one of these works, De re publica, Cicero linked the Roman concept of res publica to the Greek politeia.

The modern term "republic", despite its derivation, is not synonymous with the Roman res publica. Among the several meanings of the term res

publica, it is most often translated "republic" where the Latin expression refers to the Roman state, and its form of government, between the era of the Kings and the era of the Emperors. This Roman Republic would, by a modern understanding of the word, still be defined as a true republic, even if not coinciding entirely. Thus, Enlightenment philosophers saw the Roman Republic as an ideal system because it included features like a systematic separation of powers.

Romans still called their state "Res Publica" in the era of the early emperors because, on the surface, the organization of the state had been preserved by the first emperors without significant alteration. Several offices from the Republican era, held by individuals, were combined under the control of a single person. These changes became permanent, and gradually conferred sovereignty on the Emperor.

Cicero's description of the ideal state, in De re Publica, does not equate to a modern-day "republic"; it is more like enlightened absolutism. His philosophical works were influential when Enlightenment philosophers such as Voltaire developed their political concepts.

In its classical meaning, a republic was any stable well-governed political community. Both Plato and Aristotle identified three forms of government: democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy. First Plato and Aristotle, and then Polybius and Cicero, held that the ideal republic is a mixture of these three forms of government. The writers of the Renaissance embraced this notion.

Cicero expressed reservations concerning the republican form of government. While in his theoretical works he defended monarchy, or at least a mixed monarchy/oligarchy, in his own political life, he generally opposed men, like Julius Caesar, Mark Antony, and Octavian, who were trying to realise such ideals. Eventually, that opposition led to his death and Cicero can be seen as a victim of his own Republican ideals.

Tacitus, a contemporary of Plutarch, was not concerned with whether a form of government could be analyzed as a "republic" or a "monarchy".[5] He analyzed how the powers accumulated by the early Julio-Claudian dynasty were all given by a State that was still notionally a republic. Nor was the Roman Republic "forced" to give away these

powers: it did so freely and reasonably, certainly in Augustus' case, because of his many services to the state, freeing it from civil wars and disorder.

Tacitus was one of the first to ask whether such powers were given to the head of state because the citizens wanted to give them, or whether they were given for other reasons (for example, because one had a deified ancestor). The latter case led more easily to abuses of power. In Tacitus' opinion, the trend away from a true republic was irreversible only when Tiberius established power, shortly after Augustus' death in 14 CE (much later than most historians place the start of the Imperial form of government in Rome). By this time, too many principles defining some powers as "untouchable" had been implemented.[6]

**Renaissance republicanism**

In Europe, republicanism was revived in the late Middle Ages when a number of states, which arose from medieval communes, embraced a republican system of government.[7] These were generally small but wealthy trading states in which the merchant class had risen to prominence. Haakonssen notes that by the Renaissance, Europe was divided, such that those states controlled by a landed elite were monarchies, and those controlled by a commercial elite were republics. The latter included the Italian city-states of Florence, Genoa, and Venice and members of the Hanseatic League. One notable exception was Dithmarschen, a group of largely autonomous villages, who confederated in a peasants' republic. Building upon concepts of medieval feudalism, Renaissance scholars used the ideas of the ancient world to advance their view of an ideal government. Thus the republicanism developed during the Renaissance is known as 'classical republicanism' because it relied on classical models. This terminology was developed by Zera Fink in the 1960s,[8] but some modern scholars, such as Brugger, consider it confuses the "classical republic" with the system of government used in the ancient world.[9] 'Early modern republicanism' has been proposed as an alternative term. It is also sometimes called civic humanism. Beyond simply a non-monarchy, early modern thinkers conceived of an ideal republic, in which mixed government was an important element, and the

notion that virtue and the common good were central to good government. Republicanism also developed its own distinct view of liberty. Renaissance authors who spoke highly of republics were rarely critical of monarchies. While Niccolò Machiavelli's Discourses on Livy is the period's key work on republics, he also wrote the treatise The Prince, which is better remembered and more widely read, on how best to run a monarchy. The early modern writers did not see the republican model as universally applicable; most thought that it could be successful only in very small and highly urbanized city-states. Jean Bodin in Six Books of the Commonwealth (1576) identified monarchy with republic.[10]

Classical writers like Tacitus, and Renaissance writers like Machiavelli tried to avoid an outspoken preference for one government system or another. Enlightenment philosophers, on the other hand, expressed a clear opinion. Thomas More, writing before the Age of Enlightenment, was too outspoken for the reigning king's taste, even though he coded his political preferences in a utopian allegory.

In England a type of republicanism evolved that was not wholly opposed to monarchy; thinkers such as Thomas More and Sir Thomas Smith saw a monarchy, firmly constrained by law, as compatible with republicanism.

**Dutch Republic**

Anti-monarchism became more strident in the Dutch Republic during and after the Eighty Years' War, which began in 1568. This anti-monarchism was more propaganda than a political philosophy; most of the anti-monarchist works appeared in the form of widely distributed pamphlets. This evolved into a systematic critique of monarchy, written by men such as the brothers Johan and Peter de la Court. They saw all monarchies as illegitimate tyrannies that were inherently corrupt. These authors were more concerned with preventing the position of Stadholder from evolving into a monarchy, than with attacking their former rulers. Dutch republicanism also influenced on French Huguenots during the Wars of Religion. In the other states of early modern Europe republicanism was more moderate.[11]

**Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth**

In the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, republicanism was the influential ideology. After the establishment of the Commonwealth of Two Nations, republicans supported the status quo, of having a very weak monarch, and opposed those who thought a stronger monarchy was needed. These mostly Polish republicans, such as Łukasz Górnicki, Andrzej Wolan, and Stanisław Konarski, were well read in classical and Renaissance texts and firmly believed that their state was a republic on the Roman model, and started to call their state the Rzeczpospolita. Atypically, Polish–Lithuanian republicanism was not the ideology of the commercial class, but rather of the landed nobility, which would lose power if the monarchy were expanded. This resulted in an oligarchy of the great landed magnates.[12]

**Enlightenment republicanism**

**Corsica**

The first of the Enlightenment republics established in Europe during the eighteenth century occurred in the small Mediterranean island of Corsica. Although perhaps an unlikely place to act as a laboratory for such political experiments, Corsica combined a number of factors that made it unique: a tradition of village democracy; varied cultural influences from the Italian city-states, Spanish empire and Kingdom of France which left it open to the ideas of the Italian Renaissance, Spanish humanism and French Enlightenment; and a geo-political position between these three competing powers which led to frequent power vacuums in which new regimes could be set up, testing out the fashionable new ideas of the age.
From the 1720s the island had been experiencing a series of short-lived but ongoing rebellions against its current sovereign, the Italian city-state of Genoa. During the initial period (1729–36) these merely sought to restore the control of the Spanish Empire; when this proved impossible, an independent Kingdom of Corsica (1736–40) was proclaimed, following the Enlightenment ideal of a written constitutional monarchy. But the perception grew that the monarchy had colluded with the invading power, a more radical group of reformers led by the Pascal

Paoli pushed for political overhaul, in the form of a constitutional and parliamentary republic inspired by the popular ideas of the Enlightenment.

Its governing philosophy was both inspired by the prominent thinkers of the day, notably the French philosophers Montesquieu and Voltaire and the Swiss theorist Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Not only did it include a permanent national parliament with fixed-term legislatures and regular elections, but, more radically for the time, it introduced universal male suffrage, and it is thought to be the first constitution in the world to grant women the right to vote female suffrage may also have existed.[13][14] It also extended Enlightened principles to other spheres, including administrative reform, the foundation of a national university at Corte, and the establishment of a popular standing army.

The Corsican Republic lasted for fifteen years, from 1755 to 1769, eventually falling to a combination of Genoese and French forces and was incorporated as a province of the Kingdom of France. But the episode resonated across Europe as an early example of Enlightened constitutional republicanism, with many of the most prominent political commentators of the day recognising it to be an experiment in a new type of popular and democratic government. Its influence was particularly notable among the French Enlightenment philosophers: Rousseau's famous work On the Social Contract (1762: chapter 10, book II) declared, in its discussion on the conditions necessary for a functional popular sovereignty, that "There is still one European country capable of making its own laws: the island of Corsica. valour and persistency with which that brave people has regained and defended its liberty well deserves that some wise man should teach it how to preserve what it has won. I have a feeling that some day that little island will astonish Europe."; indeed Rousseau volunteered to do precisely that, offering a draft constitution for Paoli'se use.[15] Similarly, Voltaire affirmed in his Précis du siècle de Louis XV (1769: chapter LX) that "Bravery may be found in many places, but such bravery only among free peoples". But the influence of the Corsican Republic as an example of a sovereign people fighting for liberty and enshrining this constitutionally in the form of an Enlightened republic was even greater among the Radicals of Great

Britain and North America,[16] where it was popularised via An Account of Corsica, by the Scottish essayist James Boswell. The Corsican Republic went on to influence the American revolutionaries ten years later: the Sons of Liberty, initiators of the American Revolution, would declare Pascal Paoli to be a direct inspiration for their own struggle against despotism; the son of Ebenezer Mackintosh was named Pascal Paoli Mackintosh in his honour, and no fewer than five American counties are named Paoli for the same reason.

**England**

Oliver Cromwell set up a republic called the Commonwealth of England (1649–1660) which he ruled after the overthrow of King Charles I. James Harrington was then a leading philosopher of republicanism. John Milton was another important Republican thinker at this time, expressing his views in political tracts as well as through poetry and prose. In his epic poem Paradise Lost, for instance, Milton uses Satan's fall to suggest that unfit monarchs should be brought to justice, and that such issues extend beyond the constraints of one nation.[17] As Christopher N. Warren argues, Milton offers “a language to critique imperialism, to question the legitimacy of dictators, to defend free international discourse, to fight unjust property relations, and to forge new political bonds across national lines.”[18] This form of international Miltonic republicanism has been influential on later thinkers including 19th-century radicals Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, according to Warren and other historians.[19][20]

The collapse of the Commonwealth of England in 1660 and the restoration of the monarchy under Charles II discredited republicanism among England's ruling circles. Nevertheless, they welcomed the liberalism, and emphasis on rights, of John Locke, which played a major role in the Glorious Revolution of 1688. Even so, republicanism flourished in the "country" party of the early 18th century (commonwealthmen), which denounced the corruption of the "court" party, producing a political theory that heavily influenced the American colonists. In general, the English ruling classes of the 18th century vehemently opposed republicanism, typified by the attacks on John

Wilkes, and especially on the American Revolution and the French Revolution.[21]

### French and Swiss thought

French and Swiss Enlightenment thinkers, such as Baron Charles de Montesquieu and later Jean-Jacques Rousseau, expanded upon and altered the ideas of what an ideal republic should be: some of their new ideas were scarcely traceable to antiquity or the Renaissance thinkers. Concepts they contributed, or heavily elaborated, were social contract, positive law, and mixed government. They also borrowed from, and distinguished republicanism from, the ideas of liberalism that were developing at the same time.

Liberalism and republicanism were frequently conflated during this period, because they both opposed absolute monarchy. Modern scholars see them as two distinct streams that both contributed to the democratic ideals of the modern world. An important distinction is that, while republicanism stressed the importance of civic virtue and the common good, liberalism was based on economics and individualism. It is clearest in the matter of private property, which, according to some, can be maintained only under the protection of established positive law.

Jules Ferry, Prime Minister of France from 1880 to 1885, followed both these schools of thought. He eventually enacted the Ferry Laws, which he intended to overturn the Falloux Laws by embracing the anti-clerical thinking of the Philosophs. These laws ended the Catholic Church's involvement in many government institutions in late 19th-century France, including schools.

### Republicanism in the United States

Main article: Republicanism in the United States

In recent years a debate has developed over the role of republicanism in the American Revolution and in the British radicalism of the 18th century. For many decades the consensus was that liberalism, especially that of John Locke, was paramount and that republicanism had a distinctly secondary role.[22]

Notes

The new interpretations were pioneered by J.G.A. Pocock, who argued in The Machiavellian Moment (1975) that, at least in the early 18th century, republican ideas were just as important as liberal ones. Pocock's view is now widely accepted.[23] Bernard Bailyn and Gordon Wood pioneered the argument that the American founding fathers were more influenced by republicanism than they were by liberalism. Cornell University professor Isaac Kramnick, on the other hand, argues that Americans have always been highly individualistic and therefore Lockean.[24] Joyce Appleby has argued similarly for the Lockean influence on America.

In the decades before the American Revolution (1776), the intellectual and political leaders of the colonies studied history intently, looking for models of good government. They especially followed the development of republican ideas in England.[25] Pocock explained the intellectual sources in America:[26]

The Whig canon and the neo-Harringtonians, John Milton, James Harrington and Sidney, Trenchard, Gordon and Bolingbroke, together with the Greek, Roman, and Renaissance masters of the tradition as far as Montesquieu, formed the authoritative literature of this culture; and its values and concepts were those with which we have grown familiar: a civic and patriot ideal in which the personality was founded in property, perfected in citizenship but perpetually threatened by corruption; government figuring paradoxically as the principal source of corruption and operating through such means as patronage, faction, standing armies (opposed to the ideal of the militia), established churches (opposed to the Puritan and deist modes of American religion) and the promotion of a monied interest – though the formulation of this last concept was somewhat hindered by the keen desire for readily available paper credit common in colonies of settlement. A neoclassical politics provided both the ethos of the elites and the rhetoric of the upwardly mobile, and accounts for the singular cultural and intellectual homogeneity of the Founding Fathers and their generation.

The commitment of most Americans to these republican values made the American Revolution inevitable. Britain was increasingly seen as corrupt and hostile to republicanism, and as a threat to the established liberties the Americans enjoyed.[27]

Leopold von Ranke in 1848 claimed that American republicanism played a crucial role in the development of European liberalism:[28]

By abandoning English constitutionalism and creating a new republic based on the rights of the individual, the North Americans introduced a new force in the world. Ideas spread most rapidly when they have found adequate concrete expression. Thus republicanism entered our Romanic/Germanic world.... Up to this point, the conviction had prevailed in Europe that monarchy best served the interests of the nation. Now the idea spread that the nation should govern itself. But only after a state had actually been formed on the basis of the theory of representation did the full significance of this idea become clear. All later revolutionary movements have this same goal... This was the complete reversal of a principle. Until then, a king who ruled by the grace of God had been the center around which everything turned. Now the idea emerged that power should come from below.... These two principles are like two opposite poles, and it is the conflict between them that determines the course of the modern world. In Europe the conflict between them had not yet taken on concrete form; with the French Revolution it did.

**Républicanisme**

Republicanism, especially that of Rousseau, played a central role in the French Revolution and foreshadowed modern republicanism. The revolutionaries, after overthrowing the French monarchy in the 1790s, began by setting up a republic; Napoleon converted it into an Empire with a new aristocracy. In the 1830s Belgium adopted some of the innovations of the progressive political philosophers of the Enlightenment.

Républicanisme is a French version of modern republicanism. It is a form of social contract, deduced from Jean-Jacques Rousseau's idea of a general will. Ideally, each citizen is engaged in a direct relationship with the state, removing the need for identity politics based on local, religious, or racial identification.

Républicanisme, in theory, makes anti-discrimination laws unnecessary, but some critics argue that colour-blind laws serve to perpetuate discrimination.[29]

## Republicanism in Ireland

**Main article: Society of United Irishmen**

Inspired by the American and French Revolutions, the Society of United Irishmen was founded in 1791 in Belfast and Dublin. The inaugural meeting of the United Irishmen in Belfast on 18 October 1791 approved a declaration of the society's objectives. It identified the central grievance that Ireland had no national government: "...we are ruled by Englishmen, and the servants of Englishmen, whose object is the interest of another country, whose instrument is corruption, and whose strength is the weakness of Ireland..."[30] They adopted three central positions: (i) to seek out a cordial union among all the people of Ireland, to maintain that balance essential to preserve liberties and extend commerce; (ii) that the sole constitutional mode by which English influence can be opposed, is by a complete and radical reform of the representation of the people in Parliament; (iii) that no reform is practicable or efficacious, or just which shall not include Irishmen of every religious persuasion. The declaration, then, urged constitutional reform, union among Irish people and the removal of all religious disqualifications.

The event that above all[peacock term] influenced men's thoughts at that time was the French Revolution.[original research?] Public interest, already strongly aroused, was brought to a pitch by the publication in 1790 of Edmund Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in France, and Thomas Paine's response, Rights of Man, in February 1791.[citation needed] Theobald Wolfe Tone wrote later that, "This controversy, and the gigantic event which gave rise to it, changed in an instant the politics of Ireland."[31] Paine himself was aware of this commenting on sales of Part I of Rights of Man in November 1791, only eight months after publication of the first edition, he informed a friend that in England "almost sixteen thousand has gone off – and in Ireland above forty thousand".[32] Paine my have been inclined to talk up sales of his works but what is striking in this context is that Paine believed that Irish sales

were so far ahead of English ones before Part II had appeared. On 5 June 1792, Thomas Paine, author of the Rights of Man was proposed for honorary membership of the Dublin Society of the United Irishmen.[33]
The fall of the Bastille was to be celebrated in Belfast on 14 July 1791 by a Volunteer meeting. At the request of Thomas Russell, Tone drafted suitable resolutions for the occasion, including one favouring the inclusion of Catholics in any reforms. In a covering letter to Russell, Tone wrote, "I have not said one word that looks like a wish for separation, though I give it to you and your friends as my most decided opinion that such an event would be a regeneration of their country".[31]
By 1795, Tone's Republicanism and that of the society had openly crystallized when he tells us: "I remember particularly two days thae we passed on Cave Hill. On the first Russell, Neilson, Simms, McCracken and one or two more of us, on the summit of McArt's fort, took a solemn obligation...never to desist in our efforts until we had subverted the authority of England over our country and asserted her independence."[34]
The culmination was an uprising against British rule in Ireland lasting from May to September 1798 – the Irish Rebellion of 1798 – with military support from revolutionary France in August and again October 1798. After the failure of the rising of 1798 the United Irishman, John Daly Burk, an émigré in the United States in his The History of the Late War in Ireland written in 1799, was most emphatic in its identification of the Irish, French and American causes.[35]

**Modern republicanism**

During the Enlightenment, anti-monarchism extended beyond the civic humanism of the Renaissance. Classical republicanism, still supported by philosophers such as Rousseau and Montesquieu, was only one of several theories seeking to limit the power of monarchies rather than directly opposing them. New forms of anti-monarchism, such as liberalism and later socialism, quickly overtook classical republicanism as the leading ideologies. Republicanism gained support, and monarchies were challenged throughout Europe.

## France

### Further information: Radicalism (historical)

The French version of Republicanism after 1870 was called "Radicalism"; it became the Radical Party a major political party. In Western Europe, there were similar smaller "radical" parties. They all supported a constitutional republic and universal suffrage, while European liberals were at the time in favor of constitutional monarchy and census suffrage. Most radical parties later favored economic liberalism and capitalism. This distinction between radicalism and liberalism had not totally disappeared in the 20th century, although many radicals simply joined liberal parties. For example, the Radical Party of the Left in France or the (originally Italian) Transnational Radical Party, which still exist, focus more on republicanism than on simple liberalism.

Liberalism, was represented in France by the Orleanists who rallied to the Third Republic only in the late 19th century, after the comte de Chambord's 1883 death and the 1891 papal encyclical Rerum novarum.

But the early Republican, Radical and Radical-Socialist Party in France, and Chartism in Britain, were closer to republicanism. Radicalism remained close to republicanism in the 20th century, at least in France, where they governed several times with other parties (participating in both the Cartel des Gauches coalitions as well as the Popular Front).

Discredited after the Second World War, French radicals split into a left-wing party – the Radical Party of the Left, an associate of the Socialist Party – and the Radical Party "valoisien", an associate party of the conservative Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) and its Gaullist predecessors. Italian radicals also maintained close links with republicanism, as well as with socialism, with the Partito radicale founded in 1955, which became the Transnational Radical Party in 1989.

Increasingly, after the fall of communism in 1989 and the collapse of the Marxist interpretation of the French Revolution, France increasingly turned to Republicanism to define its national identity.[36] Charles de Gaulle, presenting himself as the military savior of France in the 1940s, and the political savior in the 1950s, refashioned the meaning of Republicanism. Both left and right enshrined him in the Republican pantheon.[37]

## United States

### Main article: Republicanism in the United States

Republicanism became the dominant political value of Americans during and after the American Revolution. The "Founding Fathers" were strong advocates of republican values, especially Thomas Jefferson, Samuel Adams, Patrick Henry, Thomas Paine, Benjamin Franklin, John Adams, James Madison and Alexander Hamilton.[38] However, in 1854, social movements started to harness values of abolitionism and free labor. These burgeoning radical traditions in America became epitomized in the early formation of the Republican Party, known as "red republicanism."[39] The efforts were primarily led by political leaders such as Alvan E. Bovay, Thaddeus Stevens, and Abraham Lincoln.[40]

The British Empire and the Commonwealth of Nations

In some countries of the British Empire, later the Commonwealth of Nations, republicanism has taken a variety of forms.

In Barbados, the government gave the promise of a referendum on becoming a republic in August 2008, but it was postponed due to the change of government in the 2008 election.

In South Africa, republicanism in the 1960s was identified with the supporters of apartheid, who resented British interference in their treatment of the country's black population.

## Australia

### Main article: Republicanism in Australia

In Australia, the debate between republicans and monarchists is still active, and republicanism draws support from across the political spectrum. Former Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull was a leading proponent of an Australian republic prior to joining the centre-right Liberal Party, and led the pro-republic campaign during the failed 1999 Australian republic referendum. After becoming Prime Minister in 2015, he confirmed he still supports a republic, but stated that the issue should wait until after the reign of Queen Elizabeth II.[41] The centre-left Labor Party officially supports the abolition of the monarchy and another referendum on the issue.

## Barbados

**Main article: Republicanism in Barbados**

On 22 March 2015, Prime Minister Freundel Stuart announced that Barbados will move towards a republican form of government "in the very near future".

Canada

Main articles: Republicanism in Canada and Debate on the monarchy in Canada

Jamaica

Main article: Republicanism in Jamaica

Andrew Holness, the current Prime Minister of Jamaica, has announced that his government intends to begin the process of transitioning to a republic.

New Zealand

Main article: Republicanism in New Zealand

In New Zealand, there is also a republican movement.

The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Main article: Republicanism in the United Kingdom

Republican groups are also active in the United Kingdom. The major organisation campaigning for a republic in the United Kingdom is 'Republic'.

## The Netherlands

**Main article: Republicanism in the Netherlands**

The Netherlands have known two republican periods: the Dutch Republic (1581–1795) that gained independence from the Spanish Empire during the Eighty Years' War, followed by the Batavian Republic (1795–1806) that after conquest by the French First Republic had been established as a Sister Republic. After Napoleon crowned himself Emperor of the French, he made his brother Louis Bonaparte King of Holland (1806–1810), then annexed the Netherlands into the French First Empire (1810–1813) until he was defeated at the Battle of Leipzig.

Thereafter the Sovereign Principality of the United Netherlands (1813–1815) was established, granting the Orange-Nassau family, who during the Dutch Republic had only been stadtholders, a princely title over the Netherlands, and soon William Frederick even crowned himself King of the Netherlands. His rather autocratic tendencies in spite of the principles of constitutional monarchy met increasing resistance from Parliament and the population, which eventually limited the monarchy's power and democratised the government, most notably through the Constitutional Reform of 1848. Since the late 19th century, republicanism has had various degrees of support in society, which the royal house generally dealt with by gradually letting go of its formal influence in politics and taking on a more ceremonial and symbolic role. Nowadays, popularity of the monarchy is high, but there is a significant republican minority that strives to abolish the monarchy altogether.

## Norway

**Main article: Republicanism in Norway**

In the period around and after the dissolution of the union between Norway and Sweden in 1905, an opposition to the monarchy grew in Norway, and republican movements and thoughts continues to exist to this day.[42]

## Sweden

**Main article: Republicanism in Sweden**

In Sweden, a major promoter of republicanism is the Swedish Republican Association, which advocates for a democratic ending to the Monarchy of Sweden.[43]

## Spain

**Main article: Republicanism in Spain**

There is a renewed interest in republicanism in Spain after two earlier attempts: the First Spanish Republic (1873–1874) and the Second Spanish Republic (1931–1939). Movements such as Ciudadanos Por la República [es], Citizens for the Republic in Spanish, have emerged, and parties like United Left (Spain) and the Republican Left of Catalonia

increasingly refer to republicanism. In a survey conducted in 2007 reported that 69% of the population prefer the monarchy to continue, compared with 22% opting for a Republic.[44] In a 2008 survey, 58% of Spanish citizens were indifferent, 16% favored a republic, 16% were monarchists, and 7% claimed they were Juancarlistas (supporters of continued monarchy under King Juan Carlos I, without a common position for the fate of the monarchy after his death).[45] In the last years republicanism has been rising, especially among the young people.[46]

**Neo-republicanism**

Neorepublicanism is the effort by current scholars to draw on a classical republican tradition in the development of an attractive public philosophy intended for contemporary purposes.[47] With traditional socialism virtually defunct[citation needed], it emerges as an alternative postsocialist critique of market society from the left.[48]

Prominent theorists in this movement are Philip Pettit and Cass Sunstein, who have each written several works defining republicanism and how it differs from liberalism. Michael Sandel, a late convert to republicanism from communitarianism, advocates replacing or supplementing liberalism with republicanism, as outlined in his Democracy's Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy.

Contemporary work from a neorepublican include jurist K. Sabeel Rahman's book Democracy Against Domination, which seeks to create a neorepublican framework for economic regulation grounded in the thought of Louis Brandeis and John Dewey and popular control, in contrast to both New Deal-style managerialism and neoliberal deregulation.[49][50] Philosopher Elizabeth Anderson's Private Government traces the history of republican critiques of private power, arguing that the classical free market policies of the 18th and 19th centuries intended to help workers only lead to their domination by employers.[51][52] In From Slavery to the Cooperative Commonwealth, political scientist Alex Gourevitch examines a strain of late 19th century American republicanism known as labor republicanism that was the producerist labor union The Knights of Labor, and how republican concepts were used in service of workers rights, but also with a strong

critique of the role of that union in supporting the Chinese Exclusion Act.[53][54]

## Democracy

### Thomas Paine

A revolutionary republican hand-written bill from the Stockholm riots during the Revolutions of 1848, reading: "Dethrone Oscar he is not fit to be a king – rather the Republic! Reform! Down with the Royal house – long live Aftonbladet! Death to the king – Republic! Republic! – the people! Brunkeberg this evening." The writer's identity is unknown.

In the late 18th century there was convergence of democracy and republicanism. Republicanism is a system that replaces or accompanies inherited rule. There is an emphasis on liberty, and a rejection of corruption.[55] It strongly influenced the American Revolution and the French Revolution in the 1770s and 1790s, respectively.[21] Republicans, in these two examples, tended to reject inherited elites and aristocracies, but left open two questions: whether a republic, to restrain unchecked majority rule, should have an unelected upper chamber—perhaps with members appointed as meritorious experts—and whether it should have a constitutional monarch.[56]

Though conceptually separate from democracy, republicanism included the key principles of rule by consent of the governed and sovereignty of the people. In effect, republicanism held that kings and aristocracies were not the real rulers, but rather the whole people were. Exactly how the people were to rule was an issue of democracy: republicanism itself did not specify a means.[57] In the United States, the solution was the creation of political parties that reflected the votes of the people and controlled the government (see Republicanism in the United States). Many exponents of republicanism, such as Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Paine, and Thomas Jefferson were strong promoters of representative democracy.[citation needed] Other supporters of republicanism, such as John Adams and Alexander Hamilton, were more distrustful of majority rule and sought a government with more power for elites.[citation needed] There were similar debates in many other democratizing nations.[58]

## Democracy and republic

In contemporary usage, the term democracy refers to a government chosen by the people, whether it is direct or representative.[59] Today the term republic usually refers to representative democracy with an elected head of state, such as a president, who serves for a limited term; in contrast to states with a hereditary monarch as a head of state, even if these states also are representative democracies, with an elected or appointed head of government such as a prime minister.[60]

The Founding Fathers of the United States rarely praised and often criticized democracy, which in their time tended to specifically mean direct democracy and which they equated with mob rule; James Madison argued that what distinguished a democracy from a republic was that the former became weaker as it got larger and suffered more violently from the effects of faction, whereas a republic could get stronger as it got larger and combatted faction by its very structure.[61] What was critical to American values, John Adams insisted, was that the government should be "bound by fixed laws, which the people have a voice in making, and a right to defend."[62]

### Constitutional monarchs and upper chambers

Some countries (such as the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Scandinavian countries, and Japan) turned powerful monarchs into constitutional ones with limited, or eventually merely symbolic, powers. Often the monarchy was abolished along with the aristocratic system, whether or not they were replaced with democratic institutions (such as in France, China, Iran, Russia, Germany, Austria, Hungary, Italy, Greece, Turkey and Egypt). In Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Papua New Guinea, and some other countries the monarch, or its representative, is given supreme executive power, but by convention acts only on the advice of his or her ministers. Many nations had elite upper houses of legislatures, the members of which often had lifetime tenure, but eventually these houses lost much power (as the UK House of Lords), or else became elective and remained powerful.

## 1.4 EMERGENCE OF MONARCHY IN ANCIENT INDIA

The state, according to the ancientIndian view, has seven constituents,1 These, in Kautilya's word, are the Saptamga or the "seven limbs" ofthe state. The seven constituents are Svamin or the Sovereign, Amatya or the Ministers or the Officials, Janapada (Rashtra) or the Territory, Durga or the Forts, Kosa or the Treasury, Danda (Bala) or the Army and Mitra (Suhrit) or the Allies. The first component of the Rajya or State, the Svamin, denotes the lord or the Sovereign. This Svamin may be Sovereign One or Sovereign Number. The Sovereign One is the king and represents the normal type ofSvamin according to Kautilya. The state is compared to a physical organism and its different elements to the various parts of a physical body and the king is. considered as the head. This makes the king the most important of the seven elements of sovereignty and the remaining elements are. considered as subordinate to him. • The king being themainpiVotofthe administration, the strength and durability of the government very much depended on his personality. As the king was the apex of the administrative structure much was expected of him.. To shoulder such responsibilities the king had to possess qualities of a high order. Kautilya, in one place, quotes the opinion of an. early teacher regarding the relative „ importance of the three 'powers' (Saktis) of the king. The three 'powers' are the power of good counsel (mantrasaktl), the majesty ofthe king himself (prabhusakti) and the power of energy (utsahasakti). This obviously implies that the state is ruled by the human qualities of. knowledge, physical might and energy. In specifying the necessary royal virtues of the king, Kautilya seems to have elaborated the three 'powers' already mentioned. Kautilya divides the essential qualities of a Svamin into four classes.3 The first comprises attributes which are of an inviting nature (abhigamika gunah) that is, those which induce the people to approach him and follow his lead. These are the qualities pertaining to noble birth— luck, intelligence, heroism, piety, sincerity, taking counsel with the aged, gratefulness, magnanimity, virtuousness, truthfulness, having ah assembly of ministers of no mean quality, discipline etc. The second class contains those which relate to his understanding (prajna gunah) or the qualities of intellect such as inquiry,

hearing, perception, deliberation, inference, curiosity, attention, assimilation,memory, discernment, discretion and passion for truth. The third class relates to his energy or enthusiasm (utsahagunah). These are the qualities ofcourage, pride, promptitude, probity and skill. The fourth class includes qualities which constitute self-possession (atmasampad) and these are prudence, strong memory, vigorous intelligence, keen mind, energetic, powerful, trained in all kinds of arts, free from vice, possessed of dignity, self-control, impartial justice, , far-sightedness, expertness to discover weak points of the adversary, control of emotions, freedom from passions,.from irritability, greed, arrogance, indolence, inconstancy, impatience and cruelty. By thus regulating his conduct he endears himself to the people at large (lokapriyatva). The king who feels happy in the happiness of his subjects and feels sorrow in their sorrow, gains fame in this world. While specifying the essential qualities of a svamin, Kautilyanowhere implies that the sovereign must be the king. A careful examination of these qualities show that svamin is not a feudatory chieftain, but a veritable, sovereign, owing . allegiance to none. He is the ruler of one whole political organisation. According to the Hindu polity the seven constituents are the natural elements of a state. A whole and entire state cannot be conceived of without these seven components. The king who is the highest unit of the state, is not an omniscierit and self-sufficient despot, for the amatya is declared to be one of his indispensable adjuncts. - Stephen Leacock, the author of the ‘Elements of Political Science', J. K. Bluntschli, the writer of ‘The Theory of the State and Raymond Garfield Gettel, the author of ‘Introduction to Political Science ’, stress on four essential factors of a state namely (1) a Territory, (2) a Population, (3) Unity and (4) Organisation. The fourth requisite of a state, that is, organisation, presupposes the distinction between the governors and the governed, the rulers and the subjects.

Several types of states like republics, oligarchies, diarchies and monarchies were prevailing in ancient India, but eventually monarchy became the order of the day. The principle of monarchical authority was emphasized by all the ancient authors. The definition of Arthasastra was sufficiently wide to apply to monarchies as well as republics but it was

the monarchic state that fixed itself as a standard concept of this science. In this connection it is necessary to mention the different types of monarchy prevalent in ancient India. What are generally supposed to be different types of monarchy are really different grades in monarchy. This is certain that even in the Brahmana period three district grades were recognised in the monarchical rule, namely that of thefeudatory chieftain, the overlord and the universal monarch. There were different forms of monarchy. One is do-rajya which is found in an old Jfaina canonical text. It means, of course, a rule of two kings. Kautilya also refers to it as dvairajya and remarks thatsuch a government perishes through mutual hatred, partiality and rivalry.

**Kingship and the Vedas**

Vedic ideas about the establishment of the office of king ultimately draw upon legends about the coronation of one god as king of all others. Legends abound as to which of the gods won this position; In the Ṛg Veda, Indra, Agni, Soma, Yama, and Varuṇa are all addressed as "King." Indeed, kingship in the Ṛg Veda largely manifests only in the form of gods as kings. Hymns directly addressed to earthly kings, like 10.173-10.175, are the exception rather than the rule. In these hymns, the king is said to have been "established" by Indra and "made victorious" by Soma and Savitṛ. Although this implies a close dependence of the king upon the gods, the rarity of the figure of the human king in the Ṛg Veda agrees with the idea that kings at this time were basically on a level with tribal chiefs and were not viewed as divine. There is a provocative line at 10.124.8 which mentions people electing their king, and 3.4.2 in the Atharvaveda seems to confirm this. Also, several hymns in the Ṛg Veda demonstrate the importance of the samiti (10.166.4, 10.191), the governing assembly, further indicating that the early Vedic king ruled in a tribal setting where decision making by assembly still played a major role.

As was stated above, the king was not considered divine in the early Vedic period. By the time the Brāhmaṇas were composed, however, the king was increasingly associated with the gods through his qualities and

the rituals he performed. Also by this time, kingship had transitioned to a hereditary position and the samiti began to wane in importance.

**Dharma and the King**

Prior to the Vedas, the Aryan tribes that arrived in India "formed a military fraternity" governing the alien, local population. As they became absorbed into the local population, political power within the society began to change from an inter-clan system in which various clans divided up responsibilities into a more Vedic-like system in which one ruler ruled over and provided for his subjects. In this new system first emerged the ideas of brahman and ksatra, or spiritual and temporal power, respectively. In order for the communal dharma to be achieved, the Brahmin had to correctly "instruct the others in their duties" and guide their spiritual practice; the Ksatriya, on the other hand, was invested with the "royal function" of maintaining obedience in accordance with dharma and thus ensuring that the proper practices were being executed. Given that the former decided on correct spiritual action while the later enforced it, an essential cooperation arose between the two in order to ensure the performance of dharma, and this cooperation formed "one of the fundamental elements in smriti's theory of kingship". This coincided with the development of the doctrine of the soul's rebirth and potential release moksha from the cycle of continual rebirths known as samsara, thus devaluing the brazen action and heroism of the "Aryan Way" as exemplified by stories predating the Hindu epics, such as the story of Vidula in which the warrior is emotionally roused to fulfill his duties as a warrior in the face of unpleasant adversity . According to this new philosophy, rulers are to "accept and fulfill [their] duty without ever desiring that which does not have enduring worth," in other words, by not attaching themselves to their actions and thinking of only the end result of their action. Enabling, and if necessary enforcing everyone to behave this way, "leads finally to escape from karma" and thus achieves the spiritual goal of brahma, escape from the cycle of samsara. As mentioned above, the best examples of this kind of detached devotion to duty by a king are seen in the smriti epics of the Bhagavad Gita and the Ramayana.

**Kingship in Dharma Literature**

Royal inscription extolling the conquests of Badami Chalukya King Pulakeshin II dated to 634 CE

By the time of the composition of the Mānava Dharmaśāstra, the divinity of the king had become well established. In Manu 7.4, the king is said to be made out of divine particles of several gods, including Yama, Indra, Varuṇa, and Kubera. This may be seen as closely related to the earlier belief that at his coronation, the king assumed various aspects of the gods. At Manu 7.8, it is stated that even an infant king must never be treated with disrespect, because he is in reality a god on earth. Nārada 18.49-50 echoes this sentiment, saying that the king's divinity is apparent in the force of his decrees: his words are law as soon as he utters them. This is in contrast to earlier Dharmasūtra texts, which seem to stress the king's subordinate status in comparison to Brahmins and make no mention of his divinity.

**King as Protector**

The Dharmasūtras and Dharmaśāstras agree that it is the special duty of the king to protect, to punish, and to preserve dharma for those in his kingdom. However, a new myth of the creation of kingship not found in the Dharmasūtras and differing from those found in previous Vedic literature is seen in the Dharmaśāstras. At Manu 7.2, it is stated that the Self-existent Lord created the king to restore order to the chaotic world which had existed without him. Then the Lord created Punishment (spoken of as a deity), because through punishment the world is subdued (Manu 7.22). By performing his duty as protector and punisher, the king flourishes (Manu 7.107). The weak and helpless (i.e. widows, children, the mentally ill, the destitute) were to receive royal protection. Beyond protecting his subjects against each other, the king, as a kṣatriya, also had a duty to protect his subjects against external threats and wage war with rival kingdoms. Manu 7.87, for instance, states that a king, when challenged, must never back down from a battle; indeed, doing battle is his dharma.

### Varṇa of the King

As was stated above Manu 7.2 specifically states that a kṣatriya who has received vedic initiation is eligible to become a king. Elsewhere, any twice-born person is forbidden to live in a country ruled over by a Śudra (4.61); likewise, Brahmins are forbidden to accept gifts from any king not of proper royal lineage (4.84). Yet commentators like Medhātithi, Kullūka, and Vijñāneśvara essentially overturned such rules about the king's lineage, stating that any person recognized as having power over a territory is to be understood as king, regardless of his varṇa.

### Authority of the King

The basis of the king's authority is a matter of some discrepancy in the Dharma literature. Some authors of dharma texts make it seem as though the king's power lies solely in his adherence to dharma and its preservation. His edicts are powerful only in that they are in accordance with the Law; his legal decisions should be based on what is stated in the śāstras alone, not on his own will and authority. Furthermore, the king really only enforces what his Brahmin advisers declare to be dharma. The Vasiṣṭha Dharmasūtra, for example, is explicit that Brahmins will state what is dharma for the three varṇas, and the king will govern accordingly (1.39-41). In other texts however, or even in passages in the same texts, the authority of the king involves the application of his own reason and will. So, in contrast to Manu 7.28-31, 8.44-45 in the same text states that the king should rely on his own powers of deduction in the administration of justice. Reasoning as a means of reaching a judgment even appears as early as the Gautama Dharmasūtra (11.23-24). But by the time of the Nāradasmṛti, royal decree had been placed above all other sources of law as the most powerful, abrogating all the rest. The power behind royal decrees is thus located increasingly in the king himself, even though he is still urged to preserve dharma.

Indeed, while certain sources do mention that the king kept a cohort of religious advisers to consult in regards to various religious matters, the king remained a power unto himself for the simple fact that he bore the results of his actions and decisions, an idea grounded in the reciprocity shared between the king and his subjects: the king's salvation "depends

on his subjects, for he suffers the consequences of their sins and profits from the merits they acquire". Similarly, his subjects depend on him, for if he "protects them as he should," his people may devote themselves "to their duties".

Moreover, while power was increasingly located within the king, his role was maintained within a set of boundaries and the role he played within society did not extend into previously untouched areas. For example, within the matter of spiritual salvation (i.e. moksa), the king played no direct role at all; it is not his responsibility to "propound any superstitious idea, to lay down any part of righteousness," or to help define "what is or is not religion" nor determine its practice. On the contrary, the king was to act as the enforcer and sometimes intermediary through which the "imperial sacrificial ceremonies" occurred. Indeed, a special "affinity with the gods," most notably Indra, resulting from his role in personally conducting special sacrifice and ensuring others likewise performed the rites is mentioned as a source of the king's authority. Examples of such sacrifices include the Rajasuya ("the king's inauguration sacrifice"), the Asvamedha ("the horse sacrifice"), and the Aindramahabhisheka ("The Great Consecration of Indra").

**Statecraft**

Following in the tradition of the Arthaśāstra, Manu and Yājñavalkya, in defining rājadharma (law of or for the king) go into great detail regarding how the king is to set up his government and manage his kingdom. In Manu, for example, the discussion of how the king should choose his ministers directly follows the description of qualities a king should cultivate. Manu 7.54 advises the king to choose seven or eight counselors who are learned and of noble birth, without specifically defining their vaṛṇa. Out of these, however, one individual should be chosen as a prime minister, and the text specifies that this individual is to be a Brahmin. Yājñavalkya 1.310, on the other hand, advises that all mantrins be Brahmins.

Lower officials (amātyas) should be assigned to duties based on their personal attributes, including honesty, intelligence, and cleverness. Among the tasks to be overseen by the amātyas were collecting taxes,

supervising the royal mines, and collecting tolls for use of public transportation.

Manu follows Kauṭilya in saying that envoys (dūta) should be chosen based on cleverness and the ability to decipher hints and gestures, i.e., to read a rival king's appearance for clues as to his intentions and general disposition. The role of the envoy was vital for both diplomacy and reconnaissance. The importance of the role of the envoy can be seen in Yājñavalkya 13.328, where an involved set of preparations in made for both the dispatching and return of the dūta, including the meeting of the king with all his ministers.

As to the organization of his kingdom, a king, according to Manu, should place constables between ever second, third, and fifth village, and at the hundredth village. Superintendents with jurisdiction over one, ten, twenty, a hundred, and a thousand villages should also be appointed (Viṣṇu 3.9-10 has one, ten, a hundred, and a whole district). Any problems arising in villages are to be reported to progressively higher superintendents; Viṣṇu states that when a solution is not reached by a lower superintendent, the problem must be reported to the next highest superintendent and so on.

**The King and Legal Procedure**

A facsimile of an inscription in Oriya script on a copper plate recording a land grant made by Rāja Purushottam Deb, king of Orissa, in the fifth year of his reign (1483). Land grants made by royal decree were protected by law, with deeds often being recorded on metal plates

According to Nārada, the king is the highest venue of legal procedure. This would indicate that only the most important of cases would be heard directly by the king, i.e. cases for which a decision had not been reachable in local community or guild courts. Manu and Viṣṇu both state that the king may either try cases himself (accompanied, of course, by Brahmin jurists), or he may appoint a Brahmin judge to oversee trials for him. Manu even allows that a non-Brahmin dvija can be appointed as a legal interpreter, but under no circumstances may a Śudra act as one.

Dharma texts uniformly stress that the king be impartial in his judgments. Manu states that a king who is partial and unjust in his inflicting of punishment will himself be punished (7.27), saying at 8.128 that punishing one who does not deserve to be punished condemns the king to hell. Elsewhere, Viṣṇu and Nārada stress that both the king and his judges be unbiased in their hearing of cases.This had religious as well as strictly legal implications; according to Nārada Mātṛkā 1.65, a king who follows proper procedure in hearing lawsuits is ensured fame in this world and heaven in the afterlife.

In the Bṛhaspatismṛti, the king is advised to hear cases in the morning, dressed in his regalia after having performed morning ablutions. This contradicts with Manu 8.2, which states that the king's clothing during his daily hearing of court case should be modest.

Much as an envoy is to decipher the disposition of a rival king through bodily and gestural clues, the king is advised to note a litigant's external clues while hearing cases to discern his disposition. Manu 8.62-72 distinguishes who the king may or may not have questioned as a witness in connection with a trial; a greatly expanded list is given at Nārada 1.159. Upon hearing contradictory testimony from witnesses, the king is advised at Manu 8.73 to rely on what the majority of witnesses say, or else the testimony of witnesses of superior qualities; if discrepancy persists, the testimony of Brahmins is to be relied upon. Nārada 1.142 states that the king should dismiss witnesses whose testimonies continuously contradict each other.

## 1.5 DIFFERENT APPROACHES OF STUDY

### Traditional Approach

The traditional approach is value based and lays emphasis on the inclusion of values to the study of political phenomena. The adherents of this approach believe that the study of political science should not be based on facts alone since facts and values are closely related to each other. Since the days of Plato and Aristotle „the great issues of politics‟ have revolved around normative orientations. Accordingly there are a large number of traditional approaches like legal approach, philosophical

approach, historical approach, institutional approach etc. Philosophical approach to the study of political science could be traced in the writings of ancient philosophers like Plato and Aristotle. Leo Strauss who was one of the ardent supporters of this approach believed that "the philosophy is the quest for wisdom and political philosophy is the attempt truly to know about the nature of political things and the right or good political order." This approach lays stress on ethical and normative study of politics and is idealistic in nature. It deals with the problems of nature and function of state, issues of citizenship, rights and duties etc. Historical approach believes that political phenomena could be understood better with the help of historical factors like age, place, situations etc. Political thinkers like Machiavelli, Sabine and Dunning believe that politics and history are intricately related and the study of politics always should have a historical perspective. Sabine is of the view that Political Science should include all those subjects which have been discussed in the writings of different political thinkers from the time of Plato. Every past is linked with the present and thus the historical analysis provides a chronological order of every political phenomenon. Institutional approach lays stress on the study of political institutions and structures like executive, legislature, judiciary, political aprties, interests groups etc. Among the ancient thinkers Aristotle is an important contributor to this approach while the modern thinkers include James Bryce, Bentley, Walter Bagehot, Harold Laski, etc. Legal approach regards state as the creator and enforcer of law and deals with legal institutions, and processes. Its advocates include Cicero, Jean Bodin, Thomas Hobbes, Jeremy Bentham, John Austin, Dicey and Sir Henry Maine. Based on the definition of traditional approach to political issues, the following features of traditional approach could be deduced1 : Accent on large questions: the issues of larger concern such as how the authority should be organised, what should be the criteria for citizenship, what should be the functions of state etc. are the subject matter of traditional approach and appear with greater degree of regularity. Normative overtone: normative orientation or statement of preferences (value questions) occurs frequently in traditional thinking. The traditional thinkers as such do not make a distinction between political

and ethical questions. Therefore thinkers like Plato have raised questions like what should be the size of state, what should be an ideal state etc.

Philosophical orientation: an important feature of traditional political thought has been its philosophical orientation. In the words of Wasby, "the philosophical approach takes in all aspects of man's political activities and has as its goal a statement of underlying principles concerning those activities". Actual political activities have often been judged against ideals postulated as „state of nature‟, natural law, ideal polity and so on. Plato's Republic and Hobbes Leviathan will always be remembered as treatise which searched for deeper general principles underlying the actual political activities. Legal institutional bias: formal aspects of government such as constitution, the organs of government, the laws of election and so on have been the concern of traditional political thought. The institutional approach has legal orientation as emphasis is placed on laws, rules and regulations that determine the structure and processes of governmental institutions. Thus traditional approach with its entire intrinsic feature has made tremendous contribution to the understanding of political problems. Even now political researchers adhere to traditional approach for understanding issues of government and politics which shows significance of traditional approach.

**Modern Approach**

The modern approach is fact based and lays emphasis on the factual study of political phenomenon to arrive at scientific and definite conclusions. The modern approaches include sociological approach, economic approach, psychological approach, quantitative approach, simulation approach, system approach, behavioural approach, Marxian approach etc.

Normative methods generally refer to the traditional methods of inquiry to the phenomena of politics and are not merely concerned with „what is‟ but „what ought to be‟ issues in politics. Its focus is on the analysis of institution as the basic unit of study. However with the advent of industrialisation and behavioural revolution in the field of political science, emphasis shifted from the study „what ought to‟ to „what is‟. Today political scientists are more interested in analysing how people

behave in matters related to the state and government. A new movement was ushered in by a group of political scientists in America who were not satisfied with the traditional approach to the analysis of government and state as they felt that tremendous exploration had occurred in other social sciences like sociology, psychology anthropology etc. which when applied to the political issues could render new insights. They now collect data relating to actual political happenings. Statistical information coupled with the actual behaviours of men, individually and collectively, may help the political scientists in arriving at definite conclusions and predicting things correctly in political matters5 . The quantitative or statistical method, the systems approach or simulation approach in political science base their inquiry on scientific data and as such are known as modern or empirical method.

**Behavioural Approach**

Until the middle of the 20th century, political science was primarily concerned with qualitative questions which had a philosophical, legalistic and descriptive orientation. The discipline was in fact transformed by the behavioural revolution in the 1950"s which laid stress on scientific and empirical approach to the understanding of political phenomena. The revolution got an impetus with the establishment of the journal Experimental Study of Politics in 1970"s. The central focus of behavioralism is its emphasis on the study of political behaviour which refers to acts, attitudes, preferences and expectations of man in political context6 . In the words of Barrow, "behavoiralism"s main methodological claim was that uniformities in political behaviour could be discovered and expressed as generalizations but such generalizations must be testable by reference to observable political behaviours such as voting, public opinion or decision making ". The main characteristics of behavioural revolution has been summed up as8 and - It rejects political institutions as the basic unit for research and identifies the behaviour of individuals in political situations as the basic unit of analysis - Identifies social sciences as behavioural sciences and emphasises the unity of political science with the other social sciences - Advocates the utilization and development of more precise techniques of observing, classifying and measuring data and urges the use of statistical or quantitative

formulation wherever possible - Defines the construction of systematic, empirical theory as the goal of political sciences. The intellectual foundations of behavioralism have been summed up by David Easton as regularities, verification, technique, quantification, values, systematisation, pure science and integration. Behaviouralism has been criticised on a number of grounds some which may be summed up as - The movement has been criticized for its dependence on techniques and methods ignoring the subject matter. - The advocates of this approach were wrong when they said that human beings behave in similar ways in similar circumstances. - Besides, it is a difficult task to study human behaviour and to get a definite result. - Most of the political phenomena are unquantifiable. Therefore it is always difficult to use scientific method in the study of Political Science. - Moreover, the researcher being a human being is not always value neutral as believed by the behaviouralists. Behaviouralism is not to be looked as a complete dissociation with the traditional thinking. In fact it is a protest against and an extension and enrichment of the traditionalist stance in political science10. The goals of behavioural research have been set as understanding, describing, analysing and if possible predicting political phenomena.

**Post- Behavioural**

David Easton coined the term Post-Behaviouralism in his Presidential Address at the 65th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association in 1969. in fact Easton was one of the key figures of behavioural revolution. Post-behavioralism claimed that despite the fact that behaviouralism claimed to be value free there was tendency in it towards social preservation and status-quo rather than social change. Therefore the new movement led stress on action and relevance. Three key tenets of the post behavioural movement were: - It challenged the view of behaviouralists that research has to be value neutral and stressed that values should not be totally neglected. Unlike natural sciences generalizations can‟t be made in the field of social sciences because study of men in the social context was a complicated affair.

- Post behavoiuralism claimed that behavoiralists stress on observable and measurable phenomena meant that too much emphasis was being

placed on easily studies trivial issue at the expense of more important topics. Easton himself declared that he felt dissatisfied with the research made under the impact of behavoiralist movement as it looked more of Mathematics than Political Science which had lost touch with the reality and the contemporary world. - Post behaviouralism stressed that research should have relevance to the society and that intellectuals have a positive role to play. The new movement believed that the use of scientific tools in political science could be beneficial only when it is able to solve the various problems confronting society. It criticised behavoiuralism for ignoring the realities of society while laying too much emphasis on techniques. However it needs to be stressed that post- behavoiralism was a continuation of the behavioural movement as it recognised the contributions of behaviouralism in the realm of political science. By making use of different techniques and methods postbehaviouralism try to overcome the drawbacks of behaviouralism and make the study of political science more relevant to the society.

**Structural-Functional Approach**

The structural-functional theory postulates that political systems are comprised of various structures that are relatively uniform in the sense that they are found in most political systems throughout the world. The theory asserts that each of these structures has a particular function that supports the establishment of an orderly, stable system of governance within which individuals and other societal structures fulfil roles of their own. Typical political structures include: legislative bodies, courts, bureaucratic organizations, executive bodies, and political parties. (Powell, Dalton, Strom, pg 35). Structural functionalism became popular around 1960 when it became clear that ways of studying U.S. and European politics were not useful in studying newly independent countries, and that a new approach was needed.

election, etc.) does within a political system (of country x)? Almond claimed that certain political functions existed in all political systems. On the input side he listed these functions as: political socialization, political interest articulation, political interest aggregation, and political communication. The output functions included rulemaking, rule implementation, and rule adjudication. Other basic functions of all

political systems included the conversion process, basic pattern maintenance, and various capabilities (distributive, symbolic, etc.)11. Structural functionalists argued that all political systems, including Third World systems, could most fruitfully be studied and compared on the basis of how differing structures performed these functions in the various political systems. The structural functional approach could be better summed up through the given diagram:

Structural functionalists try to do find out the function a given structure (guerrilla movement, political party, Political system in the diagram refers to nation states while environment refers to the interactions between the social, economic and political variables including internal as well external.




Source: http://udel.edu/~jdeiner/strufunc.html

Structural-functionalism has a bias towards status-quo as it is more interested in the maintenance of equilibrium than in change. It favours evolutionary change in place of a revolutionary one.

**Check Your Progress 1**

Note: i) Use the space given below for your answer.

ii) See the end of the unit for tips for your answer.

1. Describe Oligarchy.

……………………………………………………………………

……………………………………………………………………

……………………………………………………………………

Notes

2. How do you understand the Republicanism?

…………………………………………………………………

…………………………………………………………………

…………………………………………………………………

3. What do you know Emergence of Monarchy in Ancient India?

…………………………………………………………………

…………………………………………………………………

…………………………………………………………………

4. How do you understand Different approaches of Study?

…………………………………………………………………

…………………………………………………………………

…………………………………………………………………

## 1.6 LET US SUM UP

In geopolitics, a polity can be manifested in different forms such as a state, an empire, an international organization, a political organization and other identifiable, resource-manipulating organizational structures. A polity like a state does not need to be a sovereign unit. The most preeminent polities today are Westphalian states and nation-states, commonly referred to as nations.

A polity can encapsulates a vast multitude of organizations, many of which form the fundamental apparatus of contemporary states such as their subordinate civil and local government authorities. Polities do not need to be in control of any geographic areas, as not all political entities and governments have controlled the resources of one fixed geographic area. The historical Steppe Empires originating from the Eurasian Steppe are the most prominent example of non-sedentary polities. These polities differ from states because of their lack of a fixed, defined territory. Empires also differ from states in that their territories are not statically defined or permanently fixed and consequently that their body politic was also dynamic and fluid. It is useful then to think of a polity as a political community.

A polity can also be defined either as a faction within a larger (usually state) entity, or at different times as the entity itself. For example, Kurds in Iraqi Kurdistan are parts of their own separate and distinct polity.

Notes

However, they are also members of the sovereign state of Iraq which is itself a polity, albeit one which is much less specific and as a result much less cohesive. Therefore, it is possible for an individual to belong to more than one polity at a time.

Thomas Hobbes was a highly significant figure in the conceptualisation of polities, in particular of states. Hobbes considered notions of the state and the body politic in Leviathan, his most notable work.

In previous centuries, a body politic was also understood to mean "the physical person of the sovereign", i.e. emperor, monarch or dictator in monarchies and despotisms and the electorate in republics. As many polities have become more democratic in the last few centuries the body politic, where sovereignty is bestowed, has grown to a much greater size than simply the ruling elite such as the monarchy. In present times, it may also refer to the representation of a group such as ones drawn along ethnic or gender lines. Cabinets in liberal democracies are chosen to represent the body politic.

## 1.7 KEY WORDS

Oligarchy: Oligarchy is a form of power structure in which power rests with a small number of people. These people may be distinguished by nobility, wealth, education or corporate, religious, political, or military control

Republicanism: Republicanism is a representative form of government organization. It is a political ideology centered on citizenship in a state organized as a republic. Historically, it ranges from the rule of a representative minority or oligarchy to popular sovereignty.

Monarchy: A monarchy is a form of government in which a person, the monarch, is head of state until death or abdication. The legitimation and governing power of the monarch may vary from purely symbolic, to restricted, to fully autocratic, combining executive, legislative and judicial power.

## 1.8 QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

1. Describe Oligarchy.

Notes

2. How do you understand the Republicanism?
3. What do you know Emergence of Monarchy in Ancient India
4. How do you understand Different approaches of Study?

## 1.9 SUGGESTED READINGS AND REFERENCES


- Aslund, Anders (2005), "Comparative Oligarchy: Russia, Ukraine and the United States", CASE Network Studies and Analyses No. 296 (PDF), Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, doi:10.2139/ssrn.1441910
- Gordon, Daniel (2010). "Hiring Law Professors: Breaking the Back of an American Plutocratic Oligarchy". Widener Law Journal. 19: 1–29. SSRN 1412783.
- Hollingsworth, Mark; Lansley, Stewart (12 August 2010). Londongrad: From Russia with Cash: The Inside Story of the Oligarchs. Fourth Estate. ISBN 978-0007356379.
- J. M. Moore, ed. (1986). Aristotle and Xenophon on democracy and oligarchy. University of California Press. ISBN 978-0-520-02909-5.
- Ostwald, M. Oligarchia: The Development of a Constitutional Form in Ancient Greece (Historia Einzelschirften; 144). Stuttgart: Steiner, 2000 (ISBN 3-515-07680-8).
- Ramseyer, J. Mark; Rosenbluth, Frances McCall (28 March 1998). The Politics of Oligarchy: Institutional Choice in Imperial Japan. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0521636490.
- Tabachnick, David; Koivukoski, Toivu (20 January 2012). On Oligarchy: Ancient Lessons for Global Politics. University of Toronto Press. ISBN 978-1442661165.
- Whibley, Leonard (1896). Greek oligarchies, their character and organisations. G. P. Putnam's Sons.
- Winters, Jeffrey A. (2011). Oligarchy. Northwestern University, Illinois: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1107005280.
- Translation by Richard W. Lariviere (1989). The Nāradasmṛti. University of Philadelphia.

- Olivelle, Patrick (2005). Manu's Code of Law: A Critical Edition and Translation of the Mānava-Dharmaśāstra. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-517146-2.
- Olivelle, Patrick (2004). The Law Code of Manu. New York: OUP. ISBN 0-19-280271-2.
- Lingat, Robert (1973). The Classical law of India. New York: Oxford UP Publ.
- Kane, P.V. (1973). History of DharmaŚāstra. Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental research Institute.
- Nath Dutt, Manmatha (2005). Yajnavalkyasmrti: Sanskrit Text, English Translation, Notes, Introduction and Index of Verses. New Delhi: Parimal Publications. ISBN 81-7110-273-5.
- The Institutes of Visnu. Trans. Julius Jolly. Oxford: Claredon Press, 1880. http://www.sacred-texts.com/hin/sbe07/index.htm
- Translation by G. Bühler (1886). Sacred Books of the East: The Laws of Manus (Vol. XXV). Oxford. Available online as The Laws of Manu
- Sharma, Ram Sharan (2005). Aspects of Political Ideas and Institutions in Ancient India. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. ISBN 81-208-0898-3.
- Altekar, A. S. (2002). State and Government in Ancient India. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. ISBN 81-208-1009-0.
- Drekmeier, Charles (1962). Kingship and Community in Early India. Stanford: Standford UP. ISBN 0-8047-0114-8.
- Ghoshal, U.N. (1959). A History of Indian Political Ideas. Bombay: Oxford UP.
- Ghoshal, U.N. (1972). Contributions to the History of the Hindu Revenue System. Kolkata: Saraswat Press.
- Sarkar, K.R. (1978). Public Finance in Ancient India. New Delhi: Abhinav Publications.
- Ferguson, Yale; Mansbach, Richard W. (1996). "Polities: Authority, Identities, and Change". Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press.
- Black's Law Dictionary, 4th ed. (1968). West Publishing Co.
- Uricich v. Kolesar, 54 Ohio App. 309, 7 N.E. 2d 413.
- Hobbes, Thomas (1651). Leviathan. Retrieved 2 January 2019.

## 1.10 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

**Check Your Progress 1**

1. See Section 1.2
2. See Section 1.3
3. See Section 1.4
4. See Section 1.5

# UNIT 2: LEGITIMACY OF POLITICAL POWER: TEXTS AND PRACTICE

**STRUCTURE**

2.0 Objectives

2.1 Introduction

2.2 Descriptive and Normative Concepts of Legitimacy

2.3 The Function of Political Legitimacy

- 2.3.1 Legitimacy and the Justification of Political Authority
- 2.3.2 Justifying Power and Creating Political Authority
- 2.3.3 Political Legitimacy and Political Obligations

2.4 Sources of Political Legitimacy

- 2.4.1 Consent
- 2.4.2 Beneficial Consequences
- 2.4.3 Public Reason and Democratic Approval

2.5 Political Legitimacy and Democracy

- 2.5.1 Democratic Instrumentalism
- 2.5.2 Pure Proceduralist Conceptions of Democratic Legitimacy
- 2.5.3 Mixed Conceptions of Democratic Legitimacy

2.6 Legitimacy and Political Cosmopolitanism

- 2.6.1 Political Nationalism
- 2.6.2 Political Cosmopolitanism

2.7 Let us sum up

2.8 Key Words

2.9 Questions for Review

2.10 Suggested readings and references

2.11 Answers to Check Your Progress

## 2.0 OBJECTIVES

After this unit, we can able to know:

- To know about the Descriptive and Normative Concepts of Legitimacy
- To discuss The Function of Political Legitimacy

- To discuss the Sources of Political Legitimacy
- To describe Political Legitimacy and Democracy
- To know the Legitimacy and Political Cosmopolitanism

## 2.1 INTRODUCTION

Political legitimacy is a virtue of political institutions and of the decisions—about laws, policies, and candidates for political office—made within them. This entry will survey the main answers that have been given to the following questions. First, how should legitimacy be defined? Is it primarily a descriptive or a normative concept? If legitimacy is understood normatively, what does it entail? Some associate legitimacy with the justification of coercive power and with the creation of political authority. Others associate it with the justification, or at least the sanctioning, of existing political authority. Authority stands for a right to rule—a right to issue commands and, possibly, to enforce these commands using coercive power. An additional question is whether legitimate political authority is understood to entail political obligations or not. Most people probably think it does. But some think that the moral obligation to obey political authority can be separated from an account of legitimate authority, or at least that such obligations arise only if further conditions hold.

Next there are questions about the requirements of legitimacy. When are political institutions and the decisions made within them appropriately called legitimate? Some have argued that this question has to be answered primarily on the basis of procedural features that shape these institutions and underlie the decisions made. Others argue that legitimacy depends—exclusively or at least in part—on the substantive values that are realized. A related question is: does political legitimacy demand democracy or not? This question is intensely debated both in the national and the global context. Insofar as democracy is seen as necessary for political legitimacy, when are democratic decisions legitimate? Can that question be answered with reference to procedural features only, or does democratic legitimacy depend both on procedural values and on the quality of the decisions made? Finally, there is the question which political institutions are subject to the legitimacy requirement.

Historically, legitimacy was associated with the state and institutions and decisions within the state. The contemporary literature tends to judge this as too narrow, however. This raises the question how the concept of legitimacy may apply—beyond the nation state and decisions made within it—to the international and global context.

## 2.2 DESCRIPTIVE AND NORMATIVE CONCEPTS OF LEGITIMACY

If legitimacy is interpreted descriptively, it refers to people's beliefs about political authority and, sometimes, political obligations. In his sociology, Max Weber put forward a very influential account of legitimacy that excludes any recourse to normative criteria (Mommsen 1989: 20). According to Weber, that a political regime is legitimate means that its participants have certain beliefs or faith ("Legitimitätsglaube") in regard to it: "the basis of every system of authority, and correspondingly of every kind of willingness to obey, is a belief, a belief by virtue of which persons exercising authority are lent prestige" (Weber 1964: 382). As is well known, Weber distinguishes among three main sources of legitimacy—understood as the acceptance both of authority and of the need to obey its commands. People may have faith in a particular political or social order because it has been there for a long time (tradition), because they have faith in the rulers (charisma), or because they trust its legality—specifically the rationality of the rule of law (Weber 1990 [1918]; 1964). Weber identifies legitimacy as an important explanatory category for social science, because faith in a particular social order produces social regularities that are more stable than those that result from the pursuit of self-interest or from habitual rule-following (Weber 1964: 124).

In contrast to Weber's descriptive concept, the normative concept of political legitimacy refers to some benchmark of acceptability or justification of political power or authority and—possibly—obligation. On one view, held by John Rawls (1993) and Ripstein (2004), for example, legitimacy refers, in the first instance, to the justification of coercive political power. Whether a political body such as a state is legitimate and whether citizens have political obligations towards it

depends, on this view on whether the coercive political power that the state exercises is justified. On a widely held alternative view, legitimacy is linked to the justification of political authority. On this view, political bodies such as states may be effective, or de facto, authorities, without being legitimate. They claim the right to rule and to create obligations to be obeyed, and as long as these claims are met with sufficient acquiescence, they are authoritative. Legitimate authority, on this view, differs from merely effective or de facto authority in that it actually holds the right to rule and creates political obligations (e.g. Raz 1986). On some views, even legitimate authority is not sufficient to create political obligations. The thought is that a political authority (such as a state) may be permitted to issue commands that citizens are not obligated to obey (Dworkin 1986: 191). Based on a view of this sort, some have argued that legitimate political authority only gives rise to political obligations if additional normative conditions are satisfied (e.g. Wellman 1996; Edmundson 1998; Buchanan 2002).

There is sometimes a tendency in the literature to equate the normative concept of legitimacy with justice. Some explicitly define legitimacy as a criterion of minimal justice (e.g. Hampton 1998; Buchanan 2002). Unfortunately, there is sometimes also a tendency to blur the distinction between the two concepts, and a lot of confusion arises from that. Someone might claim, for example, that while political authorities such as states are often unjust, only a just state is morally acceptable and legitimate in this sense. The emerging literature on realist political theory criticizes this tendency to blur the distinction between legitimacy and justice (e.g. Rossi and Sleat 2015), diagnosing it as a sign of misplaced "political moralism" (Williams 2005). Rawls (1993, 1995) clearly distinguishes between the two concepts, of course. In his view, while justice and legitimacy are related—they draw on the same set of political values—they have different domains and legitimacy makes weaker demands than justice (1993: 225; 1995: 175ff.). A state may be legitimate but unjust, but the converse is not possible. Pettit (2012: 130ff) distinguishes more sharply between the two concepts. According to Pettit, a state is just if it imposes a social order that promotes freedom as non-domination for all its citizens. It is legitimate if it imposes a social

order in an appropriate way. A state that fails to impose a social order in an appropriate way, however just the social order may be, is illegitimate. Vice versa, a legitimate state may fail to impose a just social order.

Political realists also lend support to those who have questioned any sharp distinction between descriptive and normative concepts of legitimacy (e.g. Habermas 1979; Beetham 1991; Horton 2012). The objection to a strictly normative concept of legitimacy is that it is of only limited use in understanding actual processes of legitimation. The charge is that philosophers tend to focus too much on the general conditions necessary for the justification of political institutions, but neglect the historical actualization of the justificatory process. In Jürgen Habermas' words (Habermas 1979: 205): "Every general theory of justification remains peculiarly abstract in relation to the historical forms of legitimate domination. … Is there an alternative to this historical injustice of general theories, on the one hand, and the standardlessness of mere historical understanding, on the other?" The objection to a purely descriptive concept such as Weber's is that it neglects people's second order beliefs about legitimacy—their beliefs, not just about the actual legitimacy of a particular political institution, but about the justifiability of this institution, i.e. about what is necessary for legitimacy. According to Beetham, a "power relationship is not legitimate because people believe in its legitimacy, but because it can be justified in terms of their beliefs" (Beetham 1991: 11).

## 2.3 THE FUNCTION OF POLITICAL LEGITIMACY

This section lays out the different ways in which legitimacy, understood normatively, can be seen as relating to political authority, coercion, and political obligations.

### 2.3.1 Legitimacy and the Justification of Political Authority

The normative concept of political legitimacy is often seen as related to the justification of authority. The main function of political legitimacy, on this interpretation, is to explain the difference between merely effective or de facto authority and legitimate authority.

John Locke put forward such an interpretation of legitimacy. Locke's starting-point is a state of nature in which all individuals are equally free to act within the constraints of natural law and no individual is subject to the will of another. As Rawls (2007: 129) characterizes Locke's understanding of the state of nature, it is "a state of equal right, all being kings." Natural law, while manifest in the state of nature, is not sufficiently specific to rule a society and cannot enforce itself when violated, however. The solution to this problem is a social contract that transfers political authority to a civil state that can realize and secure the natural law. According to Locke, and contrary to his predecessor Thomas Hobbes, the social contract thus does not create authority. Political authority is embodied in individuals and pre-exists in the state of nature. The social contract transfers the authority they each enjoy in the state of nature to a particular political body.

While political authority thus pre-exists in the state of nature, legitimacy is a concept that is specific to the civil state. Because the criterion of legitimacy that Locke proposes is historical, however, what counts as legitimate authority remains connected to the state of nature. The legitimacy of political authority in the civil state depends, according to Locke, on whether the transfer of authority has happened in the right way. Whether the transfer has happened in the right way depends on individuals' consent: "no one can be put out of this estate and subjected to the political power of another without his own consent" (Locke 1980: 52). Anyone who has given their express or tacit consent to the social contract is bound to obey a state's laws (Locke 1980: 63). Locke understands the consent criterion to apply not just to the original institutionalization of a political authority—what Rawls (2007: 124) calls "originating consent". It also applies to the ongoing evaluation of the performance of a political regime—Rawls (2007: 124) calls this "joining consent".

Although Locke emphasises consent, consent is not, however, sufficient for legitimate authority because an authority that suspends the natural law is necessarily illegitimate (e.g. Simmons 1976). On some interpretations of Locke (e.g. Pitkin 1965), consent is not even necessary

for legitimate political authority; it is only a marker of illegitimacy. Whether an actual political regime respects the constraints of the natural law is thus at least one factor that determines its legitimacy.

This criterion of legitimacy is negative: it offers an account of when effective authority ceases to be legitimate. When a political authority fails to secure consent or oversteps the boundaries of the natural law, it ceases to be legitimate and, therefore, there is no longer an obligation to obey its commands. For Locke—unlike for Hobbes—political authority can thus not be absolute.

The contemporary literature has developed Locke's ideas in several ways. John Simmons (2001) uses them to argue that we should distinguish between the moral justification of states in general and the political legitimacy of actual states. I will come back to this point in section 3.3. Joseph Raz links legitimacy to the justification of political authority. According to Raz, political authority is just a special case of the more general concept of authority (1986, 1995, 2006). He defines authority in relation to a claim—of a person or an agency—to generate what he calls pre-emptive reasons. Such reasons replace other reasons for action that people might have. For example, if a teacher asks her students to do some homework, she expects her say-so to give the students reason to do the homework.

Authority is effective, on this view, if it gets people to act on the reasons it generates. The difference between effective and legitimate authority, on Raz' view, is that the former merely purports to change the reasons that apply to others, while legitimate authority actually has the capacity to change these reasons. Legitimate authority satisfies what Raz calls the pre-emption thesis: "The fact that an authority requires performance of an action is a reason for its performance which is not to be added to all other relevant reasons when assessing what to do, but should exclude and take the place of some of them" (Raz 1988: 46). (There are limits to what even a legitimate authority can rightfully order others to do, which is why it does not necessarily replace all relevant reasons.)

When is effective or de facto authority legitimate? In other words, what determines whether the pre-emption thesis is satisfied? Raz' answer is captured in two further theses. The "dependence thesis" states that the

justification of political authority dpends on the normative reasons that apply to those under its rule directly, independently of the authority's directives. Building on the dependence thesis, the "normal justification thesis" then states that political authority is justified if it enables those subject to it to better comply with the reasons that apply to them anyway. In full, the normal justification thesis says: "The normal way to establish that a person has authority over another involves showing that the alleged subject is likely to better comply with the reasons which apply to him (other than the alleged authoritative directive) if he accepts the directives of the alleged authority as authoritatively binding and tries to follow them, rather than by trying to follow the reasons which apply to him directly" (Raz 1988: 53). The normal justification thesis explains why those governed by a legitimate authority ought to treat its directives as binding. It thus follows as a corollary of the normal justification thesis that such an authority generates a duty to be obeyed. Raz calls his conception the "service conception" of authority (1988: 56). Note that even though legitimate authority is defined as a special case of effective authority, only the former is appropriately described as a serving its subjects. Illegitimate—but effective—authority does not serve those it aims to govern, although it may purport to do so.

William Edmundson formulates this way of linking authority and legitimacy via a condition he calls the warranty thesis: "If being an X entails claiming to F, then being a legitimate X entails truly claiming to F." (Edmundson 1998: 39). Being an X here stands for "a state", or "an authority". And "to F" stands for "to create a duty to be obeyed", for example. The idea expressed by the warranty thesis is that legitimacy morally justifies an independently existing authority such that the claims of the authority become moral obligations.

## 2.3.2 Justifying Power and Creating Political Authority

Those who link political legitimacy to the problem of justifying authority tend to think of political coercion as only a means that legitimate states may use to secure their authority. As Leslie Green puts it: "Coercion threats provide secondary, reinforcing motivation when the political order fails in its primary normative technique of authoritative guidance"

(Green 1988: 75). According to a second important interpretation, by contrast, the main function of legitimacy is precisely to justify coercive power. (For an excellent discussion of the two interpretations of legitimacy and a defense of the coercion-based interpretation, see Ripstein 2004; see also Hampton 1998.) On coercion-based interpretations, the main problem that a conception of legitimacy aims to solve is how to distinguish the rightful use of political power from mere coercion. One way to capture the thought is that, on these views, legitimacy relates to the way in which the rightful use of political power creates or constitutes political authority. Again, there are different ways in which this idea might be understood.

In Hobbes' influential account, political authority is created by the social contract. In the state of nature, everyone's self-preservation is under threat and this makes it rational for all, Hobbes argues, to consent to a covenant that authorizes a sovereign who can guarantee their protection and to transfer their rights to this sovereign—an individual or a group of individuals. When there is no such sovereign, one may be created by a covenant—Hobbes calls this "sovereignty by institution". But political authority may also be established by the promise of all to obey a threatening power ("sovereignty by acquisition"; see Leviathan, chapter 17). Both manners of creating a sovereign are equally legitimate. And political authority will be legitimate as long as the sovereign ensures the protection of the citizens, as Hobbes believes that the natural right to self-preservation cannot be relinquished (Leviathan, chapter 21). Beyond that, however, there can be no further questions about the legitimacy of the sovereign. In particular, there is no distinction between effective authority and legitimate authority in Hobbes' thought. It might even be argued that Hobbes fails to distinguish between legitimate authority and the mere exercise of power (Korsgaard 1997: 29; see chapter 30 of Leviathan, however, for an account of the quality of the sovereign's rule).

Another way in which the relation between legitimacy and the creation of authority may be understood is that the attempt to rule without legitimacy is an attempt to exercise coercive power—not authority. Such a view can be found in Jean-Jacques Rousseau's work. Legitimacy, for

Rousseau, justifies the state's exercise of coercive power and creates an obligation to obey. Rousseau contrasts a legitimate social order with a system of rules that is merely the expression of power. Coercive power is primarily a feature of the civil state. While there are some forms of coercive power even in the state of nature—for example the power of parents over their children—Rousseau assumes that harmful coercive power arises primarily in the civil state and that this creates the problem of legitimacy. In the first chapter of the first book of On the Social Contract he remarks that while "[m]an is born free", the civil state he observes makes everyone a slave. Rousseau's main question is under what conditions a civil state, which uses coercive power to back up its laws, can be thought of as freeing citizens from this serfdom. Such a state would be legitimate. As he puts it in the opening sentence of the Social Contract, "I want to inquire whether there can be some legitimate and sure rule of administration in the civil order, taking men as they are and laws as they might be."

Rousseau's account of legitimacy is importantly different from Locke's in that Rousseau does not attach normativity to the process through which a civil state emerges from the state of nature. Legitimate political authority is created by convention, reached within the civil state. Specifically, Rousseau suggests that legitimacy arises from the democratic justification of the laws of the civil state (Social Contract I:6; cf. section 3.3. below).

For Kant, as for Hobbes, political authority is created by the establishment of political institutions in the civil state. It does not pre-exist in individuals in the state of nature. What exists in the pre-civil social state, according to Kant, is the moral authority of each individual qua rational being and a moral obligation to form a civil state. Establishing a civil state is "in itself an end (that each ought to have)" (Kant, Theory and Practice 8:289; see also Perpetual Peace, Appendix I). Kant regards the civil state as a necessary first step toward a moral order (the "ethical commonwealth"). It helps people conform to certain rules by eliminating what today would be called the free-riding problem or the problem of partial compliance. By creating a coercive order of public legal justice, "a great step is taken toward morality (though it is not yet a

moral step), toward being attached to this concept of duty even for its own sake" (Kant, Perpetual Peace 8:376, notes to Appendix I; see also Riley 1982: 129f).

The civil state, according to Kant, establishes the rights necessary to secure equal freedom. Unlike for Locke and his contemporary followers, however, coercive power is not a secondary feature of the civil state, necessary to back up laws. According to Kant, coercion is part of the idea of rights. The thought can be explained as follows. Coercion is defined as a restriction of the freedom to pursue one's own ends. Any right of a person—independently of whether it is respected or has been violated—implies a restriction for others. (cf. Kant, Theory and Practice, Part 2; Ripstein 2004: 8; Flikschuh 2008: 389f). Coercion, in this view, is thus not merely a means for the civil state to enforce rights as defenders of an authority-based concept of legitimacy claim. Instead, according to Kant, it is constitutive of the civil state. This understanding of rights links Kant's conception of legitimacy to the justification of coercion.

Legitimacy, for Kant, depends on a particular interpretation of the social contract. For Kant, the social contract which establishes the civil state is not an actual event. He accepts David Hume's objection to Locke that the civil state is often established in an act of violence (Hume "Of the Original Contract"). Kant invokes the social contract, instead, as the test "of any public law's conformity with right" (Kant Theory and Practice 8:294). The criterion is the following: each law should be such that all individuals could have consented to it. The social contract, according to Kant, is thus a hypothetical thought experiment, meant to capture an idea of public reason. As such, it sets the standard for what counts as legitimate political authority. Because of his particular interpretation of the social contract, Kant is not a social contract theorist in the strict sense. The idea of a contract is nevertheless relevant for his understanding of legitimacy. (On the difference between voluntaristic and rationalistic strands in liberalism, see Waldron 1987.)

Kant, unlike Hobbes, recognizes the difference between legitimate and effective authority. For the head of the civil state is under an obligation to obey public reason and to enact only laws to which all individuals could consent. If he violates this obligation, however, he still holds

authority, even if his authority ceases to be legitimate. This view is best explained in relation to Kant's often criticized position on the right to revolution. Kant famously denied that there is a right to revolution (Kant, Perpetual Peace, Appendix II; for a recent discussion, see Flikschuh 2008). Kant stresses that while "a people"—as united in the civil state—is sovereign, its individual members are under the obligation to obey the head of the state thus established. This obligation is such that it is incompatible with a right to revolution. Kant offers a transcendental argument for his position (Kant Perpetual Peace, Appendix II; Arendt 1992). A right to revolution would be in contradiction with the idea that individuals are bound by public law, but without the idea of citizens being bound by public law, there cannot be a civil state—only anarchy. As mentioned earlier, however, there is a duty to establish a civil state. Kant's position implies that the obligation of individuals to obey a head of state is not conditioned upon the ruler's performance. In particular, the obligation to obey does not cease when the laws are unjust.

Kant's position on the right to revolution may suggest that he regards political authority as similarly absolute as Hobbes. But Kant stresses that the head of state is bound by the commands of public reason. This is manifest in his insistence on freedom of the pen: "a citizen must have, with the approval of the ruler himself, the authorization to make known publicly his opinions about what it is in the ruler's arrangements that seems to him to be a wrong against the commonwealth" (Kant Theory and Practice 8:304). While there is no right to revolution, political authority is only legitimate if the head of state respects the social contract. But political obligations arise even from illegitimate authority. If the head of state acts in violation of the social contract and hence of public reason, for example by restricting citizens' freedom of political criticism, citizens are still obligated to obey.

In 2004, Ripstein argued that much of the contemporary literature on political legitimacy has been dominated by a focus on the justification of authority, rather than coercive political power (Ripstein 2004). In the literature since then, it looks as if the tables are turning, especially if one considers the debates on international and global legitimacy (section 5). But prominent earlier coercion-based accounts include those by Nagel

(1987) and by contemporary Kantians such as Rawls and Habermas (to be discussed in sections 3.3. and 4.3., respectively).

Let me briefly mention other important coercion-based interpretations. Jean Hampton (1998; drawing on Anscombe 1981) offers an elegant contemporary explication of Hobbes' view. According to her, political authority "is invented by a group of people who perceive that this kind of special authority as necessary for the collective solution of certain problems of interaction in their territory and whose process of state creation essentially involves designing the content and structure of that authority so that it meets what they take to be their needs" (Hampton 1998: 77). Her theory links the authority of the state to its ability to enforce a solution to coordination and cooperation problems. Coercion is the necessary feature that enables the state to provide an effective solution to these problems, and the entitlement to use coercion is what constitutes the authority of the state. The entitlement to use coercion distinguishes such minimally legitimate political authority from a mere use of power. Hampton draws a further distinction between minimal legitimacy and what she calls full moral legitimacy, which obtains when political authority is just.

Buchanan (2002) also argues that legitimacy is concerned with the justification of coercive power. Buchanan points out that this makes legitimacy a more fundamental normative concept than authority. Like Hampton, he advocates a moralized interpretation of legitimacy. According to him, "an entity has political legitimacy if and only if it is morally justified in wielding political power" (2002: 689). Political authority, in his approach, obtains if an entity is legitimate in this sense and if some further conditions, relating to political obligation, are met (2002: 691). Stilz (2009) offers a coercion-centered account of state legitimacy that draws on both Kant and Rousseau.

## 2.3.3 Political Legitimacy and Political Obligations

Historically speaking, the dominant view has been that legitimate political authority entails political obligations. Locke, for example, writes: "every man, by consenting with others to make one body politic under one government, puts himself under an obligation to every one of that society to submit to the determination of the majority, and to be

concluded by it; or else this original compact, whereby he with others incorporates into one society, would signify nothing, and be no compact if he be left free and under no other ties than he was in before in the state of nature" (Locke 1990 [1690]: 52f).

While this is still the view many hold, not all do. Some take the question of what constitutes legitimate authority to be distinct from the question of what political obligations people have. Ronald Dworkin (1986: 191) defends a view of this sort. Dworkin (1986) treats political obligations as a fundamental normative concept in its own right. What he calls "associative obligations" arise, not from legitimate political authority, but directly from membership in a political community. (For a critical discussion of this account, see Simmons 2001; Wellman 1996.)

Applbaum (2010) offers a conceptual argument to challenge the view that legitimate political authority entails an obligation to obey. Applbaum grants that legitimate political authority has the capacity to change the normative status of those under its rule, as Raz (1986), for example, has influentially argued, and that this capacity should be interpreted as a moral power in Hohfeld's sense, not as a claim right to rule. But, Applbaum argues, Hohfeldian powers, unlike rights, are not correlated with duties; they are correlated with liabilities. On Applbaum's view, legitimate political authority thus has the capacity to create a liability for those under its rule, but not an obligation. To be liable to legitimate politcal authority means to not be free from the authority's power or control. To be sure, the liability might be to be subject to a duty, but to be liable to be put under a duty to obey should not be confused with being under a duty to obey (see also Perry 2013 on this distinction).

Views that dissociate legitimate authority from political obligation have some appeal to those who aim to counter Robert Paul Wolff's influential anarchist argument. The argument highlights what today is sometimes called the subjection problem (Perry 2013): how can autonomous individuals be under a general—content-independent—obligation to subject their will to the will of someone else? A content-independent obligation to obey the state is an obligation to obey a state's directives as such, independently of their content. Wolff (1970) argues that because

there cannot be such a general obligation to obey the state, states are necessarily illegitimate.

Edmundson (1998) has a first response to the anarchist challenge. He argues that while legitimacy establishes a justification for the state to issue directives, it does not create even a prima facie duty to obey its commands. He claims that the moral duty to obey the commands of legitimate political authority arises only if additional conditions are met.

Simmons (2001) has a different response to Wolff. Simmons draws a distinction between the moral justification of states and the political legitimacy of a particular, historically realized, state and its directives. According to Simmons, the state's justification depends on its moral defensibility. If it can successfully be shown that having a state is morally better than not having a state (Simmons 2001: 125), the state is justified. But moral justification is only necessary, not sufficient, for political legitimacy, according to Simmons. The reason is that our moral obligations are to everyone, including citizens of other states, not to the particular state we live in. A particular state's legitimacy, understood as the capacity to generate and enforce a duty to obey, depends on citizens' actual consent. While there is no general moral duty to obey the particular state we live in, we may have a political obligation to obey if we have given our prior consent to this state. The absence of a general moral duty to obey the state thus does not imply that all states are necessarily illegitimate (Simmons 2001: 137).

## 2.4 SOURCES OF POLITICAL LEGITIMACY

Insofar as legitimacy, understood normatively, defines which political institutions and which decisions made within them are acceptable, and, in some cases, what kind of obligations people who are governed by these institutions incur, there is the question what grounds this normativity. This section briefly reviews different accounts that have been given of the sources of legitimacy.

### 2.4.1 Consent

While there is a strong voluntarist line of thought in Christian political philosophy, it was in the 17th century that consent came to be seen as the

main source of political legitimacy. The works of Hugo Grotius, Hobbes, and Samuel Pufendorf tend to be seen as the main turning point that eventually led to the replacement of natural law and divine authority theories of legitimacy (see Schneewind 1998; Hampton 1998). The following passage from Grotius' On the Law of War and Peace expresses the modern perspective: "But as there are several Ways of Living, some better than others, and every one may chuse which he pleases of all those Sorts; so a People may chuse what Form of Government they please: Neither is the Right which the Sovereign has over his Subjects to be measured by this or that Form, of which divers Men have different Opinions, but by the Extent of the Will of those who conferred it upon him" (cited by Tuck 1993: 193). It was Locke's version of social contract theory that elevated consent to the main source of the legitimacy of political authority.

Raz helpfully distinguishes among three ways in which the relation between consent and legitimate political authority may be understood (1995: 356): (i) consent of those governed is a necessary condition for the legitimacy of political authority; (ii) consent is not directly a condition for legitimacy, but the conditions for the legitimacy of authority are such that only political authority that enjoys the consent of those governed can meet them; (iii) the conditions of legitimate political authority are such that those governed by that authority are under an obligation to consent.

Locke and his contemporary followers such as Nozick (1974) or Simmons (2001), but also Rousseau and his followers defend a version of (i)—the most typical form that consent theories take. Greene (2016) defends a version of this view she calls the quality consent view. Versions of (ii) appeal to those who reject actual consent as a basis for legitimacy, as they only regard consent given under ideal conditions as binding. Theories of hypothetical consent, such as those articulated by Kant or Rawls, fall into this category. Such theories view political authority as legitimate only if those governed would consent under certain ideal conditions (cf. section 3.3.).

David Estlund (2008: 117ff) defends a version of hypothetical consent theory that matches category (iii). What he calls "normative consent" is a

theory that regards non-consent to authority, under certain conditions as invalid. Authority, in this view, may thus be justified without actual consent. Estlund defines authority as the moral power to require action. Estlund uses normative consent theory as the basis for an account of democratic legitimacy, understood as the permissibility of using coercion to enforce authority. The work that normative consent theory does in Estlund's account is that it contributes to the justification of the authority of the democratic collective over those who disagree with certain democratically approved laws.

Although consent theory has been dominating for a long time, there are many well-known objections to it. As mentioned in section 2.1, Simmons (2001) argues that hypothetical consent theories (and, presumably, normative consent theories, too) conflate moral justification with legitimation. Other objections, especially to Lockean versions, are about as old as consent theory itself. David Hume, in his essay "Of the Original Contract", and many after him object to Locke that consent is not feasible, and that actual states have almost always arisen from acts of violence. The attempt to legitimize political authority via consent is thus, at best, wishful thinking (Wellman 1996). What is worse, it may obscure problematic structures of subordination (Pateman 1988). Hume's own solution was, like Bentham later, to propose to justify political authority with reference to its beneficial consequences.

## 2.4.2 Beneficial Consequences

In the utilitarian view, legitimate political authority should be grounded on the principle of utility. This conception of legitimacy is necessarily a moralized one: the legitimacy of political authority depends on what morality requires. Christian Thomasius, a student of Pufendorf and contemporary of Locke, may be seen as a precursor of the utilitarian approach to political legitimacy, as he rejected voluntarism and endorsed the idea that political legitimacy depends on principles of rational prudence instead (Schneewind 1998: 160; Barnard 2001: 66). Where Thomasius differs from the utilitarians, however, is in his attempt to identify a distinctively political—not moral or legal—source of legitimacy. He developed the idea of "decorum" into a theory of how people should relate to one another in the political context. Decorum is

best described as a principle of "civic mutuality" (Barnard 2001: 65): "You treat others as you would expect them to treat you" (Thomasius, Foundations of the Law of Nature and of Nations, quoted by Barnard 2001: 65). By thus distinguishing legitimacy from legality and justice, Thomasius adopted an approach that was considerably ahead of his time.

Jeremy Bentham rejects the Hobbesian idea that political authority is created by a social contract. According to Bentham, it is the state that creates the possibility of binding contracts. The problem of legitimacy that the state faces is which of its laws are justified. Bentham proposes that legitimacy depends on whether a law contributes to the happiness of the citizens. (For a contemporary take on this utilitarian principle of legitimacy, see Binmore 2000.)

A well-known problem with the view that Bentham articulates is that it justifies restrictions of rights that liberals find unacceptable. John Stuart Mill's answer to this objection consists, on the one hand, in an argument for the compatibility between utilitarianism and the protection of liberty rights and, on the other, in an instrumentalist defense of democratic political authority based on the principle of utility. According to Mill, both individual freedom and the right to participate in politics are necessary for the self-development of individuals (Mill On Liberty and Considerations on Representative Government, see Brink 1992; Ten 1998).

With regard to the defense of liberty rights, Mill argues that the restriction of liberty is illegitimate unless it is permitted by the harm principle, that is, unless the actions suppressed by the restriction harm others (On Liberty, chapter 1; for a critical discussion of the harm principle as the basis of legitimacy, see Wellman 1996; see also Turner 2014). Mill's view of the instrumental value of (deliberative) democracy is expressed in the following passage of the first chapter of On Liberty: "Despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians, provided that the end be their improvement and the means justified by actually effecting that end. Liberty, as a principle, has no application to any state of things anterior to the time when mankind have become capable of being improved by free and equal discussion." Deliberation is important, according to Mill, because of his belief in the

power of ideas—in what Habermas would later call the force of the better argument (Habermas 1990: 158f). Deliberation should keep partisan interests, which could threaten legitimacy by undermining the general happiness, in check: "The representative system ought … not to allow any of the various sectional interests to be so powerful as to be capable of prevailing against truth and justice and the other sectional interests combined. There ought always to be such a balance preserved among personal interests as may render any one of them dependent for its successes, on carrying with it as least a large proportion of those who act on higher motives, and more comprehensive and distant views" (Mill, Collected Works XIX: 447, cited by Ten 1998: 379).

Many are not convinced that such instrumentalist reasoning provides a satisfactory account of political legitimacy. Rawls (1971:175f) and Jeremy Waldron (1987: 143f) object that the utilitarian approach will ultimately only convince those who stand to benefit from the felicific calculus, and that it lacks an argument to convince those who stand to lose.

Fair play theories offer one answer to this problem (see Klosko 2004 and the entry on political obligation). Another answer comes from perfectionist theories. The best example is Raz' service conception of legitimate authority (section 2.1.). Raz tries to show how an account of legitimacy based on beneficial consequences is compatible with everyone having reasons to obey the directives of a legitimate authority. According to Raz (1995: 359), "[g]overnments decide what is best for their subjects and present them with the results as binding conclusions that they are bound to follow." The justification for this view that Raz gives ("the normal justification thesis") is, as explained above, that if the authority is legitimate, its directives are such that they help those governed to better comply with reasons that apply to them. (For criticisms of this approach, see Hershovitz 2003 and 2011, Nussbaum 2011, and Quong 2011).

Wellman's (1996) samaritan account of political legitimacy is also an attempt to overcome the problem that showing that political institutions and the decisions made within them have beneficial consequences is not sufficient for political legitimacy. In his account, a state's legitimacy

depends on it being justified to use coercion to enforce its laws. His suggestion is that the justification of the state can be grounded in the samaritan duty to help others in need. The thought is that "what ultimately legitimizes a state's imposition upon your liberty is not merely the services it provides you, but the benefits it provides others" (Wellman 1996: 213; his emphasis). Wellman argues that because "political society is the only vehicle with which people can escape the perils of the state of nature" (Wellman 1996: 216), people have a samaritan duty to provide to one another the benefits of a state. Associated restrictions of their liberty by the state, Wellman claims, are legitimate.

## 2.4.3 Public Reason and Democratic Approval

An important legacy of consent theory in contemporary thought is manifest in accounts that attribute the source of legitimacy either to an idea of public reason—taking the lead from Kant—or to a theory of democratic participation—taking the lead from Rousseau. Theories of deliberative democracy combine elements of both accounts.

Public reason accounts tend to focus on the problem of justifying political coercion. The solution they propose is that political coercion is justified if it is supported on the basis of reasons that all reasonable persons can share. Interest in public reason accounts started with Rawls' Political Liberalism, but Rawls developed the idea more fully in later works. Rawls' starting-point is the following problem of legitimacy (Rawls 2001: 41): "in the light of what reasons and values … can citizens legitimately exercise … coercive power over one another?" The solution to this problem that Rawls proposes is the following "liberal principle of legitimacy": "political power is legitimate only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution (written or unwritten) the essentials of which all citizens, as reasonable and rational, can endorse in the light of their common human reason" (Rawls 2001: 41).

Rawls idea of public reason, which is at the core of the liberal principle of legitimacy, rests on the method of "political"—as opposed to "metaphysical"—justification that Rawls has developed in response to critics of his theory of justice as fairness (Rawls 1985). This means that

public reason should be "freestanding" in the same way as his theory of justice is. Public reason should involve only political values and be independent of—potentially controversial—comprehensive moral or religious doctrines of the good. This restricts the content of public reason to what is given by the family of what Rawls calls political conceptions of justice (Rawls 2001: 26). Rawls recognizes that because the content of the idea of public reason is restricted, the domain to which it should apply must be restricted too. The question is: in what context is it important that the restriction on reason is observed? Rawls conceives of the domain of public reason as limited to matters of constitutional essentials and basic justice and as applying primarily—but not only—to judges, government officials, and candidates for public office when they decide on matters of constitutional essentials and basic justice.

Simmons (2001) criticizes Rawls' approach for mistakenly blurring the distinction between justifying the state and political legitimacy (see also section 2.3.). A Rawlsian could reply, however, that the problem of legitimacy centrally involves the justification of coercion and that legitimacy should thus be understood as what creates—rather than merely justifies—political authority. The following thought supports this claim. Rawls—in Political Liberalism—explicitly focuses on the democratic context. It is a particular feature of democracy that the right to rule is created by those who are ruled. As Hershovitz puts it in his critique of the Razian approach to political legitimacy, in a democracy there is no sharp division between the "binders" and the "bound" (2003: 210f). The political authority of the democratic assembly is thus entailed by some account of the conditions under which citizens may legitimately exercise coercive power over one another (Peter 2008; Kolodny 2014a,b). But even if Simmons' objection can be refuted in this way, a further problem for public reason accounts is whether they can successfully show that some form of public justification is indeed required for political legitimacy (see Enoch 2015).

Recent public reason accounts have developed Rawls' original idea in different ways (see also the entry on public reason). Those following Rawls more closely will understand public reasons as reasons that attract

a—hypothetical—consensus. On this interpretation, a public reason is a reason that all reasonable persons can be expected to endorse. The target of the consensus is either the political decisions themselves or the procedure through which political decisions are made. On a common reading today, the Rawlsian idea of public reason is understood in terms of a hypothetical consensus on substantive reasons (e.g. Quong 2011). On those conceptions, the use of political coercion is legitimate if it is supported by substantive reasons that all reasonable persons can be expected to endorse. The problem with this interpretation of public reason is that the demand for a consensus on substantive reasons in circumstances of moral and religious pluralism and disagreement is that it either relies on a very restrictive characterization of reasonable persons or ends up with a very limited domain for legitimate political coercion.

Rawls' conception of political legitimacy can also be understood in terms of procedural reasons (Peter 2008). On this interpretation, the domain of public reason is limited to the justification of the process of political decision-making, and need not extend to the substantive (as opposed to the procedural) reasons people might hold to justify a decision. For example, if the hypothetical consensus supports democratic decision-making, then the justification for a decision is that it has been made democratically. Of course, a political decision that is legitimate in virtue of the procedure in which it has been made may not be fully just. But this is just a reflection of the fact that legitimacy is a weaker idea than justice.

An alternative interpretation of the public reason account focuses on convergence, not consensus (Gaus 2011). A political decision is legitimized on the basis of public reason, on this account, if reasonable persons can converge on that decision. They need not agree on the—substantive or procedural—reasons that support a decision. Instead, it is argued, it is sufficient for political legitimacy if all can agree that a particular decision should be made, even if they disagree about the reasons that support this decision. Note that the convergence needs not be actual; it can be hypothetical.

Accounts that emphasize political participation or political influence regard a political decision as legitimate if it has been made in a process that allows for equal participation of all relevant persons. They thus see

political legitimacy as dependent on the participation or influence of all, to paraphrase Bernard Manin's (1987) expression, not on the will of all, as consent theories do, or on a justification all can access, as public reason accounts do. Older accounts of this kind focus on democratic participation (Pateman 1970). Newer accounts include deliberative democracy accounts (Manin 1987) and Philipp Pettit's equal control view (Pettit 2012).

Rousseau's solution to the problem of how to explain the legitimacy of political decisions has influenced many contemporary democratic theorists (section 4.3.). One of the important departures from Locke's version of social contract theory that Rousseau proposes is that tacit consent is not sufficient for political legitimacy. Without citizens' active participation in the justification of a state's laws, Rousseau maintains, there is no legitimacy. According to Rousseau, one's will cannot be represented, as this would distort the general will, which alone is the source of legitimacy: "The engagements that bind us to the social body are obligatory only because they are mutual… the general will, to be truly such, should be general in its object as well as in its essence; … it should come from all to apply to all; and … it loses its natural rectitude when it is directed towards any individual, determinate object" (Rousseau, Social Contract, II:4; see also ibid. I:3 and Rawls 2007: 231f).

Rousseau distinguishes among a citizen's private will, which reflects personal interests, a citizen's general will, which reflects an interpretation of the common good, and the general will, which truly reflects the common good. A democratic decision is always about the common good. In democratic decision-making, citizens thus compare their interpretations of the general will. If properly conducted, it reveals the general will. This is the legitimate decision.

Active participation by all may not generate a consensus. So why would those who oppose a particular decision be bound by that decision? Rousseau's answer to this question is the following. On Rousseau's view, citizens can—and will want to—learn from democratic decisions. Since the democratic decision, if conducted properly, correctly reveals the general will, those who voted against a particular proposal will

recognize that they were wrong and will adjust their beliefs about what the general will is. In this ingenious way, individuals are only bound by their own will, but everyone is bound by a democratic decision.

## 2.5 POLITICAL LEGITIMACY AND DEMOCRACY

This section takes a closer look at the relationship between democracy and political legitimacy. In contemporary political philosophy, many, but by no means all, hold that democracy is necessary for political legitimacy. Democratic instrumentalism is the view that democratic decision-making procedures are at best a means for reaching just outcomes, and whether or not legitimacy requires democracy depends on the outcomes that democratic decision-making brings about. Thomas Christiano (2004) helpfully distinguishes between monistic conceptions of political legitimacy and non-monistic ones. Democratic instrumentalism is a monistic view. It reduces the normativity of political legitimacy to a single dimension: only the quality of the outcomes a particular political regime generates is relevant for political legitimacy. The contrasting position in contemporary political philosophy is that democratic forms of political organization are necessary for political legitimacy, independently of their instrumental value (Buchanan 2002). What conceptions of democratic legitimacy, as I use the term here, have in common is that they demand that political institutions respect democratic values. Some such proceduralist conceptions of democratic legitimacy are also monistic. What is commonly called pure proceduralism is an example of a monistic view. According to pure proceduralism only procedural features of decision-making are relevant for democratic legitimacy. Many contributors are drawn to non-monistic conceptions of democratic legitimacy. Such mixed conceptions of democratic legitimacy combine conditions that refer to the quality of outcomes of democratic decision-making with conditions that apply to procedural features.

### 2.5.1 Democratic Instrumentalism

Democratic instrumentalism is sometimes used to argue against democracy. According to arguments of this kind, some ideal of good outcomes, however defined, forms the standard that determines political legitimacy. If democracy does not contribute to better outcomes than an alternative decision-making procedure, it is not necessary for political legitimacy (Raz 1995; Wall 2007).

Those who defend instrumentalism take it as a premise that there is an ideal outcome that exists independently of the democratic process, and in terms of which the value of the democratic process, its legitimacy, can be gauged. The instrumentalist accounts of Richard Arneson (2003) and Steven Wall (2007), for example, refer to some ideal egalitarian distribution. In their view, the legitimacy of political institutions and the decisions made within them depends on how closely they approximate the ideal egalitarian distribution. If sacrificing political equality allows for a better approximation of equality overall, so their argument goes, then this does not undermine legitimacy.

One problem with this view is that to get off the ground, it needs to treat the value of political equality as less important than the value of those other equalities that inform the perfectionist standard. This is implausible to those who take political equality to be one of the most important egalitarian values (e.g. Rawls 1993; Buchanan 2002; Christiano 2008; Kolodny 2014a,b). In addition, democratic instrumentalism is at odds with the view that many democrats hold—that legitimate procedures of democratic decision-making create or constitute political authority.

Instrumentalist defenses of democracy aim to show that democratic decision-making procedures are best able to produce legitimate outcomes. The most famous version of this argument is based on the Condorcet jury theorem (for a recent discussion, see List and Goodin 2001). In its original formulation, the Condorcet jury theorem assumes that there are two alternatives and one of them is the correct outcome, however defined. Take the latter to be the legitimate outcome. The theorem says that if each voter is more likely to be correct than wrong, then a majority of all is also more likely to be correct than wrong. In addition, the probability that a majority will vote for the correct outcome

increases with the size of the body of voters. Since democracy has a greater constituency than any other regime, the theorem gives an argument for why democracy is best able to generate legitimate outcomes. In addition to arguments based on the Condorcet jury theorem, there are other attempts to defend the instrumental epistemic value of democracy. Landemore (2012), for example, offers an argument for the instrumental epistemic value of democracy that rests on the potential of decision-making mechanisms that bring together diverse perspectives to outperform decision-making by less diverse groups, e.g. groups of experts.

## 2.5.2 Pure Proceduralist Conceptions of Democratic Legitimacy

According to pure proceduralist conceptions of democratic legitimacy, democratic decisions are legitimate as long as they are the result of an appropriately constrained process of democratic decision-making. These views place all the normative weight on the value of the democratic procedure.

There are several ways in which pure proceduralism might be understood. On an account of aggregative democracy—which takes the aggregation of individual preferences, for example through voting, to be the key feature of democracy—pure proceduralism implies that democratic decisions are legitimate if the aggregative process is fair. Kenneth O. May's defense of majority rule (May 1952) implies a view of this sort (see also Dahl 1956).

On a deliberative account of democracy, legitimacy depends, at least in part, on the process of public deliberation (Manin 1987, Bohman 1996). Thomas Christiano has a good characterization of what pure proceduralism entails in an account of deliberative democracy: "democratic discussion, deliberation, and decisionmaking under certain conditions are what make the outcomes legitimate for each person. … [W]hatever the results of discussions, deliberation, and decisionmaking …, they are legitimate. The results are made legitimate by being the results of the procedure" (Christiano 1996: 35). The idea is that while democratic deliberation helps sorting through reasons for and against particular candidates or policy proposals, and perhaps even generates

new alternatives, the legitimacy of the outcomes of such a process only depends on the fairness of the decision-making process, not on the quality of the outcomes it produces. The justification for conceptions of democratic legitimacy of this kind is that there is no shared standard for assessing the quality of the outcomes—deep disagreement about reasons for and against proposals will always remain. A fair way to resolve such disagreements is thus the only source of the legitimacy of the outcomes (Waldron 1996; Gaus 1997; Christiano 2008).

Estlund (2008) has raised a challenge against fairness-based versions of democratic proceduralism. He points out that other decision-making procedures—flipping a coin, for example—also satisfy a fairness requirement. An argument from fairness is thus insufficient to establish the superior legitimacy of democratic decision-making. Pure proceduralists can respond to this challenge by pointing to the distinctive fairness of democratic decision-making procedures. Christiano and Kolodny, for example, argue that the legitimacy of democratically made decisions stems from the kind of political equality that democracy, and only democracy, constitutes. According to Christiano (2008), only in a democracy are people publicly treated as equals. According to Kolodny (2014a, b), only a democracy offers the kind of equal opportunity to influence decision-making that avoids subordinating some to the decisions of others.

A different proceduralist reponse to Estlund’s challenge is to point to the procedural epistemic values that the democratic process realizes—on how inclusive it is, for example, or how thoroughly the knowledge claims on which particular proposals rest have been subjected to criticism. The thought is that political legitimacy may be jeopardized not just by unequal access to political, social and economic institutions, but also by unjustified epistemic privilege. What Peter calls pure epistemic proceduralism is a conception of democratic legitimacy according to which political decisions are legitimate if they are the outcome of a deliberative democratic decision-making process that satisfies some conditions of political and epistemic fairness (Peter 2008; on procedural epistemic values, see also Peter 2013).

Yet another response is to focus on the kind of freedom that democracy offers, rather than on egalitarian considerations. Pettit's equal control view, already mentioned in sections 1 and 3.3, rests on this strategy. Pettit republican theory defends democracy as uniquely able to secure the non-domination of the citizens.

## 2.5.3 Mixed Conceptions of Democratic Legitimacy

Rational proceduralist conceptions of democratic legitimacy add conditions that refer to the quality of outcomes to those that apply to the procedural properties of democratic decision-making. While pure proceduralists argue that the inevitable contestedness of standards that define the quality of outcomes makes it impossible to ground legitimacy in them, defenders of mixed conceptions are concerned that a fair process may lead to irrational outcomes—outcomes of unnecessarily and unacceptably low quality. The general thought underlying rational proceduralist conceptions is that the fairness of the democratic decision-making process is not sufficient to establish the legitimacy of its outcomes.

As is the case with pure proceduralist conceptions, mixed conceptions of democratic legitimacy also vary with the underlying account of democracy. A version of rational proceduralism is implicit in Arrow's approach to aggregative democracy (Arrow 1963; see Peter 2008 for a discussion). The problem he poses is: are there methods of democratic decision-making that are based on equal consideration of individual interests and are conducive to rational social choice? As is well known, his impossibility theorem shows a problem with finding such decision-making mechanisms. Arrow's way of posing the problem—which contrasts with May's (1952)—suggests that the possible irrationality of majority rule undermines its legitimacy, even if it respects certain procedural values. His view implies that democratic legitimacy only obtains if the outcomes themselves satisfy certain quality conditions—specifically, he postulated that they should satisfy certain rationality axioms.

The default conception of democratic legitimacy that many deliberative democrats favor is also a mixed conceptions. Habermas' conception of

democratic legitimacy is an example. Drawing on discourse ethics, Habermas (1990; 1996) argues that people's participation in the justificatory processes of deliberative democracy is necessary for political legitimacy. According to him, "the procedures and communicative presuppositions of democratic opinion- and will-formation function as the most important sluices for the discursive rationalization of the decisions of an administration bound by law and statute" (1996: 300). The legitimacy of democratic decisions, then, depends on both procedural values and on the substantive quality of the outcomes that these deliberative decision-making procedures generate. As Habermas puts it: "Deliberative politics acquires its legitimating force from the discursive structure of an opinion- and will-formation that can fulfill its socially integrative function only because citizens expect its results to have a reasonable quality" (Habermas 1996: 304; see also Benhabib 1994; Knight and Johnson 1994; Cohen 1997a,b; Bohman 1997). In his view, only deliberative democratic decision-making can produce a decision everyone has reasons to endorse.

Other deliberative democrats, while still pegging the legitimacy of democratic decisions to features of both the procedure and its outcomes, are more skeptical about the ability of deliberative processes to reach an ideally justified decision (e.g. Gutmann and Thompson 1996). A case in point is Philip Pettit's and Christian List's work on the discursive dilemma (e.g. Pettit 2001, 2003; List and Pettit 2002; List 2006). They show how occurrences of the discursive dilemma may undermine the rationality of the outcome of public deliberation. This problem arises when the evaluation of alternative outcomes is logically connected to a set of independent premises. It is possible that the deliberative constellation is such that a decision made based on the evaluation of the premises will produce the opposite result than a decision based on the evaluation of the outcomes directly. For example: while a majority might hold (P1) that health is the most important good and there might also a be a majority that holds (P2) that affordable health care is a good strategy to secure people's health, it is still possible that a majority will reject a health care reform (C) which would improve people's health. This can happen if participants will only endorse the reform if they endorse both

premises and if only a minority does so—even though there are majorities for each premise individually.

The potential irrationality of deliberative processes (see also Sunstein 2003) is an important motivation for some democratic theorists to take into account epistemic features of democratic decision-making. Many advocates of epistemic democracy favor either an instrumentalist or a mixed conception of legitimacy. As mentioned above, some accounts of epistemic democracy draw on the Condorcet jury theorem. Grofman and Feld (1988) interpret the Condorcet jury theorem as an explanation of Rousseau's theory of how a democratic decision reflects the general will. Such interpretations of epistemic democracy rely on what David Estlund calls "the correctness theory of democratic legitimacy" (Estlund 2008: 99). According to this conception, a version of rational proceduralism, a democratic decision is legitimate if it is correct.

Estlund's own account of epistemic democracy puts forward a different conception of legitimacy. His main objection is that accounts based on the Condorcet jury theorem fail to give a sufficient explanation for why those who disagree with the outcome of the democratic decision-making process ought to treat it as binding and hence demand too much deference from the participants of democratic decision-making. To correct for that, Estlund's alternative conception of democratic legitimacy puts more emphasis on procedures. The conception of legitimacy that he advocates "requires that the procedure can be held, in terms acceptable to all qualified points of view, to be epistemically the best (or close to it) among those that are better than random" (Estlund 2008: 98). He calls this conception "epistemic proceduralism". He sometimes refers to it as a "purely" procedural conception of legitimacy (e.g. Estlund 2008: 108, 116). This is misleading, however, as pure proceduralist conceptions of legitimacy do not depend on procedure-independent standards. In Estlund's epistemic proceduralism, a procedure-independent standard functions as a selection device. His conception of legitimacy is thus better described as a version of what Rawls calls imperfect proceduralism (Rawls 1971: 85). It assumes a procedure-independent standard for correct outcomes and defends a particular democratic procedure in terms of how closely it approximates

these outcomes while allowing that no procedure can guarantee that the right outcome is reached every time. It is a feature of an imperfect proceduralist conception of democratic legitimacy that a particular decision may fail to reach the ideal outcome—here, the correct outcome—yet still be legitimate. To put the point differently, whereas pure proceduralist conceptions of democratic legitimacy are monistic about legitimacy, Estlund's "epistemic proceduralism" is non-monistic, as it both insists that (deliberative) democratic procedures of decision-making are essential for political legitimacy and requires that these procedures approximate, as much as possible, an ideal outcome.

## 2.6 LEGITIMACY AND POLITICAL COSMOPOLITANISM

Political cosmopolitanism is the view that national communities are not the exclusive source of political legitimacy in the global realm. This is a minimal characterization. It is compatible with a system in which nation states and their governments remain the main political agents, as long as there is some attribution of legitimate political authority to international conventions. For even if states and their governments are the main political entities, there is still the question about appropriate relations among national actors. When should nation states recognize another political entity as legitimate? And what are appropriate sanctions against entities that do not meet the legitimacy criteria? Let us call this problem the problem of international legitimacy.

Political cosmopolitanism is also compatible with the much more demanding idea of replacing nation states and national governments—at least in certain policy areas—by global institutions. Examples of relevant policy areas are trade or the environment. The associated global institutions may include both global rules (e.g. the rules of the WTO treaty) and global political agents (e.g. the UN General Assembly). This raises the question of what conditions such global governance institutions have to satisfy in order to qualify as legitimate. Let us call this the problem of global legitimacy.

### 2.6.1 Political Nationalism

The more familiar, contrasting position is political nationalism. It is the view that only the political institutions of nation states pose and can overcome the legitimacy problem and hence be a source of political legitimacy. Political nationalism is usually defended on the grounds that there is something unique either about the coercion deployed by states or about the political authority which states possess which needs justification.

Political nationalism has had much influence on debates on global justice. Some have argued that because moral cosmopolitan commitments trump commitments to (national) legitimacy, a conception of global justice can be detached from concerns with legitimacy (Beitz 1979a,b, 1998; Pogge 2008). Others have argued—again assuming political nationalism—that legitimate authority at the level of the nation state is necessary to pursue moral cosmopolitan goals (Ypi 2008 provides an empirical argument). Yet others have argued against the idea of global justice altogether, on the grounds that political legitimacy ties obligations of justice to nation states (Blake 2001; Nagel 2005). What these approaches to global justice have failed to address is the possibility of sound political cosmopolitan conceptions of political legitimacy. Hassoun (2012) takes this issue as her starting-point. She argues that the coercive power of global governance institutions raises a legitimacy problem of its own and, turning the arguments of Blake (2001) and Nagel (2005) on their heads, that securing the legitimacy of those institutions entails obligations of global justice.

### 2.6.2 Political Cosmopolitanism

There are two main approaches to both international and global legitimacy: the state-centered approach and the people-centered approach. The former takes appropriate relations among states as basic. As Charles Beitz characterizes this approach: “international society is understood as domestic society writ large, with states playing the roles occupied by persons in domestic society. States, not persons, are the subjects of international morality, and the rules that regulate their behavior are supposed to preserve a peaceful order of sovereign states” (1979b: 408; see also Beitz 1998). Locke, Bentham, and Mill, among

others, approached the issue of international legitimacy in this way. Among contemporary thinkers, Michael Walzer (1977, 1980) defends a state-based—or as he calls it—community-based approach. The most important criterion of international legitimacy that he proposes is the criterion of non-interference. (For discussions of Walzer's proposal, see Beitz 1979a, b). Others have put forward conceptions based on state consent. Rawls advocates a conception based on the consent of "well-ordered" (either "liberal" or "decent") peoples (Rawls 1999; for critical discussions, see e.g. Buchanan 2000; Wenar 2002; Cavallero 2003).

The second approach takes features of individuals—their interests or their rights—as basic for legitimacy. At present, the most comprehensive contemporary philosophical treatment of international legitimacy of this kind is probably Allen Buchanan's Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination (2003). As mentioned above (section 2.2.), Buchanan advocates a moralized conception of legitimacy, according to which entities are legitimate if they are morally justified to wield political power. Specifically, political legitimacy requires that a minimal standard of justice is met.

On the basis of this moralized conception of legitimacy, Buchanan argues against the state-based conception and against state consent theories of legitimacy in particular. State consent, Buchanan claims, is neither necessary nor sufficient for legitimacy. It is not sufficient because it is well-known that states tend to be the worst perpetrators in matters of human rights and there is thus need for an independent international standard of minimal justice to obtain legitimacy. It is not necessary, because international law recognizes many obligations as binding even without the consent of acting governments. As long as these obligations are compatible with the minimal standard of justice, they are legitimate even if they have arisen without state consent.

Buchanan also rejects the idea that the source of a legitimacy deficit at the international level is the inequality among states. He does not believe that states need to have equal weight in international institutions. What he regards as the main problem of legitimacy at the international level is, instead, that "a technocratic elite, lacking in democratic accountability to individuals and nonstate groups, is playing an increasingly powerful role

in a system of regional and global governance" (2003: 289). The more efficient remedy for this problem, he argues, is protecting basic human rights and improving democratic accountability.

Buchanan uses his conception of legitimacy to answer the question when a political entity—as formed, for example, by secession or by union—should be recognized as legitimate. He lists three criteria (Buchanan 2003: 266ff). The first is a "minimal internal justice requirement". It specifies how political entities should treat those upon whom it wields political power. Specifically, it requires that basic human rights are protected. This requirement includes a demand for minimal democracy. But not all political entities that satisfy this requirement deserve to be recognized as legitimate. They also need to be formed in the right way. The second criterion is thus a criterion of procedural justice and requires that a political entity has not come about through usurpation ("nonusurpation requirement"). Finally, there is a "minimal external justice requirement". It contains conditions about how political entities should interact with one another.

Näsström (2007) uses the people-centered approach to push against the tendency to associate state legitimacy with the legitimacy of governments. The more fundamental question, she argues, is what makes the constitution of a people legitimate. And it would be a mistake to think that the constitution of a people is a historical issue or an empirical given. What makes the constitution of a people legitimate is a normative question in its own right that must be asked before we can ask about the legitimacy of the government of a people.

The question Näsström articulates, which is also discussed in the literature on the constitution of the demos (Goodin 2007), is important for the debate on the ethics of immigration. What is the scope for legitimate border controls? Do states have a unilateral right to control their borders or do potential immigrants have a right to participate in the determination of immigration policies? Abizadeh (2008) has argued, on the basis of the claim that the constitution of the demos is not a historical given, that a commitment to a democratic theory of domestic political legitimacy implies that one ought to reject the unilateral domestic right to control and close the state's boundaries. His key claim is that state

borders are coercive to potential immigrants. In light of this, and because, in a democracy, the exercise of coercive political power requires some form of democratic justification, he concludes that both citizens and foreigners should have say in the determination of border policies. (See Miller 2008 for a critical discussion of this argument.)

Conceptions of global legitimacy broaden the scope of legitimate authority to global governance institutions. One of the precursors of global legitimacy is Kant. Kant is often read as advocating a conception of international legitimacy based on a loose "league of nations"—especially in Perpetual Peace. But Sharon Byrd and Joachim Hruschka (2008) argue that Kant, especially in The Doctrine of Right, can also be read as favoring, a "state of nation states" as the right approach to global legitimacy. This conception, while stopping short of requiring a single world state, confers more coercive political power to the global level than the league of nations, which essentially leaves untouched the sovereignty of nation states.

The philosophical literature on global legitimacy is very much work in progress. But most proposals favor a multilevel system of governance in which global legitimacy is to be achieved through an appropriate division of labor between nation states and issue-specific global governance institutions (e.g. Caney 2006; Valentini 2012).

Any successful theory of global legitimacy has to cover the following three issues. First, what are global governance institutions and in what ways can and should they be thought of as taking over roles from states or their governments? This is a question about the subject of global legitimacy (Hurrell and MacDonald 2012). Second, what is the legitimacy problem that such governance institutions face? And, third, how can they solve this problem of legitimacy and what are legitimacy criteria that apply to them? How, if at all, do these criteria differ from those that apply at the level of nation states?

In response to the first question, Buchanan and Keohane (2006) argue that global governance institutions such as the WTO or the IMF "are like governments in that they issue rules and publicly attach significant consequences to compliance or failure to comply with them—and claim authority to do so" (Buchanan and Keohane 2006: 406). These

institutions are set up to handle certain issues in similar fashion as national political agencies would. Just like national political institutions, they are coordination devices. Only they are created to solve problems that arise at the global level.

Joshua Cohen and Charles Sabel (2005) have a slightly broader account of global governance institutions—one that is not limited to them being coordination devices, but that emphasizes coercion instead. According to Cohen and Sabel 2005: 765), "[t]o a substantial and growing extent … rulemaking directly affecting the freedom of action of individuals, firms, and nation states (and the making of rules to regulate this rulemaking) is taking place … in global settings created by the world's nations but no longer under their effective control." In their answer to the second question, they relate the legitimacy problem of global governance institutions to the absence of political authority, understood as legitimate exercises of coercive political power, at the global level. To overcome this problem, they argue, new modes of governance must be created, with their own structures of accountability. These structures are necessary to properly deal with the coercive power that these institutions exercise.

Buchanan and Keohane agree that the attempt to rule without legitimacy is an unjustified exercise of power. They also argue that the attempt to rule without legitimacy raises not only a normative problem, but has direct practical consequences, as institutions that appear unjustified will not be effective. The problem of legitimacy that global governance institutions face is that even when there is widespread agreement that global institutions that can take on the role of co-ordination devices are necessary, there will be widespread disagreement about which particular institutions are necessary and what rules they should issue (Buchanan and Keohane 2006: 408ff).

In answer to the third question, Buchanan and Keohane (2006) propose a moralized conception of legitimacy: legitimacy "is the right to rule, understood to mean both that institutional agents are morally justified in making rules and attempting to secure compliance with them and that people subject to those rules have moral, content-independent reasons to follow them and/or to not interfere with others' compliance with them"

(2006: 411). Substantively, they propose that an institution is morally justified in this way if it does not contribute to grave injustices ("minimal moral acceptability"), if there is no obvious alternative that would perform better ("comparative benefit"), and if it respects its own guidelines and procedures ("institutional integrity") (Buchanan and Keohane 2006: 419ff).

An important question for political cosmopolitanism is to what extent international and global legitimacy require democracy—either at the level of national states and governments or at the level of global governance institutions. Many writers on the subject have tended to take a cautiously positive stance on this issue (e.g. Beitz, 1979, 1998; Held 1995, 2002; Buchanan 2003; Buchanan and Keohane 2006). An exception is Rawls in The Law of Peoples, however, who advocates a conception of international legitimacy that demands that peoples and their states are well-ordered, but does not associate well-orderedness with democracy.

There are two worries that tend to underlie the cautious attitude. One is feasibility: it is often argued that democracy at the international level, let alone at the level of global governance institutions, is utopian and cannot be realized. The second worry is of a moral nature: democracy should not be imposed on people and peoples who endorse a different set of values (see Valentini 2014 for a discussion).

In response to the second worry, Christiano (2015) argues that a human right to democracy is compatible with a right to self-determination and that, properly understood, the right to self-determination presupposes the human right to democracy. Christiano's work offers the most comprehensive defense of a human right to democracy at the domestic level (Christiano 2011; 2015). Christiano's instrumental argument aims to show that democracies offer better protection of a range of human rights than non-democracies. His intrinsic argument for a human right to democracy builds on an argument discussed earlier (section 4.2), namely that democracies are uniquely able to realize the value of publicly treating people as equals.

Cohen and Sabel (2005) seek to rescue an ideal of global democracy from more skeptical tendencies in the literature. They respond to these

considerations by advocating a notion of global democracy that emphasizes the deliberative aspect. Granting to skeptics that democratic decision-making mechanisms might be problematic for both feasibility reasons and moral reasons, they argue that some form of deliberation is primarily what is needed to address the legitimacy deficit that global governance institutions face (see also Appiah 2006; List and Koenig-Archibugi 2010).

**Check Your Progress 1**

Note: i) Use the space given below for your answer.

ii) See the end of the unit for tips for your answer.

1. How do you know about the Descriptive and Normative Concepts of Legitimacy?

   …………………………………………………………………

   …………………………………………………………………

   …………………………………………………………………

2. Discuss The Function of Political Legitimacy.

   …………………………………………………………………

   …………………………………………………………………

   …………………………………………………………………

3. Discuss the Sources of Political Legitimacy.

   …………………………………………………………………

   …………………………………………………………………

   …………………………………………………………………

4. Describe Political Legitimacy and Democracy.

   …………………………………………………………………

   …………………………………………………………………

   …………………………………………………………………

5. How do you know the Legitimacy and Political Cosmopolitanism?

   …………………………………………………………………

   …………………………………………………………………

   …………………………………………………………………

# 2.7 LET US SUM UP

In political science, legitimacy is the right and acceptance of an authority, usually a governing law or a régime. Whereas "authority" denotes a specific position in an established government, the term "legitimacy" denotes a system of government—wherein "government" denotes "sphere of influence". An authority viewed as legitimate often has the right and justification to exercise power. Political legitimacy is considered a basic condition for governing, without which a government will suffer legislative deadlock(s) and collapse. In political systems where this is not the case, unpopular régimes survive because they are considered legitimate by a small, influential élite. In Chinese political philosophy, since the historical period of the Zhou Dynasty (1046–256 BC), the political legitimacy of a ruler and government was derived from the Mandate of Heaven, and unjust rulers who lost said mandate therefore lost the right to rule the people.

In moral philosophy, the term "legitimacy" is often positively interpreted as the normative status conferred by a governed people upon their governors' institutions, offices, and actions, based upon the belief that their government's actions are appropriate uses of power by a legally constituted government.

The Enlightenment-era British social philosopher John Locke (1632–1704) said that political legitimacy derives from popular explicit and implicit consent of the governed: "The argument of the [Second] Treatise is that the government is not legitimate unless it is carried on with the consent of the governed." The German political philosopher Dolf Sternberger said that "[l]egitimacy is the foundation of such governmental power as is exercised, both with a consciousness on the government's part that it has a right to govern, and with some recognition by the governed of that right". The American political sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset said that legitimacy also "involves the capacity of a political system to engender and maintain the belief that existing political institutions are the most appropriate and proper ones for the society". The American political scientist Robert A. Dahl explained legitimacy as a reservoir: so long as the water is at a given level, political stability is maintained, if it falls below the required level, political legitimacy is endangered

## 2.8 KEY WORDS

Legitimacy: In political science, legitimacy is the right and acceptance of an authority, usually a governing law or a régime. Whereas "authority" denotes a specific position in an established government, the term "legitimacy" denotes a system of government—wherein "government" denotes "sphere of influence".

## 2.9 QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

1. How do you know about the Descriptive and Normative Concepts of Legitimacy?
2. Discuss The Function of Political Legitimacy
3. Discuss the Sources of Political Legitimacy
4. Describe Political Legitimacy and Democracy
5. How do you know the Legitimacy and Political Cosmopolitanism?

## 2.10 SUGGESTED READINGS AND REFERENCES


- Abizadeh, Arash, 2008. “Democratic Theory and Border Coercion No Right to Unilaterally Control Your Own Borders,” Political Theory, 36(1): 37–65.
- Anscombe, G.E.M., 1981. “One the Source of Authority of the State,” Ethics, Religion, and Politics (Collected Philosophical Papers: Volume 3), Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 130–155.
- Appiah, Anthony, 2007. Cosmopolitanism, London: Penguin.
- Applbaum, Arthur, 2010. “Legitimacy without the Duty to Obey.” Philosophy & Public Affairs, 38(3): 215–239.
- Arendt, Hannah, 1992. Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Arrow, Kenneth, 1963. Social Choice and Individual Values, New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Barnard, Frederick M., 2001. Democratic Legitimacy: Plural Values and Political Power, Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press.

- Beetham, David, 1991. The Legitimation of Power, Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Beitz, Charles, 1979a. Political Theory and International Relations, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- –––, 1979b. "Bounded Morality: Justice and the State in World Politics," International Organization, 33: 405–424.
- –––, 1998. "International Relations, Philosophy of," in Edward Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, London: Routledge.
- Benhabib, Seyla, 1994. "Deliberative Rationality and Models of Democratic Legitimacy," Constellations, 1(1): 25–53.
- Bentham, Jeremy, 1987 [1843]. "Anarchical Fallacies," In Waldron, Jeremy (ed.), Nonsense upon Stilts, London: Taylor and Francis, pp. 46–69.
- Binmore, Ken, 2000. "A Utilitarian Theory of Legitimacy," in Economics, Values, and Organization, Ben-Ner, Avner and Louis G. Putterman (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 101–132.
- Blake, Michael, 2001. "Distributive Justice, State Coercion, and Autonomy," Philosophy and Public Affairs, 30(3): 257–296.
- Bohman, James, 1996. Public Deliberation, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- –––, 1997. "Deliberative Democracy and Effective Social Freedom: Capabilites, Resources, and Opportunities," in Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics, James Bohman and William Rehg (eds.), Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, pp. 321–348.
- Brink, David, 1992. "Mill's Deliberative Utilitarianism," Philosophy and Public Affairs, 21(1): 67–103.
- Buchanan, Allen, 2002. "Political Legitimacy and Democracy," Ethics, 112(4): 689–719.
- –––. 2003. Justice, Legitimacy and Self-Determination, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Buchanan, Allen and Robert O. Keohane, 2006. “The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions,” Ethics and International Affairs, 20(4): 405–437.
- Byrd, B. Sharon and Joachim Hruschka, 2008. “From the State of Nature to the Juridical State of States,” Law and Philosophy, 27: 599–641.
- Caney, Simon, 2006. “Cosmopolitan Justice and Institutional Design: An Egalitarian Liberal Conception of Global Governance,” Social Theory and Practice, 32(4): 725–756.
- Cavallero, Eric, 2003. “Popular Sovereignty and the Law of Peoples,” Legal Theory, 9(3):181–200.
- Christiano, Thomas, 1996. The Rule of the Many, Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- –––, 2004. “The Authority of Democracy,” The Journal of Political Philosophy, 12(3): 266–90.
- –––, 2008. The Constitution of Equality, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- –––, 2011. “An Instrumental Argument for a Human Right to Democracy,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 39(2): 142–176.
- –––, 2015. “Self Determination and the Human Right to Democracy.” In Cruft, Rowan, S. Matthew Liao, and Massimo Renzo (eds.) Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 459–480.
- Cohen, Joshua, 1997a. “Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy,” in Deliberative Democracy, James Bohman and William Rehg (eds.), Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 67–91.
- –––, 1997b. “Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy,” in Deliberative Democracy, James Bohman and William Rehg (eds.), Cambridge: MIT Press, 407–437. Reprinted from Democracy and Difference, Seyla Benhabib (ed.), Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 95–119.
- Cohen, James and Charles Sabel, 2005. “Global Democracy?” New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, 37(4): 763–797.

- Dahl, Robert A., 1956. A Preface to Democratic Theory, Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Dworkin, Ronald, 1986. Law's Empire, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Edmundson, William A., 1998. Three Anarchical Fallacies, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.


## 2.11 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

**Check Your Progress 1**

1. See Section 2.2
2. See Section 2.3
3. See Section 2.4
4. See Section 2.5
5. See Section 2.6

# UNIT 3: RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF SUBJECTS

**STRUCTURE**

3.0 Objectives
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Gandhi's Individualism
3.3 Concept of Autonomy
3.4 Individual and Satyagraha
3.5 Satyagraha and Swaraj
3.6 Rights and Duties
3.7 Rights of Women
3.8 Let us sum up
3.9 Key Words
3.10 Questions for Review
3.11 Suggested readings and references
3.12 Answers to Check Your Progress

## 3.0 OBJECTIVES

After reading this Unit, you would be able to understand

- To know the Gandhi's concept of rights and duties.
- To discuss His concepts of individualism and autonomy.
- To discuss Gandhi's vision of the individual's role in Satyagraha.
- To discuss the Rights and Duties
- To know about the Rights of Women

## 3.1 INTRODUCTION

The discourse on rights is linked with the rise of liberal individualism. The language of rights permeates and dominates all walks of modern political, social and economic life. In defining the proper relationship between the individual and the state, the philosophical defence of rights have assumed unparalleled importance in the modern political discourse exemplified in the philosophies of Rawls and Dworkin, the proponents of rights-based liberalism. The other streams including the

Communitarianism do not emphasise on rights; yet individual theorists like MacIntyre and Walzer accord importance to individual rights. There is a general belief that rights secure liberty by protecting the individual against the state and other persons, even a majority, gives a person the shield against arbitrariness and tyranny. It safeguards the individual's private sphere ensuring that neither the state nor others can interfere without justification. Embedded in the concept of right is the acceptance of ideas of personal autonomy, individuality, liberty and human equality and, any denial or discrimination would have to have sufficient reasons. The concept is quintessentially anti-statist in nature, also the basis of Gandhi's perceptions and philosophy.

## 3.2 GANDHI'S INDIVIDUALISM

Gandhi's suspicion of the modern state apparatus, his denial of the all-powerful state, his description of the state as a soulless machine and the supreme importance that he accords to the individual makes him an individualist par excellence. Iyer considers Gandhi as "one of the most revolutionary of individualists and one of the most individualistic of revolutionaries in world history". Writing in 1924, Gandhi declares that 'the individual is the one supreme consideration' and held on this belief right till the end of his life. He writes: If the individual ceases to count, what is left of society? Individual freedom alone can make a man voluntarily surrender himself completely to the service of society. If it is wrested from him, he becomes an automaton and society is ruined. No society can possibly be built on a denial of individual freedom. It is contrary to the very nature of man. Just as a man will not grow horns or a tail, so will he not exist as a man if he has no mind of his own. In reality even those who do not believe in the liberty of the individual believe in their own. Gandhi also does not lose sight of the fact that the individual is essentially a social being and in this sense his individualism is like that of T.H. Green. He is critical of unbridled individualism and considers it as unsuitable for social progress. Unrestricted individualism is the law of the beast of the jungle. We have learnt to strike the mean between individual freedom and social restraint. Willing submission to social restraint for the sake of the well being of the whole society, enriches both

the individual and the society of which he is a member. Gandhi views society as an aggregate of individuals and that a society is incomplete if it does not cater to individual's self-development. The individual, for him, is not only a social person but also a moral one. Individual initiative enhances human dignity and also provides for a mechanism for resolving conflicts in a non-violent manner. He underlines the importance of common good without denying the pivotal role for the individual. He considers the individual as the bearer of moral authority vested with the moral law and duty (dharma) to judge the state and its laws, by the standards of truth (satya) and non-violence (ahimsa). His faith in the individual as the basis of a modern society is strengthened by his notion of relative truth. Gandhi considers truth and God as inter-dependent and acknowledges the need to go beyond 'God is Truth' to 'Truth is God'. "In 'God is Truth', is, certainly does not mean 'equal to' nor does it mean, 'is truthful'. Truth is not an attribute of God, but He is That. He is nothing if He is not That. Truth in Sanskrit means Is. Therefore Truth is implied in Is. God is nothing else is. Therefore the more truthful we are, the nearer we are to God. We are only to the extent that we are truthful" (Gandhi, 1949, p.29). In view of the concept of relative truth and recognising the need for establishing some standard and that is human needs, Gandhi recommends non-violence (ahimsa) as truth differs from person to person and describes satyagraha as 'soul force'.

## 3.3 CONCEPT OF AUTONOMY

Gandhi's individualism is embedded in his notion of autonomy and is derived from his extensive view of power which he locates in the state, economy and society and in each individual. Within this framework he insists that everyone can and should take charge of his life. Accepting human dignity and worth as intrinsic goods, he is severe in his indictment of colonialism and untouchability and interestingly, sees the seeds of degeneration that undermines and suppresses human dignity within Indian traditions. He emphasises that India got subjugated because of its moribund and repressive practices and stresses on the need for reforming the Indian society and in particular, Hinduism, by highlighting some of its inequities and discriminatory practices towards women, the

lower castes and the untouchables. According to Gandhi, individuals make and remake their lives through their choices and action. The highest duty for Gandhi is to act morally, regardless of the consequences. The moral way to proceed is through non-violence. Since each person knows best about his moral project and the means to realise it in action, each one ought to be free from both domination and violence. Gandhi's autonomous person is also a social person, never apart from the community to which he belongs and therefore he expects everyone to be concerned not only about their self-governance but also the autonomy of others. This, in a nutshell, is the meaning of 'swaraj' or self-rule, a vision of India ruled by Indians with concern for the poorest, the destitute and the most vulnerable. Self-rule not only means end of British colonialism but also an end of other forms of domination such as untouchability and modernisation. 'Swaraj', for Gandhi, is when Indians learn to rule themselves, individually and collectively. It means self-control and self-rule. Like Green, Gandhi seeks to "make life morally meaningful for all people and both viewed the community as held together not by compulsion but by the sense of a common interest or good". The individual has a soul while the state is a soulless machine "which can never be weaned from violence to which it owes its existence". The individual has the moral authority as he consistently pursues satya and ahimsa and hence his description of the individual as possessing a soul while the state is soulless. He accepts the state if it uses minimum of violence but the fear is always that the state may use too much violence against those who differ from it. His concern with the consequences of excessive centralisation of power makes him concede only a minimal role to the state. Decentralisation of power ensures greater chance for the collective pursuit of satya and ahimsa. He admits that state ownership is preferable to private ownership involving the exploitation of the masses, but in general he considers the violence of private ownership as less injurious than the violence of the state. In an enlightened anarchy 'everyone is his own ruler'. In an ideal state, there is no political power because there is no state. As this ideal is not realisable, he prefers a minimal state, like Thoreau, namely that government is best which governs the least. Gandhi limits the ambit of the state and focuses on the

civil society and the role of the individual within it. "I look upon an increase in the power of the state with the greatest fear, because, although while apparently doing good by minimizing exploitation, it does the greatest harm to mankind by destroying individuality, which lies at the root of all progress."

## 3.4 INDIVIDUAL AND SATYAGRAHA

According to Gandhi, as all states violate satya and ahimsa, "every citizen renders himself responsible for every act of his government. And loyalty to a capricious and corrupt state is a sin, disloyalty a virtue. Civil disobedience becomes a sacred duty when the state becomes lawless or, which is the same thing, corrupt, and a citizen who barters with such a state shares its corruption and lawlessness". Satyagraha is the moral right of every individual, a 'birthright that cannot be surrendered without losing self respect'. Gandhi describes satyagrahi as 'real constitutionalist' on the grounds that disobedience to evil laws is a moral duty and in disobeying and accepting punishment, he obeys a higher law. The existence of injustice justifies political resistance and political protest is basically moral. "To put down civil disobedience is to imprison conscience. Civil disobedience can only lead to strength and purity". The state, for Gandhi, has no right to dehumanise or suppress the individual. "It is the inherent right of a subject to refuse or assist a government that will not listen to him". The individual citizen has the responsibility to uphold satya and practise ahimsa which cannot be relinquished or abdicated. Gandhi also accepts that a majority could be wrong and stresses on the fact that an individual, at all times, must have the power to veto over state action. A citizen, as stated by Antigone1 , must have the right to judge the state on the basis of higher law and like Socrates2 must willingly accept the consequences of challenging the laws of the state. This is all the more necessary, according to Gandhi, as modern day states, including representative democracies augment greater power and violence and ignore truth. Like Locke and Jefferson, he believes that loyalty to a constitution and its laws need to be reviewed and affirmed once in every generation. He accepts the Lockean principle that political authority has be judged and questioned, and, if necessary disobeyed.

Satyagraha demonstrates an intricate relationship between means and ends through a philosophy of action. In its approach to conflict, Gandhi does not seek a compromise but a synthesis, as a satyagrahi never yields his position which he regards as truth but he is prepared to accept the opponent's position, if it is true. By sacrificing one's position he does not make any concessions to the opponent but only to a mutually agreeable adjustment. Both parties are satisfied without either feeling triumphant or defeated as both do not compromise in course of the resolution of the conflict. Satyagraha, for Gandhi, is based on a profound respect for law and is resorted to nonviolently and publicly. The Satyagrahi willingly accepts full penalties, including the rigours of jail discipline as resistance is respectful and restrained, undertaken by law-abiding citizens. Gandhi insists that 'disobedience without civility, discipline, discrimination and non violence is certain destruction'. A satyagrahi accepts personal responsibility publicly. He must inform the concerned government official(s) about the time and place of the act, the reason(s) for protest and if possible, the law that would be disobeyed. A satyagrahi cooperates not out of fear of punishment but because cooperation is essential for the common good. Satyagraha is resistance without any acrimony or hatred or injury to the opponent. A satyagrahi also suffers the consequences of resistance. As a person he owes it to himself to suffer, if necessary for his conscience and as a citizen, it is his duty to suffer the consequences of his conscientious disobedience to the laws of the state. A satyagrahi invites suffering upon himself and does not seek mercy. The following rules have to be followed in satyagraha: (1) self-reliance at all times; (2) Initiative in the hands of the satyagrahis; (3) Propagation of the objective, strategy and tactics of the campaign, (4) Reduction of demands to a minimum consistent with Truth, (5) Progressive advancement of the movement through steps and stages- direct action only when all other efforts to achieve an honourable settlement have been exhausted, (6) Examination of weakness within the satyagraha group- no sign of impatience, discouragement or breakdown of non-violent attitude, (7) Persistent search for avenues of cooperation with the adversary on honourable terms by winning over the opponent by helping him. There must be sincerity to achieve an agreement with rather than triumph over

Notes

the adversary (8) Refusal to surrender essentials in negotiation and there must be no compromise on basic principles and (9) Insistence on full agreement on fundamentals before accepting a settlement. Gandhi suggests on the need to follow these steps in a satyagraha: (1) Negotiation and arbitration, (2) preparation of the group for direct action-exercise in self-discipline, (3) agitation – demonstration such as mass meetings, parades, slogan-shouting, (4) issuing of an ultimatum, (5) economic boycott and forms of strike- picketing, dharna, non-violent labour strike and general strike (6) non-cooperation, (7) civil disobedience, (8) usurping of the functions of government and should step 8 fail then resort to the last one, namely establishment of a parallel government by securing greatest possible cooperation from the public. In 1930, Gandhi laid down a code of discipline that satyagrahis would have to adhere to: (1) harbour no anger but suffer the anger of the opponent, refuse to return the assaults of the opponent; (2) do not submit to any order given in anger, even though severe punishment is threatened for disobeying; (3) refrain from insults; (4) protect opponents from insult or attack, even at the risk of life; (5) do not resist arrest nor the attachment of property, unless holding property as a trustee; (6) refuse to surrender any property held in trust at the risk of life; (7) if taken prisoner, behave in any exemplary manner; (8) as a member of a satyagraha unit, obey the order of satyagraha leaders and resign from the unit in the event of serious disagreement and (9) do not expect guarantees for maintenance of the dependants. For Gandhi satyagraha incorporates civil disobedience though it went beyond the pressure tactics associated with strikes and demonstrations to include moral, social and political reform (Dalton, 1982, p.148). Satyagraha, unlike civil disobedience, is resistance without acrimony or hatred or injury to the opponent. ‘Satyagraha’, for him, is both a ‘mode of action and a method of enquiry’ (Bondurant, 1958, v). Satya is derived from the Sanskrit word sat, ‘being’, and means both truth and essence. For Gandhi, it means the continuous search of truth and also a means of resolving conflict by which a person comes to know himself and the process of his evolution. The idea of openness is embodied in satyagraha. Actions based on pre-conceived notions and marked by violence are characterised as duragraha and is similar to the

forms of passive resistance. Passive resistance may be offered side by side with the use of arms. Satyagraha and brute force, being each a negation of the other, can never go together. In passive resistance there is always present an idea of harassing the other party and there is a simultaneous readiness to undergo any hardships entailed upon us by such activity; while in Satyagraha there is not the remotest idea of injuring the opponent. Satyagraha postulates the conquest of the adversary by suffering in one's own person (Gandhi, 1928, p.179). Satyagraha is coined during the movement of Indian resistance in South Africa to the 'Asiatic Law Amendment Ordinance' introduced into the Transvaal Legislative Council in 1906. At first, Gandhi called the movement passive resistance but realised that a new principle had crystallised as the movement unfolded. He then announced through the pages of his new newspaper, Indian Opinion, a prize for the best name to describe the movement. One competitor suggested 'sadagraha' meaning firmness in a good cause. Subsequently it was changed to satyagraha, "a force which is born of Truth and Love or non violence" and gave up the phrase 'passive resistance'3 . Iyer interprets it as following: "Gandhi's analysis of civil disobedience conflated two separate notions –the natural right, the universal obligation of every human being to act according to his conscience in opposition, if necessary, to any external authority or restraint, and secondly, the duty of the citizen to qualify himself by obedience to the laws of the state to exercise on rare occasions his obligation to violate an unjust law or challenge an unjust system, and to accept willingly the consequences of his disobedience as determined by the legal sanctions of the state". Gandhi's perceptions were determined by the British colonial traditions and the faith he had in the "British love of justice and fair play", mainly because of the British constitutional practice of equality before law, not only of the British citizens, but for all. He idolised the British constitution because it guarantees both individual freedom and racial equality. Until the Jallianwala Bagh massacre, he was a loyalist of the Empire and was convinced that helping the Empire would qualify for swarajya, i.e. self-rule. His understanding of the British history and character led him to the use of the technique of Satyagraha. He opined that grievances could be redressed only if people

demonstrate their willingness to suffer to get relief and cited the example of the British Suffragists for Indians in South Africa to emulate.

## 3.5 SATYAGRAHA AND SWARAJ

Satyagraha is inextricably linked with his notion of swaraj or self-rule or self-restraint. Swaraj would be attained through the method of Satyagraha in which the individual through voluntary self-sacrifice and suffering achieves self-control, in other words self-discipline. For Gandhi, swaraj is attained when there is social unity in three major areas of the Indian society: among the untouchables and the various castes, between the Hindus and Muslims and narrowing the gap between the city and villages, the former urban, westernised and educated and the latter rural and illiterate. To be of service for the betterment of the ordinary people, an idea that Gandhi derived from Vivekananda, Tolstoy, 'Sermon on the Mount' and numerous texts and saints of the Indian tradition, is the quintessence of swaraj. Swaraj means "all around awakening-social, educational, moral, economic and political" (Young India, 26-8-1926, II, p.1231). Merely replacing British rulers with their Indian counterparts is Englishstan and not Hindustan, an "English rule without the Englishman, the tiger's nature, but not the tiger" (1997, ch. IV). By Swaraj I mean the government of India by the consent of the people as ascertained by the largest number of adult population, male or female, native born or domiciled, who have contributed by manual labour to the services of the state and who have taken the trouble of having registered their names as voters…. Real Swaraj will come not by the acquisition of authority by a few but by the acquisition of the capacity by all to resist authority when it is abused. In other words, swaraj is to be obtained by educating the masses to a sense of their capacity to regulate and control authority (Gandhi, 1947, p.14). Gandhi makes welfare of the masses, with fulfilment of their basic needs as basis of economic freedom, thus reflecting the inspiration that he derives from Ruskin. The India of My Dreams, as Gandhi envisioned, is the swaraj of the poor person. A truly non-violent state would be composed of self-governing and self-sufficient small cohesive village communities in which the majority would rule with due consideration to the rights of the minorities. It would

be a participatory democracy whereby citizens have the positive freedom to "participate in the process of politics in every possible way, restricting its activities to the bare minimum,… it did not mean that the state was all-powerful, rather an intimate relationship should exist between the state and all its citizens". Satyagraha is the glue that cements on one hand his ideal of enlightened anarchy and common good and on the other hand his ideals of individual autonomy and moral self-determinism. Like Thoreau, Gandhi stresses on the supremacy of the individual conscience against all claims of the state.

Satyagraha (Sanskrit: सत्याग्रह; satya: "truth", āgraha: "insistence" or "holding firmly to"), or holding onto truth, or truth force, is a particular form of nonviolent resistance or civil resistance. It is not the same as passive resistance, and advocates resisting non-violently over using violence. Resisting non-violently is considered the summit of bravery. Someone who practices Satyagraha is a satyagrahi.

The term satyagraha was coined and developed by Mahatma Gandhi (1869–1948). He deployed satyagraha in the Indian independence movement and also during his earlier struggles in South Africa for Indian rights. Satyagraha theory influenced Martin Luther King Jr.'s and James Bevel's campaigns during the Civil Rights Movement in the United States, and many other social justice and similar movements.

**Origin and meaning of name**

The term originated in a competition in the news-sheet Indian Opinion in South Africa in 1906. Mr. Maganlal Gandhi, grandson of an uncle of Mahatma Gandhi, came up with the word "Sadagraha" and won the prize. Subsequently, to make it clearer, Gandhi changed it to Satyagraha. "Satyagraha" is a tatpuruṣa compound of the Sanskrit words satya (meaning "truth") and āgraha ("polite insistence", or "holding firmly to"). Satya is derived from the word "sat", which means "being". Nothing is or exists in reality except Truth. In the context of satyagraha, Truth therefore includes

a) Truth in speech, as opposed to falsehood,

b) what is real, as opposed to nonexistent (asat) and

c) good as opposed to evil, or bad. This was critical to Gandhi's understanding of and faith in nonviolence: "The world rests upon the bedrock of satya or truth. Asatya, meaning untruth, also means nonexistent, and satya or truth also means that which is. If untruth does not so much as exist, its victory is out of the question. And truth being that which is, can never be destroyed. This is the doctrine of satyagraha in a nutshell." For Gandhi, satyagraha went far beyond mere "passive resistance" and became strength in practising non-violent methods. In his words:

Truth (satya) implies love, and firmness (agraha) engenders and therefore serves as a synonym for force. I thus began to call the Indian movement Satyagraha, that is to say, the Force which is born of Truth and Love or non-violence, and gave up the use of the phrase “passive resistance”, in connection with it, so much so that even in English writing we often avoided it and used instead the word “satyagraha” itself or some other equivalent English phrase.

In September 1935, a letter to P. K. Rao, Servants of India Society, Gandhi disputed the proposition that his idea of Civil Disobedience was adapted from the writings of Henry David Thoreau especially Civil Disobedience of 1849.

The statement that I had derived my idea of civil disobedience from the writings of Thoreau is wrong. The resistance to authority in South Africa was well advanced before I got the essay of Thoreau on civil disobedience. But the movement was then known as passive resistance. As it was incomplete, I had coined the word satyagraha for the Gujarati readers. When I saw the title of Thoreau’s great essay, I began the use of his phrase to explain our struggle to the English readers. But I found that even civil disobedience failed to convey the full meaning of the struggle. I therefore adopted the phrase civil resistance. Non-violence was always an integral part of our struggle."

**Gandhi described it as follows:**

Its root meaning is holding on to truth, hence truth-force. I have also called it love-force or soul-force. In the application of satyagraha, I discovered in the earliest stages that pursuit of truth did not admit of

violence being inflicted on one's opponent but that he must be weaned from error by patience and compassion. For what appears to be truth to the one may appear to be error to the other. And patience means self-suffering. So the doctrine came to mean vindication of truth, not by infliction of suffering on the opponent, but on oneself.

**Contrast to "passive resistance"**

Gandhi distinguished between satyagraha and passive resistance in the following letter:

I have drawn the distinction between passive resistance as understood and practised in the West and satyagraha before I had evolved the doctrine of the latter to its full logical and spiritual extent. I often used "passive resistance" and "satyagraha" as synonymous terms: but as the doctrine of satyagraha developed, the expression "passive resistance" ceases even to be synonymous, as passive resistance has admitted of violence as in the case of the suffragettes and has been universally acknowledged to be a weapon of the weak. Moreover, passive resistance does not necessarily involve complete adherence to truth under every circumstance. Therefore it is different from satyagraha in three essentials: Satyagraha is a weapon of the strong; it admits of no violence under any circumstance whatsoever; and it ever insists upon truth.

**Ahimsa and satyagraha**

It is important to note the intrinsic connection between ahimsa and satyagraha. Satyagraha is sometimes used to refer to the whole principle of nonviolence, where it is essentially the same as ahimsa, and sometimes used in a "marked" meaning to refer specifically to direct action that is largely obstructive, for example in the form of civil disobedience.

**Gandhi says:**

It is perhaps clear from the foregoing, that without ahimsa it is not possible to seek and find Truth. Ahimsa and Truth are so intertwined that it is practically impossible to disentangle and separate them. They are like the two sides of a coin, or rather of a smooth unstamped metallic

disk. Nevertheless, ahimsa is the means; Truth is the end. Means to be means must always be within our reach, and so ahimsa is our supreme duty.

Swarāj (Hindi: स्वराज swa- "self", raj "rule") can mean generally self-governance or "self-rule", and was used synonymously with "home-rule" by Maharishi Dayanand Saraswati and later on by Mohandas Gandhi, but the word usually refers to Gandhi's concept for Indian independence from foreign domination. Swaraj lays stress on governance, not by a hierarchical government, but by self governance through individuals and community building. The focus is on political decentralisation. Since this is against the political and social systems followed by Britain, Gandhi's concept of Swaraj advocated India's discarding British political, economic, bureaucratic, legal, military, and educational institutions. S. Satyamurti, Chittaranjan Das and Motilal Nehru were among a contrasting group of Swarajists who laid the foundation for parliamentary democracy in India.

Although Gandhi's aim of totally implementing the concepts of Swaraj in India was not achieved, the voluntary work organisations which he founded for this purpose did serve as precursors and role models for people's movements, voluntary organisations, and some of the non-governmental organisations that were subsequently launched in various parts of India. The student movement against oppressive local and central governments, led by Jayaprakash Narayan, and the Bhoodan movement, which presaged demands for land reform legislation throughout India, and which ultimately led to India's discarding of the Zamindari system of land tenure and social organisation, were also inspired by the ideas of Swaraj.

However, Chatrapati Shivaji Maharaj, Indian Maratha ruler also fought for Swaraj in India as Deccan sultans and Mughal emperor were Firangi, Outsiders etc. His ideas of Swaraj are remembered by many Indians today as well.

**Check Your Progress 1**

Note: i) Use the space given below for your answer.

ii) See the end of the unit for tips for your answer.

1. Explain Gandhi's concept of individual autonomy.

   ………………………………………………………………

   ………………………………………………………………

   ………………………………………………………………

2. What is the role of the Individual in Satyagraha?

   ………………………………………………………………

   ………………………………………………………………

   ………………………………………………………………

3. What is the link between Satyagraha and Swaraj?

   ………………………………………………………………

   ………………………………………………………………

   ………………………………………………………………

## 3.6 RIGHTS AND DUTIES

The crux of Satyagraha, for Gandhi, is in deciphering what one's duty is. Gandhi speaks of rights in the context of duties and that is his distinctiveness; he considers 'real rights as a result of performance of duty' meaning, that all rights to be deserved and preserved as rights is derived from duties which are performed well. Rights cannot be divorced from duties and that rights have to be exercised in the interests of all. The concept of duty, for Gandhi, is derived from the idea of dispassionate action which the Bhagavad Gita advocates. Unless one's action is performed with a degree of detachment one would not be free from the anxiety of its future consequences. He contends "if we are sure of the 'purity' of the means we employ, we shall be led on by the faith, before which any fear and trembling melt away".

Non-attachment does not mean lack of clarity about the ends one desires to achieve. For Gandhi, the important thing is to get the people to do what they ought to do without offering inducements or threats or theological sanctions. Interestingly, Gandhi accepts the core idea of right-based individualism, the dominant paradigm in contemporary political theory, namely human equality and moral worth of every person but rights are coalesced with the idea of duties, assigning individuals with responsibilities to lead a moral life and devote to the good of their community. He also supports the basic rights of those at the margins of

society, namely women, untouchables and the vulnerable, who have been objects of domination and humiliation. According to him, Freedom is not being left alone but the freedom to cultivate love and service which he describes as the best feature of human nature. He champions equal rights for women and the right of everyone to make the choices they desire. He rejects ascriptive properties such as gender, class, birth, caste, education or nationality that can justify unequal treatment and disqualify some as moral agents. For Gandhi any discourse of rights would have to focus on how persons are treated. He pays attention to the role of institutions or the way resources affect choices available for individuals, an aspect which most theorists on autonomy, with the exception of Raz, ignore. Another difference between Gandhi and conventional theories of autonomy is that for Gandhi, individuals are equal members of a harmonious and interdependent cosmos rather than abstracted selves. It is only through an association with others based on mutual respect and cooperation that persons become complete or achieve good. The community ought to be one that is open and tolerant of diverse conceptions of good and that its institutional practices do not hinder the pursuit of their good by ordinary persons. Gandhi considers duties as primary and considers the duty to act morally regardless of the consequences as the highest.

**Fundamental Rights and Duties**

As a citizen of India, we are entitled to certain rights as well as obliged to certain duties. It is our duty as responsible citizens that we abide by these laws and carry out our duties. Similarly, knowledge of our fundamental rights is important so as to prevent injustice. Let us update ourselves about the Fundamental Rights and Duties laid down by the constitution of India.

**Introduction to Fundamental Rights and Duties**

During the period of 1947 to 1949, Constitution of India developed and prescribed the fundamental obligations of the State to its citizens and the duties and the rights of the citizens towards the State under the following sections which constitute the vital elements of the constitution.

- Fundamental Rights
- Directive Principles of State Policy

- Fundamental Duties

CONSTITUTION OF INDIA

WE, THE PEOPLE OF INDIA, ... SOVEREIGN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC ...

JUSTICE, ...

LIBERTY ...

EQUALITY ...

FRATERNITY ...

IN OUR CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY ... HEREBY ADOPT, ENACT AND GIVE TO OURSELVES THIS CONSTITUTION.

**The Constitution of India (Source: Wikipedia)**

These sections consist of a constitutional bill of rights for government policy-making and lay down a foundation for the appropriate the behaviour and conduct of citizens.

### The Fundamental Rights

These are the basic human rights of all citizens, defined in Part III of the Constitution. These are applicable irrespective of race, place of birth, religion, caste, creed, or gender. They are enforceable by the courts, subject to specific restrictions. Following are some of the important rights of the citizens of India in accordance with the Constitution.

- Right to Equality
- Right to freedom
- Right against exploitation
- Right to freedom of religion
- Cultural and Educational Rights
- Right to Constitutional Remedies

### Directive Principles of State Policy

These are included in Part IV of the Constitution. For the framing of certain Laws, the Government requires certain guidelines. These are

Notes

included in the Directive Principles of State Policy. According to Article 37, they are not enforceable by the courts. It just lays down the fundamental principles and guidelines on which they are based are fundamental guidelines for governance that the State need to follow while designing the laws. Emphasis is on the Welfare of State Model.

The establishment of Directive Principles of State Policy is in accordance with certain articles of the Constitution of India. Let us explore more about the importance of these articles.

| Article | Significance |
|---|---|
| 37 | Non-enforceability in court |
| 39A | Securing participation of workers in management of industries |
| 41-43 | Mandate the state to endeavour to secure to all citizens right to work, living wage, security, maternity relief and a decent standard of living |
| 43 | • Promotion of industries<br>• Establishment of Several Boards for the promotion of Khadi and other handlooms |
| 45 | • Free and compulsory education to children between age group of 6-14<br>• After 2002 amendment childhood care age limit was shifted to below 6 years |
| 47 | • Raise the standard of living and improve public health<br>• Prohibition of consumption of intoxicating drinks and drugs injurious to health |
| 48 | • Organize agriculture and animal husbandry on modern and scientific lines |
| 48A | Protection of the environment and safeguard the forests and wildlife of the country |
| 49 | Preservation of monuments and objects of national importance |
| 50 | Separation of judiciary from the executive in public services |
| 51 | • International peace and security<br>• Implementation of Laws giving effect to International Treaties |

**The Fundamental Duties**

These are defined as the moral obligations of all citizens to help promote a spirit of patriotism and to uphold the unity of India and concern the individuals and the nation. Included in Part IVA of the Constitution, like the Directive Principles, they are not enforceable by the law. According to the constitution, following are the duties to be followed by every citizen of India

- To abide by the Constitution and respect its ideals and institutions, the National Flag and the National Anthem.
- To cherish and follow the noble ideals which inspired our national struggle for freedom.
- To uphold and protect the sovereignty, unity, and integrity of India.
- To defend the country and render national service when called upon to do so.
- To promote harmony and the spirit of common brotherhood amongst all the people of India transcending religious, linguistic and regional or sectional diversities; to renounce practices derogatory to the dignity of women.
- To value and preserve the rich heritage of our composite culture.
- To protect and improve the natural environment including forests, lakes, rivers, wildlife and to have compassion for living creatures.
- To develop the scientific temper, humanism and the spirit of inquiry and reform.
- To safeguard public property and to abjure violence.
- To strive towards excellence in all spheres of individual and collective activity, so that the nation constantly rises to higher levels of endeavor and achievement.
- Who is a parent or guardian, to provide opportunities for education to his child, or as the case may be, ward between the age of six to fourteen years.
- According to the 86th constitutional amendment in 2002, it is the duty of the people of India to adapt to make India a safer place to live, to be clean and make the surrounding clean and not to hurt anybody physically and mentally.

The Relationship between the Fundamental Rights, Directive Principles and Fundamental Duties

Directive Principles have been used to uphold the Constitutional validity of legislation in case of conflict with Fundamental Rights. According to the amendment of 1971, any law that even though it deviates from the Fundamental Rights, but has been made to give effect to the Directive Principles in Article 39(b)(c) would not be deemed invalid. The Fundamental Duties will be held obligatory for all citizens subject to the State enforcing the same by means of a valid law.

## 3.7 RIGHTS OF WOMEN

Gandhi speaks of equal rights for women. He wanted women and men to be complimentary to one another and insists that women and men differ but their differences cannot be the basis of women's subjugation and oppression. He wanted marriage to be one of partnership between two equals. He censured women if they imitated men and appealed to women to get out of their habits of pleasing men. Writing in 1927, in an address to women in Ceylon, now Sri Lanka, Gandhi remarks: What is it that makes a woman deck herself more than a man? I am told by feminine friends that she does so for pleasing man. Well, I tell you, if you want to play your part in the world's affairs, you must refuse to deck yourself for pleasing man. If I was born a woman, I would rise in rebellion against the pretensions on the part of man that woman is born to be his plaything. Gandhi sees the primary tasks of a woman in being a mother and a householder. Additionally a woman, according to Gandhi, is the repository of spiritual and moral values and a teacher to man. A woman is the embodiment of suffering and sacrifice and it is for this reason that he considers her to be the best messenger of peace and non-violence. A woman is inherently more peaceful than a man. On these grounds he recommends separate education for women and men as women would make better soldiers than men in non-violent struggles. He credits his wife Kasturba and the black women in South Africa for helping him to evolve the technique of satyagraha. He considers the nature of women as being conducive to non-violent satyagraha based on dharma. …woman is the incarnation of ahimsa. Ahimsa means infinite love, which again

means infinite capacity for suffering. Who but woman, the mother of man, shows this capacity in the largest measure? She shows it as she is the infant and feeds it during the nine months and derives joy in the suffering involved…. Let her transfer that love to the whole of humanity, let her forget that she ever was or can be the object of man's lust. And she will occupy her proud position by the side of man as his mother, maker and silent leader. It is given to her to teach the art of peace to the warring world thirsting for that nectar. She can become the leader in satyagraha which does not require the learning that books give but does require the stout heart that comes from suffering and faith. Gandhi's credit lay in the fact that under his stewardship women participated in large numbers in the nationalist struggle. Initially, in the 1920s he confined them to their homes and made them take up the spinning-wheel. Subsequently he allowed them picket liquor shops as he knew majority of women suffered at the hands of drunkard husbands. At the peak of the civil disobedience movement in the 1930s, he allowed them to join the salt satyagraha. Women played an important role in many of the humanitarian works that Gandhi undertook such as helping the poor, nursing, promoting khadi, spinning and weaving.

The distinctiveness about Gandhi's formulation is not only the acceptance of rights as central to individual well-being but also stressing on the performance of duties. He considers the two as inter-twined and that the realisation of one without the other is not possible as both pave the way for the fulfilment of common good. The underlying assumption of Gandhi to which he remains steadfast is the idea that the individual is a social person and that the essence of individuality is social self. The emphasis on duties emanates from his quest for building a humane society and conflict(s) would be resolved non-violently through adherence to truth or satyagraha. Duty, for Gandhi, is disinterested action which is performed without much attention to the result and one which morally conforms to the order of the Universe. Rights and duties lead to common good which is the basis of swaraj- self-rule, selfrestraint, self-discipline and voluntary self-sacrifice and this in turn is based in the notion of individual autonomy and moral self-determinism. Gandhi, as a philosophical anarchist, stresses on individual claims against that of the

state, with the aim that the individual armed with dharma or the moral law is the best to judge authority, take corrective steps if necessary through acts of satyagraha, and bring about common good with which his good is inextricably linked.

**Check Your Progress 2**

Note: i) Use the space given below for your answer.

ii) See the end of the unit for tips for your answer.

1. Explain Gandhi's views on rights and duties.

   ……………………………………………………………………

   ……………………………………………………………………

   ……………………………………………………………………

2. What do you know about the Rights of Women?

   ……………………………………………………………………

   ……………………………………………………………………

   ……………………………………………………………………

## 3.8 LET US SUM UP

Gandhi is unique in theorising about rights within the framework of duties. Rights cannot be divorced from duties and that rights have to be exercised in the interests of all. The concept of duty is derived from the idea of dispassionate action which the Bhagavad Gita advocates. Unless one's action is performed with a degree of detachment one would not be free from the anxiety of its future consequences. Interestingly, Gandhi accepts the core idea of right-based individualism, the dominant paradigm in contemporary political theory, namely human equality and moral worth of every person but rights are coalesced with the idea of duties, assigning individuals with responsibilities to lead a moral life and devote to the good of their community. Accepting human dignity and worth as intrinsic goods, he is severe in his indictment of colonialism and untouchability and interestingly, sees the seeds of degeneration that undermines and suppresses human dignity within Indian traditions. Gandhi expects everyone to be concerned not only about their self-governance but also the autonomy of others. This, in a nutshell, is the

meaning of 'swaraj' or self-rule, a vision of India ruled by Indians with concern for the poorest, the destitute and the most vulnerable.

## 3.9 KEY WORDS

Satyagraha: Satyagraha, or holding onto truth, or truth force, is a particular form of nonviolent resistance or civil resistance. It is not the same as passive resistance, and advocates resisting non-violently over using violence. Resisting non-violently is considered the summit of bravery.

Swaraj: Swarāj can mean generally self-governance or "self-rule", and was used synonymously with "home-rule" by Maharishi Dayanand Saraswati and later on by Mohandas Gandhi, but the word usually refers to Gandhi's concept for Indian independence from foreign domination.

## 3.10 QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

1. Explain Gandhi's concept of individual autonomy.
2. What is the role of the Individual in Satyagraha?
3. What is the link between Satyagraha and Swaraj?
4. Explain Gandhi's views on rights and duties.
5. What do you know about the Rights of Women?

## 3.11 SUGGESTED READINGS AND REFERENCES


- Andrews, C.F., Mahatma Gandhi's Ideas, New York, Macmillan, 1930.
- Bandyopadhyaya, J., Social and Political Thought of Gandhi, Bombay, Allied Publishers, 1969.
- Bhattacharya, B., Evolution of the Political Philosophy of Gandhi, Calcutta, Calcutta Book House, 1969.
- Bondurant, J. V., Conquest of Violence: Gandhian Philosophy of Conflict, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1967.
- Chatterjee, M., Gandhi's Religious Thought, London, Macmillan, 1983.

- Chatterjee, P., Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse, Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1986.
- Dalton, D., India's Idea of Freedom, Gurgaon, Academic Press, 1982.
- Haksar, V., "Rawls and Gandhi on Civil Disobedience" Inquiry, 19, 1976.
- ———————., "Coercive Proposals: Rawls and Gandhi", Political Theory, 4, 1976.
- Iyer, R. N., The Moral and Political Thought of Gandhi, Bombay, Oxford University Press, 1973.
- Pantham, T and Deutsch, K., (ed), Political Thought in Modern India, New Delhi, Sage, 1986.
- Parekh, B., Gandhi's Political Philosophy, Notre Dame, Notre Dame University Press, 1989.
- Woodcock, G., Mohandas Gandhi, New York, Fontana, 1971.


## 3.12 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

**Check Your Progress 1**

1. See Section 3.2
2. See Section 3.3
3. See Section 3.4

**Check Your Progress 2**

1. See Section 3.5
2. See Section 3.6

# UNIT 4: FORMATION OF RELIGIOUS IDEAS IN EARLY INDIA- VEDAS, UPANISHADS AND VEDANTA

**STRUCTURE**

4.0 Objectives

4.1 Introduction

4.2 Religion in Ancient India

4.3 Initiation of religions in India

4.4 Vedas

4.5 Post-Vedic religions

4.6 Upanishads

4.7 Vedanta

4.8 Let us sum up

4.9 Key Words

4.10 Questions for Review

4.11 Suggested readings and references

4.12 Answers to Check Your Progress

## 4.0 OBJECTIVES

After this unit, we can able to know:

- Religion in Ancient India
- Initiation of religions in India
- Vedas
- Post-Vedic religions
- Upanishads
- Vedanta

## 4.1 INTRODUCTION

The historical Vedic religion (also known as Vedism or ancient Hinduism[a]) refers to the religious ideas and practices among most Indo-Aryan-speaking peoples of ancient India after about 1500 BCE. These ideas and practices are found in the Vedic texts, and they were one of the major influences that shaped contemporary Hinduism.

According to Heinrich von Stietencron, in the 19th century, in western publications, the Vedic religion was believed to be different from and unrelated to Hinduism. The Hindu religion was thought to be linked to the Hindu epics and the Puranas through sects based on Purohita, Tantras and Bhakti. In the 20th century, a better understanding of the Vedic religion, its shared heritage and theology with contemporary Hinduism, has led scholars to view the historical Vedic religion as ancestral to "Hinduism". The Hindu reform movements and the Neo-Vedanta have emphasized the Vedic heritage and "ancient Hinduism", and this term has been co-opted by some Hindus. Vedic religion is now generally accepted to be a predecessor of Hinduism, but they are not the same because the textual evidence suggests significant differences between the two[b], such as the belief in an afterlife instead of the later developed reincarnation and samsāra concepts.

The Vedic religion is described in the Vedas and associated voluminous Vedic literature preserved into the modern times by the different priestly schools. The Vedic religion texts are cerebral, orderly and intellectual, but it is unclear if the theory in diverse Vedic texts actually reflect the folk practices, iconography and other practical aspects of the Vedic religion. The evidence suggests that the Vedic religion evolved in "two superficially contradictory directions", state Jamison and Witzel. One part evolved into ever more "elaborate, expensive, and specialized system of rituals", while another part questioned all of it and emphasized "abstraction and internalization of the principles underlying ritual and cosmic speculation" within oneself. Both of these traditions impacted Indic religions such as Buddhism and Jainism, and in particular Hinduism. The complex Vedic rituals of Śrauta continue to be practiced in Kerala and coastal Andhra.

Some scholars consider the Vedic religion to have been a composite of the religions of the Indo-Aryans, "a syncretic mixture of old Central Asian, new Indo-European elements", which borrowed "distinctive religious beliefs and practices" from the Bactria–Margiana culture, and the remnants of the Harappan culture of the Indus Valley.

**Defining terms**

According to Indologist Jan Heesterman, the terms Vedism and Brahmanism are “somewhat imprecise terms”. They refer to ancient forms of Hinduism based on the ideologies found in its early literary corpus. Vedism refers to the oldest version, states Heesterman, and it was older than Brahmanism. Vedism refers to the religious ideas of Indo-Europeans who migrated into the Indus River valley region of the subcontinent, whose religion relied on the Vedic corpus including the early Upanishads. Brahmanism, according to Heesterman, refers to the religion that had expanded to a region stretching from the northwest subcontinent to the Ganges valley. Brahmanism included the Vedic corpus and non-Vedic literature such as the Dharmasutras and Dharmasastras, and was the version of ancient Hinduism that gave prominence to the priestly (Brahmin) class of the society. According to the Encyclopædia Britannica, Brahmanism separately refers to both the predominant position of the priests (Brahmans) and also to the importance given to Absolute Reality (Brahman) speculations in the early Upanishads, as these terms are etymologically linked.

The word Brahmanism was coined by Gonçalo Fernandes Trancoso (1520–1596) in the 16th century, and is related to the metaphysical concept of Brahman that developed from post-Vedic ideas during the late Vedic era (Upanishads). The concept of Brahman is posited as that which existed before the creation of the universe, which constitutes all of existence thereafter, and into which the universe will dissolve into, followed by similar endless creation-maintenance-destruction cycles.

**Origins and development**

Further information: Indo-Aryans, Indo-Aryan migrations, Vedic period, Indo-European migrations, Proto-Indo-European religion, and Proto-Indo-Iranian religion

The Vedic religion was probably the religion of the Vedic Indo-Aryans, and existed in northern India from c. 1500–500 BCE. The Indo-Aryans were a branch of the Indo-European language family, which originated in the Sintashta culture and further developed into the Andronovo culture, which in turn developed out of the Kurgan culture of the Central Asian

steppes. The commonly proposed period of earlier Vedic age is dated back to 2nd millennium BCE.

The Vedic beliefs and practices of the pre-classical era has been proposed to be closely related to the hypothesised Proto-Indo-European religion, and shows relations with rituals from the Andronovo culture, from which the Indo-Aryan people descended. According to Anthony, the Old Indic religion probably emerged among Indo-European immigrants in the contact zone between the Zeravshan River (present-day Uzbekistan) and (present-day) Iran. It was "a syncretic mixture of old Central Asian and new Indo-European elements" which borrowed "distinctive religious beliefs and practices" from the Bactria–Margiana Culture (BMAC). This syncretic influence is supported by at least 383 non-Indo-European words that were borrowed from this culture, including the god Indra and the ritual drink Soma. According to Anthony,

Many of the qualities of Indo-Iranian god of might/victory, Verethraghna, were transferred to the adopted god Indra, who became the central deity of the developing Old Indic culture. Indra was the subject of 250 hymns, a quarter of the Rig Veda. He was associated more than any other deity with Soma, a stimulant drug (perhaps derived from Ephedra) probably borrowed from the BMAC religion. His rise to prominence was a peculiar trait of the Old Indic speakers.

The oldest inscriptions in Old Indic, the language of the Rig Veda, are found not in northwestern India and Pakistan, but in northern Syria, the location of the Mitanni kingdom. The Mitanni kings took Old Indic throne names, and Old Indic technical terms were used for horse-riding and chariot-driving. The Old Indic term r'ta, meaning "cosmic order and truth", the central concept of the Rig Veda, was also employed in the Mitanni kingdom. Old Indic gods, including Indra, were also known in the Mitanni kingdom.

The Vedic religion of the later Vedic period was consolidated in the Kuru Kingdom, and co-existed with local religions, such as the Yaksha cults, and was itself the product of "a composite of the Indo-Aryan and Harappan cultures and civilizations". White (2003) cites three other mainstream scholars who "have emphatically demonstrated" that Vedic

religion is partially derived from the Indus Valley Civilization. The religion of the Indo-Aryans was further developed when they migrated into the Ganges Plain after c. 1100 BCE and became settled farmers, further syncretising with the native cultures of northern India.

**Textual history**

A Yupa sacrificial post of the time of Vasishka, 3rd century CE. Isapur, near Mathura. Mathura Museum.

Texts dating to the Vedic period, composed in Vedic Sanskrit, are mainly the four Vedic Samhitas, but the Brahmanas, Aranyakas, and some of the older Upanishads[k] are also placed in this period. The Vedas record the liturgy connected with the rituals and sacrifices. These texts are also considered as a part of the scripture of contemporary Hinduism.

Who really knows?
Who will here proclaim it?
Whence was it produced? Whence is this creation?
The gods came afterwards, with the creation of this universe.
Who then knows whence it has arisen?
— Nasadiya Sukta, Rig Veda, 10:129-6

**Characteristics**

The idea of reincarnation, saṃsāra, is not mentioned in the early layers of the historic Vedic religion texts such as the Rigveda. The later layers of the Rigveda do mention ideas that suggest an approach towards the idea of rebirth, according to Ranade.

The early layers of the Vedas do not mention the doctrine of Karma and rebirth but mention the belief in an afterlife. According to Sayers, these earliest layers of the Vedic literature show ancestor worship and rites such as sraddha (offering food to the ancestors). The later Vedic texts such as the Aranyakas and the Upanisads show a different soteriology based on reincarnation, they show little concern with ancestor rites, and they begin to philosophically interpret the earlier rituals. The idea of reincarnation and karma have roots in the Upanishads of the late Vedic period, predating the Buddha and the Mahavira. Similarly, the later layers of the Vedic literature such as the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad (c.

800 BCE) – such as in section 4.4 – discuss the earliest versions of the Karma doctrine as well as causality.

Ancient Vedic religion lacked the belief in reincarnation and concepts such as Saṃsāra or Nirvana. Ancient Vedic religion was an complex animistic religion with polytheistic and pantheistic aspects. Ancestor worship was an important, maybe the central component, of the ancient Vedic religion. Elements of the ancestors cult are still common in modern Hinduism, see Śrāddha.

According to Olivelle, some scholars state that the renouncer tradition was an "organic and logical development of ideas found in the vedic religious culture", while others state that these emerged from the "indigenous non-Aryan population". This scholarly debate is a longstanding one, and is ongoing.

**Rituals**

A Śrauta yajna being performed in Kerala, South India

Specific rituals and sacrifices of the Vedic religion include, among others:

The Soma rituals, which involved the extraction, utility and consumption of Soma:

The Agnistoma or Soma sacrifice

Fire rituals involving oblations (havir):

The Agnihotra or oblation to Agni, a sun charm

The Agnicayana, the sophisticated ritual of piling the fire altar

The new and full moon as well as the Seasonal (Cāturmāsya) sacrifices

The royal consecration (Rajasuya) sacrifice

The Ashvamedha (horse sacrifice) or a Yajna dedicated to the glory, wellbeing and prosperity of the kingdom or empire

The Purushamedha

The rituals and charms referred to in the Atharvaveda are concerned with medicine and healing practices.

The Hindu rites of cremation are seen since the Rigvedic period; while they are attested from early times in the Cemetery H culture, there is a late Rigvedic reference invoking forefathers "both cremated (agnidagdhá-) and uncremated (ánagnidagdha-)". (RV 10.15.14)

**Pantheon**

Though a large number of names for devas occur in the Rigveda, only 33 devas are counted, eleven each of earth, space, and heaven. The Vedic pantheon knows two classes, Devas and Asuras. The Devas (Mitra, Varuna, Aryaman, Bhaga, Amsa, etc.) are deities of cosmic and social order, from the universe and kingdoms down to the individual. The Rigveda is a collection of hymns to various deities, most notably heroic Indra, Agni the sacrificial fire and messenger of the gods, and Soma, the deified sacred drink of the Indo-Iranians. Also prominent is Varuna (often paired with Mitra) and the group of "All-gods", the Vishvadevas.

**Sages**

This section needs expansion. You can help by adding to it. (August 2018)

In the Hindu tradition, the revered sages of this era were Yajnavalkya, Atharvan, Atri, Bharadvaja, Gautama Maharishi, Jamadagni, Kashyapa, Vasistha, Bhrigu, Kutsa, Pulastya, Kratu, Pulaha, Vishwamitra Narayana, Kanva, Rishabha, Vamadeva, and Angiras.

Ethics — satya and rta

See also: Asha and ṛta

Ethics in the Vedas are based on concepts like satya and ṛta.

In the Vedas and later sutras, the meaning of the word satya (सत्य) evolves into an ethical concept about truthfulness and is considered an important virtue. It means being true and consistent with reality in one's thought, speech and action.

Vedic ṛtá and its Avestan equivalent aša are both thought by some to derive from Proto-Indo-Iranian *Hr̥tás "truth", which in turn may continue from a possible Proto-Indo-European *h2r-tós "properly joined, right, true", from a presumed root *h2er-. The derivative noun ṛta is defined as "fixed or settled order, rule, divine law or truth". As Mahony (1998) notes, however, the term can be translated as "that which has moved in a fitting manner" – although this meaning is not actually cited by authoritative Sanskrit dictionaries it is a regular derivation from the verbal root -, and abstractly as "universal law" or "cosmic order", or

simply as "truth". The latter meaning dominates in the Avestan cognate to Ṛta, aša.

Due to the nature of Vedic Sanskrit, the term Ṛta can be used to indicate numerous things, either directly or indirectly, and both Indian and European scholars have experienced difficulty in arriving at fitting interpretations for Ṛta in all of its various usages in the Vedas, though the underlying sense of "ordered action" remains universally evident.

The term is also found in the Proto-Indo-Iranian religion, the religion of the Indo-Iranian peoples. The term dharma was already used in the later Brahmanical thoughts, where it was conceived as an aspect of ṛta.

## 4.2 RELIGION IN ANCIENT INDIA

The religious practices of the early Indo-Aryans, known as the Vedic religion (1500 BCE to 500 BCE) were written down and later redacted into the Samhitas, four canonical collections of hymns or mantras, called the Veda, in archaic Sanskrit.

The Late Vedic age (9th to 6th centuries BCE) marked the beginning of the Upanisadic or Vedantic phase. This epoch heralded the start of what became classical Hinduism, with the composition of the Upanishads, later the Sanskrit epics, still later followed by the Puranas. The Sanskrit term Upanishad arose from upa- (nearby), ni- (at the proper place, down) and şad (to sit) thus: "sitting down near"), implying sitting near a teacher to get instruction.

The Upanishads are the philosophical account deemed to be the earliest source of Hindu religion. Out of more than 200 Upanishads the first dozen or so were the oldest and most important. The Brihadaranyaka, Jaiminiya and Chandogya Upanishads were composed during the pre-Buddhist era while the Taittiriya, Aitareya and Kausitaki, which showed Buddhist influence, must have been composed after the 5th century BC. All Upanishads had been passed down in oral tradition.

## 4.3 INITIATION OF RELIGIONS IN INDIA

The Puranas (meaning "of ancient times") were a genre of important Hindu, Jain and Buddhist religious texts, with stories of the history of the universe from creation to destruction, genealogies of kings, heroes, sages, and demigods, and descriptions of Hindu cosmology, philosophy, and geography. Early references to the Puranas are found in the Chandogya Upanishad (7.1.2) (500BCE).

Vedic religion had a strict code of rituals where the kings, the aristocrats and the rich merchants would contribute as the cost of organising such worship was very high and time-consuming. The mode of worship was prayer to the elements like fire and rivers, worship of heroic gods like Indra, chanting of hymns and carrying out sacrifices. Sacrifice was the offering of food, objects or the lives of animals to the gods as an act of propitiation or worship. In Vedic times, Yagya commonly included the sacrifice of milk, ghee, curd, grains, and the soma plant—animal offerings were less common.

**Preparation of a Vedic ritual**

Priests were trained for the ritual and they had to get proficient in its practice. The specialization of roles focused on the elaboration and development of the ritual corpus over time. Over time a full complement of sixteen priests became the custom for major ceremonies. The sixteen consisted of four chief priests and their assistants, with each of the four chief priests playing a unique role:

The hotri was the reciter of invocations and litanies. These could consist of single verses, or entire hymns (sukta), drawn from the Rig-Veda. As each phase of the ritual required an invocation, the hotri had a leading or presiding role.

The adhvaryu was in charge of the physical details of the sacrifice. According to Monier-Williams, the adhvaryu "had to measure the ground, to build the altar, to prepare the sacrificial vessels, to fetch wood and water, to light the fire, to bring the animal and immolate it," among other duties. Each action was accompanied by supplicative or benedictive formulas (yajus), drawn from the Yajur-Veda.

The udgātri was a chanter of hymns set to melodies (sāman) drawn from the Sāma-Veda. This was a specialized role in the major soma sacrifices:

a characteristic function of the udgātri was to sing hymns in praise of the energizing properties of the freshly pressed juice of the soma plant. The brahman was superintendent of the entire performance, and responsible for correcting mistakes by means of supplementary invocations, usually from the Atharva-Veda.

**THOSE WHO HAD PAID FOR & PARTICIPATED IN SUCH RITUALS PRAYED FOR ABUNDANCE OF CHILDREN, RAIN, CATTLE (WEALTH), LONG LIFE & AN AFTERLIFE IN THE HEAVENLY WORLD OF THE ANCESTORS.**

Those who had paid for and participated in such rituals prayed for abundance of children, rain, cattle (wealth), long life and an afterlife in the heavenly world of the ancestors. This mode of worship has been preserved even today in Hinduism, which involves recitations from **the Vedas** by a purohita (priest), for prosperity, wealth and general well-being.

Sacrifice was done in several ways: First, there was simply the gift-offering. There was also a sense in which the sacrifice gave power or a way of spiritually carrying out something through the sacrifice, such as the severing of the heads of enemies through the gods. Sacrifice was seen as a way of pleasing the gods and gaining their favour in contrast to those who did not sacrifice (e.g. Rig 1.110.7 "those who pour no offering forth"). In the soma offering it was the priests offering the gods the juice that gave them pleasure and strength to win wealth and help from the gods for those who offered the Soma.

**Narration in the epic on Vedic ritual**

There was an ornate description of the Vedic rites performed at the royal bidding in Kosala. At the prologue of **the Ramayana**, King Dasaratha was getting ready to perform a grand yagna to have a son.

After some time, when the sweet vernal season appeared, King Dasaratha thought of carrying out the ritual […] to get sons to keep up his lineage.

King Dasaratha, addressing his prime minister, said, O Sumantra, summon priests versed in the **Vedas** and the Vedangas. When they arrived, Dasaratha, after showing due respect to them, said, having no

son I have no happiness in life. Hence, I intend to perform an Asvamedha Yagna. By the blessings of holy Sage Rishyasringa, I am sure, I shall attain my intent. They fully agreed to his words.

The priests erected the sacrificial fireplace with bricks. The fireplace consisting on three sides of eighteen bricks looked like a golden-winged **Garuda**, the celestial carrier of **Vishnu**. For the purpose of sacrifice, horses, beasts and birds, reptiles and aquatic animals were collected. To those Yupas (posts) were tied hundreds of animals as well as the horse of the king.

**Vishnu Riding Garuda by Jean-Pierre Galbéra (CC BY)**

Animal sacrifice was very apparent in the Vedas as a part of the rituals. The Rig-Veda had several clear references to animal sacrifices. In a

reference to the sacrifice of a goat it held (1.162.2) “The dappled goat went straight to heaven, bleating to the place dear to Indra and to Pusan.” In one of the hymns to the horse (1.162.9-11) it said, “What part of the steed’s flesh the fly did not eat or was left sticking to the post or hatchet, or to the slayer’s hands and nails adhered, among the Gods, too may all this be with thee. Food undigested steaming from his belly and any odour of raw flesh that remained let the immolators set in order and dress the sacrifice with perfect cooking. What from thy body which with fire was roasted when thou art set upon the spit distilled let not that lay on earth or grass neglected, but to the longing Gods let all be offered.” As well, the non-vegetarian aspect was clear that when this horse was sacrificed, it was distributed to those who were eagerly waiting.

The meat was tested with a trial fork and then distributed (Rig 1.162.12ff). The Yajur-Veda was full of many more references to animal sacrifices, clear and often repeated references to animal sacrifices, mainly in association with the full moon rite, the Soma sacrifice and its supplement. There was an entire section of the Yajur-Veda devoted to optional animal sacrifices (ii.1): “To the Asvins he sacrifices a dusky, to **Sarasvati** a ram, to Indra a bull” (Yajur 1.8.21.e).

**Asvamedha Yagna**

The Ashvamedha, horse sacrifice, was one of the most important royal rituals of Vedic religion, described in detail in the Yajur-Veda. The Ashvamedha could only be conducted by a king. Its object was the acquisition of power and glory, the sovereignty over neighbouring provinces, and general prosperity of the kingdom. The ceremony narrated in the Ramayana was a departure from the Vedic text as the king wished to perform the ritual for being blessed with sons.

The horse to be sacrificed had to be a stallion, more than 24, but less than 100 years old. The horse was sprinkled with water, and the chief priest whispered mantras into its ear. Anyone who detained the horse was ritually cursed, and a dog was killed, symbolic of the punishment for the sinners. The horse was yoked to a gilded **chariot**, together with three other horses, and RV 1.6.1, 2 (Y.V. 23.5, 6) was recited. The horse was then driven into water and bathed. After this, the chief queen and two

other royal consorts anointed it with ghee (clarified butter). They also adorned the horse's head, neck, and tail with golden ornaments.

After this, the horse, a hornless he-goat and a wild ox were tied to sacrificial stakes near the fire, and seventeen other animals were fastened to the horse. A great number of animals both tame and wild were tied to other stakes, according to a commentator, 609 animals in total.

The chief queen ritually called on the king's fellow wives for pity. The queens walked around the dead horse reciting mantras. The chief queen then had to mimic coitus with the dead horse, while the other queens ritually uttered obscenities.

On the next morning, the priests lifted up the queen from the place where she had spent the night with the horse. The three queens with a hundred golden, **silver** and **copper** needles pointed to the lines on the horse's body along which it would be dissected. The horse was dissected, and its flesh roasted. Various parts were offered to a host of deities.

Now, to get back to the narration in the epic: a scholarly analysis put forward as under: ‘According to the text available to us, it seemed that the queen did not spend the entire night with the horse. Typically, she lay down with the horse and was covered with an upper cloth; at this time she was symbolically said to unite with the horse. Some words suggestive of copulation and fertility were spoken over her and the dead horse.

**THERE WERE MANY AMBIGUITIES AND DISCORDS BETWEEN THE DIFFERENT SECTIONS OF THE VEDA, OFTEN CAUSING CLASHES BETWEEN MEMBERS OF THE PRIESTLY CLASS.**

Wilson, the eminent Vedic scholar, held: […] As was detailed in the Yajur-Veda 22.26, and more particularly in the Sutras of Katyayani (Asvamedha 1-210), the object was the same as that of the Ramayana, or posterity, as one step towards which the principal queen, Kausalya, in the poem, was directed to lie all night in closest contact with the dead steed; in the morning, when the queen was released from the disgusting, and in fact, impossible, contiguity, a dialogue, as given in the Yajus, and in the Asvamedha section of the Satapatha Brahmana, and as explained in

the **Sutra**, took place between the queen and the females accompanying or attending upon her, and the principal priest, which though brief, was in the highest degree both silly and obscene[…] We came across no vestige, however, of these revolting impurities in the Rig-Veda[…] no reasonable doubt could be entertained that the early ritual of the Hindus did authorize the sacrifice of a horse, the details and objects of which were very soon grossly amplified and distorted; at the same time it was to be remarked that these two hymns were the only ones in the Rich that related especially to the subject; from which it might be inferred that they belonged to a different period[…] As the solemnity appeared in the Rich, it allowed a less poetical, a more barbaric character, and it might have been a relic of an ante-Vedic period, imported from some foreign region, possibly from Scythia, where animal victims, and especially horses, were commonly sacrificed (Herod IV 71).

There were many ambiguities and discords between the different sections of the Veda, often causing clashes between members of the priestly class. Further, they spoke of the rewards of carrying out costly rites and rituals. Often, the different sections of the Veda contradicted each other, confusing the common man as to what to believe.

To sum up, the attitude of the Vedic **Aryan** to unseen forces was simple yet primitive. The gods were thirty-three to begin with. They had no icons. Fire was their emissary. The Aryan man killed an ox, a sheep, a goat, at times, a horse and offered its meat and fat together with milk and butter, barley bread and the intoxicating drink soma by the fire to his gods. The gods were gratified with these offerings of food and drink and in return, they gave the worshipper what he wished for, viz. wealth, sons, long life and victory over enemies. This was the Vedic Aryan ritual of homa or fire-worship.

**Basic concepts of religion in the Veda**

The gods in the Rig-Veda were mostly personified concepts, who fell into two categories: the devas – who were gods of nature – such as the weather deity Indra (who was also the king of the gods), **Agni** (fire), Usha (dawn), **Surya** (sun) and Apas (waters) on the one hand, and on the other hand the asuras – gods of moral concepts – such as Mitra

(contract), Aryaman (guardian of guest, friendship and marriage), Bhaga (share) or Varuna, the supreme Asura (or Aditya). While Rig-Vedic deva was variously applied to most gods, including many of the Asuras, the Devas were characterized as Younger Gods while Asuras were the Older Gods (pūrve devāh). In later Vedic texts, the Asuras became demons.

Agni Seated on a Ram
by Vassil (Public Domain)

The Rig-Veda had 10 Mandalas (books). There was essential variation in the language and style between the older family books (RV books 2–7), book 8, the Soma Mandala (RV 9), and the more recent books 1 and 10. The older books shared many aspects of common Indo-Iranian religion and were an important source for the reconstruction of earlier

common Indo-European traditions. Especially RV 8 had striking similarity to the Avesta, containing allusions to Afghan Flora and Fauna, e.g. to camels uštra- = Avestan uštra). Many of the key religious terms in Vedic Sanskrit had cognates in the religious vocabulary of other Indo-European languages (deva: Latin deus; hotar: Germanic god; asura: Germanic ansuz; yajna: Greek hagios; brahman: Norse Bragi or perhaps Latin flamen etc.). Above all notable is the fact that in the Avesta Asura (Ahura) was known as good and Deva (Daeva) as evil entity, quite the opposite of the Rig-Veda.

Leaving aside the question of the primary religion of the Hindus at a later section of this essay, let it be made clear that the Veda did not deal with religion alone throughout the volumes one went over. It had been a favourite notion of many scholars that at the time of composition of the hymns of the Veda there were a nomadic and pastoral people. Such an opinion rested solely upon frequent solicitations for food, and for horses and cattle, found right in the hymns. That those people were not nomads became evident from the repeated allusions to fixed dwellings, villages and towns. Also there were references to overthrow of enemies and destruction of their **cities** after long-drawn-out battles. Not only the hymns were familiar with the ocean, there were merchants sailing to distant places for the sake of grain. There was a naval expedition against a continent, frustrated by a shipwreck. Most curious was the prayer in the Rig-Veda (I.11.7.14), from the peculiar expression used on more than one occasion, in soliciting long life, when the worshipper asked for a hundred winters (himas), a boon not likely to have been desired by the natives of hot climate like north-western part of **India**, Iran and so on. People coming over at that distant epoch towards India appeared to have been fair-complexioned as one hymn (I.15.7.18) declared that Indra, the supreme God, divided the conquered fields to his white-complexioned people, after destroying the native barbarian races, the term being Dasyu.

**Synthesis of Harappa, Vedic & Hindu religions**

Hinduism is a label for a wide variety of related religious traditions native to India. Historically, it includes the development of religion in India since the Iron Age traditions, which in turn harks back to

prehistoric religions such as that of the Bronze Age Indus Valley Civilization followed by the Iron Age Vedic religion.

The Indus Valley Civilization (IVC) was a Bronze Age civilization (3300–1300 BCE; mature period 2600–1900 BCE) that was located in the north-western region of the Indian subcontinent. The mature phase was known as the Harappan Civilization, as the first excavated city was the one at Harappa in modern Pakistan, in the 1920s CE. Around 1800 BCE, signs of a gradual decline began to emerge, and by around 1700 BCE, most of the cities were abandoned. In 1953 CE, Sir Mortimer Wheeler proposed that the decline of the Indus Civilization was caused by the invasion of an Indo-European tribe from Central Asia called the Aryans. Because of language similarities those Aryans were associated particularly with the Iranians and even further back with the origins of the Indo-European language group. The general consensus seemed to be that this culture must have begun somewhere in the Russian steppes and Central Asia about 2000 BCE. The branch of these speakers, who came to India under the name Aryans, meaning noble ones, was the Indo-Iranian group. In fact "Iran" drew from the Persian cognate of the word for Aryan.

**Indus Valley**

by hceebee (CC BY-NC-ND)

However, the Indus Valley Civilization did not disappear suddenly, and many elements of the Indus Civilization could be found in later cultures. Harvard archaeologist Richard Meadow pointed to the late Harappan settlement of Pirak, which thrived continuously from 1800 BCE to the time of the invasion of Alexander the Great in 325 BCE. Pirak was located in Baluchistan, Pakistan. After the discovery of the IVC in the 1920s, it was immediately associated with the indigenous Dasyu, inimical to the Rig-Vedic tribes in numerous hymns of the Rig-Veda.

Religion of Indus valley civilization was a theme not found in any ancient accounts. Seals, images and other materials had been unearthed by various archaeologists. Scholars were unable to draw any inference about those people.

Well over 400 distinct Indus symbols (some say 600) had been found on seals, small tablets, or ceramic pots and over a dozen other materials, including a "signboard" that apparently once hung over the gate of the inner citadel of the Indus city of Dholavira. It was one of the largest and most prominent archaeological sites in India in the Kutch Desert Wildlife Sanctuary of Gujarat, India.



Banner at the North Gate of Dholavira
by Swastik (CC BY-SA)

Typical Indus inscriptions were no more than four or five characters in length, most of which (aside from the Dholavira "signboard") were exquisitely tiny; the longest on a single surface, which was less than 1 inch (2.54 cm) square, was 17 signs long; the longest on any object (found on three different faces of a mass-produced object) had a length of 26 symbols. Each **script** was written from right to left. However, the script had not been deciphered as yet. It was believed that they used ideograms i.e., a graphic symbol or character to convey the idea directly.

Indus Valley Civilization was often believed as a literate society on the evidence of such lettering. Even so, Farmer, Sproat, and Witzel (2004) argued that the Indus system did not encode language; it was instead

similar to a variety of non-linguistic sign systems used widely in the Near East and other societies. Others had claimed on occasion that the symbols were used for economic transactions, but this claim left unexplained the appearance of symbols on many ritual objects, many of which were mass-produced in moulds. No parallels to these mass-produced inscriptions were known in any other early ancient civilizations.

Several pottery figurines called to mind that female deities had been worshipped. Probably it represented the Mother-Goddess worshipped in the near and Middle East in ancient times. Clay figures resembled the horns of a goat or bull that traced that animal worship was common. The seal amulets and talismans of stone and pottery did indicate the religious attitude of the Harappa people. A nude image of a deity with horns and three faces, seated on a stool with heals closely pressed together pointed to some ritualistic posture. Animals like deer, antelope, rhinoceros, elephant, tiger and buffalo encircled him. Arms were adorned with large number of bangles.

Another seal-amulet showed a horned goddess in the midst of a Peepul or sacred fig-tree before which one more horned deity was kneeling and doing obeisance. A row of female deities occupied the whole of the lower register of the seal-amulet, each figure wearing a spring on the head, a long pigtail behind. Stone objects made out that veneration was paid to phallic symbols.

Several steatite seals discovered at Indus Valley Civilization (3300–1700 BCE) sites portrayed figures in a yoga- or meditation-like posture, "a form of ritual discipline, suggesting a precursor of yoga", according to Indus archaeologist Gregory Possehl. He pointed out sixteen specific "yogi glyptics" in the corpus of mature Harappan artefacts that suggested Harappan devotion to "ritual discipline and concentration", and that the yoga pose "may have been used by deities and humans alike." Some type of connection between the Indus Valley seals and later yoga and meditation practices was supported by many other scholars.




Map of the Indus Valley Civilization

by Dbachmann (GNU FDL)

Karel Werner held that "Archaeological discoveries allowed us therefore to speculate with some justification that a wide range of Yoga activities was already known to the people of pre-Aryan India." A seal recently (2008) uncovered in the Cholistan desert was described by Dr. Farzand Masih, Chairman, **Archaeology** Department, Punjab University, as depicting a "yogi". Thomas McEvilley noted that "The six mysterious Indus Valley seal images...all without exception showed figures in a position known in hatha yoga as mulabhandasana or possibly the closely related utkatasana or baddha konasana...."

**Reaction to austere ritualistic religion**

From early times, there were those who denied faith in divine beings. Even the Vedic hymns referred sharply to scoffers and unbelievers. Those hymns, usually ascribed to Brihaspati, a son of Loka, put into words the first protests against just a study of the Veda and upheld that a man who tried to soak them up was far superior to the reciting priest. Although there was no special animal fable in Vedic **literature**, in the Rig-Veda there was all the variety of a story. It pointed to the fondness of the Vedic Aryan for tales of all sorts. There was one song in the Rig-

Veda where Brahmins singing at a holy offering were compared to croaking frogs. Prof. Max Muller said that this famous hymn was a satire on Vedic priesthood, or better still, on the manner of hymn chanting. Aitereya Aranyaka put forth, why should we repeat the Vedas or offer this kind of oblation? To offset such negative analyses, the cynics adopted the doctrine of svabhava (nature) as the next stage. This doctrine held that all things were self-existent. They did not create themselves nor any cause created them. For instance, there was no cause for the delicate web of the lotus or the eye-like marks on the peacock's tail. As the cause was not there, they indeed existed on their own. Such was the case with this changing universe. In the same way, feelings like pleasure, pain etc. had no cause, as they were fleeting.

With its claim of pratyaksa or perception as the only means of learning, and physical pleasure being the central object of life, this system was widespread in ancient India. Thus, its name was Lokayata, literally meaning a doctrine spread among the people (loka).

The Vratyas, who were the Aryans from later migrations, came slowly into this belief. Like the Lokayatikas, they too defied everything, including the caste system, sacrifices and the Veda. Drawing upon such generous support, the Lokayatikas exhorted people to strain every nerve for instant earthly welfare rather than striving for a heaven one could not prove existed. Kama or the fulfilment of desire was the central theme of human life. The result of such activity was an urge for freedom—freedom for the individual as well as for society, for the woman as well as for the man, for the poor as well as for the rich. One unique outcome of this struggle for freedom was the rise of the Buddhist culture. **Buddha**'s views against Vedic sacrifices, memorising verses and the fruitless repetition of Vedic mantras, gory ritual of animal sacrifice, the caste system, the authority of the Veda and the worship of the deities and the magic rites, all had counterparts in the views of the Lokayatikas.

**Message of the Upanishads**

Vedanta was in earlier times a word used in Hindu philosophy as a synonym for that part of the Veda texts known also as the Upanishads. The name was a form of Veda-anta = Veda-end = the appendix to the

Vedic hymns. It was inferred that Vedanta stood for the purpose or goal [end] of the Veda. Vedanta was not restricted or confined to one book and there was no sole source for Vedantic philosophy.

Vedic religion gradually evolved into Vedanta, which was viewed by some as the primary institution of Hinduism. Vedanta deemed itself the 'essence' of the Veda.

All forms of Vedanta were drawn primarily from the Upanishads, a set of philosophical and instructive Vedic scriptures. The Upanishads were commentaries on the Veda. They were considered the fundamental essence of all the Veda. Some segment of Vedantic thought was also derived from the earlier aranyakas.

The Aranyakas were called the forest texts, because ascetics retreated into the forest to study the spiritual doctrines with their students, leading to less emphasis on the sacrificial rites that were still performed in the towns. These writings were transitional between the Brahmanas and the Upanishads in that they still discussed rites and had magical content, dull lists of formulas and some hymns from the Veda. The sages who took in students in their forest hermitages were not as wealthy as the priests in the towns who served royalty and other wealthy patrons.

The primary philosophy weighed up in the Upanishads that of one absolute reality termed as Brahman was the main tenet of Vedanta. The sage Vyasa was one of the major proponents of this philosophy and author of the **Brahma** Sūtras based on the Upanishads. The concept of Brahman – the eternal, self-existent, immanent and transcendent Supreme and Ultimate Reality which was the divine view of all being - was central to most schools of Vedānta. The notion of God or Ishvara was also there. Vedantic sub-schools differed mainly in how they would identify God with Brahman.

The Upanishads were works of various authors living in different ages. They were the words of spiritual-minded people, who got glimpses of the highest truth by observation and were not necessarily part of a consistent system of philosophy. Their ways were intuitive rather than logical and they dealt with topics like God, man, destiny, soul etc. There were so many hints, suggestions and implications in the Upanishads and so

varied that subsequent founders of almost all religions and religious sects in India had been able to quote one or more of these as authority.

In spite of the brilliance of such ideas, they were not adequate for the religious needs of the people. Their appeal lay with the intelligentsia, not with the ordinary man to whom attainment of such profound knowledge appeared a distant dream. Upanishadic philosophers soared to dizzy heights and laid the basis on which Indian thoughts were to be refined in later years.

Ganesha Statue

by Swaminathan (CC BY)

India stirred up with freethinking views and the Buddha was the result of this freedom. No man ever lived such a godlike life, without ever talking of a god. The Vishnu Purana had a record of this stage of the school. It

alluded to a set of people of very ancient origin who were free to live wherever they liked, unworried by conventions, pure at heart and blameless in action. Virtue or vice they had none; they lived in an ambience of perfect freedom in which men could move without fear of disobeying traditional dogmas of religious and social usage. Still, the ordinary devoted followers were not satisfied merely with social and religious freedom. As the Lokayatikas captured the hearts of the cultured as well as the common people, all were set on working out their immediate earthly welfare.

Before proceeding further on the topic it is necessary to recall certain basic tenets touched upon so far with a view to link with development of a few major religions in India during the coming centuries.

The Upanishads were like a breath of fresh air blowing through the stuffy corridors of power of the Vedic Brahmanism. They were noticed by the priestly authorities because the yogis did not owe allegiance to any established religion or mode of thought. They were very largely saying what may well have been current among other sramanic groups at that time. Such an atheistic doctrine was evidently very acceptable to the authors of Upanishads, who made use of many of its concepts.

The end of the Vedantic period was around the 2nd century CE. In the latter period, several texts were composed as summaries/attachments to the Upanishads. These texts collectively called as Puranas allowed for a divine and mythical interpretation of the world, not unlike the ancient Hellenic or Roman religions. Legends and epics with a multitude of gods and goddesses with human-like characteristics were composed. Two of Hinduism's most revered epics, the Mahabharata and the Ramayana were compositions of this period. Devotion to particular deities was reflected from the composition of texts composed to their worship. For example, the Ganapati Purana was written for devotion to Ganapati (or Ganesha). Popular deities of this era were Shiva, Vishnu, Durga, Surya, Skanda, and Ganesh (including the forms/incarnations of these deities.)

Unlike the early Vedic religion neither the Brahmanic rituals nor the spiritualism of the Upanishads could somehow become popular. A religion, in order that it might become popular, needed a simple and

uniform creed, a good deal of **mythology**, certain easy practices of worship. The failure of the Vedic Brahmanas and the Upanishads in this respect resulted in an indirect support to the non-Vedic religious thought. Non-Vedic religious systems such as **Buddhism** and **Jainism** quickly spread. They adopted the mythology, worship of the deities and intelligent speculation of a variety of Upanishads. At the same time they steered clear of the weak points in them.

Shramana tradition

Vedic religion of Iron Age India co-existed and closely interacted with the parallel non-Vedic shramana traditions. These were not direct outgrowths of Vedism, but separate movements that influenced it and were influenced by it. The shramanas were wandering ascetics. Buddhism and Jainism were a continuation of the shramana custom, and the early Upanishadic movement was influenced by it.

**AS A RULE, A SHRAMANA WAS ONE WHO RENOUNCED THE WORLD & LED AN ASCETIC LIFE FOR THE PURPOSE OF SPIRITUAL DEVELOPMENT & LIBERATION.**

As a rule, a shramana was one who renounced the world and led an ascetic life for the purpose of spiritual development and liberation. They asserted that human beings were responsible for their own deeds and reaped the fruits of those deeds, for good or ill. Liberation from such anxiety could be achieved by anybody irrespective of caste, creed, colour or culture. Yoga was probably the most important shramana practice to date. Elaborate processes were outlined in Yoga to achieve individual liberation through breathing techniques (Pranayama), physical postures (Asanas) and meditation (Dhyana).

The movement later received a boost during the times of **Mahavira** and Buddha when Vedic ritualism had become the dominant belief in certain parts of India. Shramanas adopted a path alternate to the Vedic rituals to achieve liberation, while renouncing household life. They typically engaged in three types of activities: austerities, meditation, and associated theories (or views). At times, a shramana was at variance with traditional authority, and he often recruited members from priestly communities as well. Mahāvīra, the 24th Jina, and Gautama Buddha

were leaders of their shramana orders. According to Jain literature and the Buddhist Pali Canon, there were also some other shramana leaders at that time.

Indian philosophy was a confluence of shramanic (self-reliant) traditions, Bhakti traditions with idol worship and Vedic ritualistic nature worship. These co-existed and influenced each other. Śramanas held a view of samsara as full of suffering (or dukkha). They practiced Ahimsa and rigorous ascetism. They believed in **Karma** and Moksa and viewed re-birth as undesirable.

Vedics, on the contrary, believed in the efficacy of rituals and sacrifices, performed by a privileged group of people, who could improve their life by pleasing certain gods. The Sramanic ideal of mendicancy and renunciation, that the worldly life was full of suffering and that emancipation required abandoning desires and withdrawal into a solitary contemplative life, was in stark contrast with the Brahminical ideal of an active and ritually punctuated life. Traditional Vedic belief held that a man was born with an obligation to study the Vedas, to procreate and bring up male offspring and to perform sacrifices. Only in later life would he meditate on the mysteries of life. The idea of devoting one's whole life to mendicancy seemed to disparage the whole process of Vedic social life and obligations. Because the shramanas rejected the Vedas, the Vedics labelled their philosophy as "nastika darsana" (heterodox philosophy).

Astika and nastika were sometimes used to categorise Indian religions. Those religions that believed that God was the central actor in this world were termed as astika. Those religions that did not believe that God was the prime mover were classified as nastika. From this point of view the Vedic religion (and Hinduism) was an astika religion, whereas Buddhism and Jainism were nastika religions.

India has long been known as a very spiritual, religious heavy area of the world. In India, religion is a way of life. It is an integral part of the entire Indian tradition. For the majority of Indians, religion permeates every aspect of life, from common-place daily chores to education and politics.

India is one of the most religiously diverse nations in the world, with one of the most deeply religious societies and cultures. Religion plays a

central and definitive role in the life of the country and most of its people.

The faith of more than 80% of the people is Hinduism, considered the world's oldest religious and philosophical system. Islam is practiced by around 13% of all Indians.

Sikhism, Ayyavazhi, Buddhism and Jainism are Indian-born religious systems that are strong and influential not only in India but across the world. Christianity, Zoroastrianism, Judaism and the Bah‡" Faith are also influential but their numbers are smaller.

Despite the strong role of religion in Indian life, atheism and agnostics are also visible influences.

**Hinduism**

Hinduism is a worldwide religious tradition that is based on the Vedas, and is the direct descendant of the Vedic religion. Hinduism evolved from a monolithic religion into a multitude of traditions over a period of 1500 years. It encompasses many religious rituals that widely vary in practice, as well as many diverse sects and philosophies. With an array of deities, all manifestations of the one Supreme monistic Brahman, are venerated. Thus, Hinduism is often misconceived to be a polytheistic religion, although the belief in a singular, Universal Soul is a fundamental tenet of the Hindu faith. Beliefs, codes and principles vary from region to region. It is the third largest religion in the world, with a following of approximately 1 billion people. Ninety-eight percent of

Hindus can be found on the Indian subcontinent, chiefly in India. It is noteworthy however that the relatively small Himalayan kingdom of Nepal is the only nation in the world with Hinduism as its state religion.

**Buddhism**

Buddhism, known in ancient India as Buddha Dharma, originated in northern India in what is today the state of Bihar. It rapidly gained adherents during the Buddha's lifetime. Up to the 9th century, Indian followers numbered in the hundreds of millions. While the exact cause of the decline of Buddhism in India is disputed, it is known that the mingling of Hindu and Buddhist societies in India and the rise of Hindu Vedanta movements began to compete against Buddhism. Many believe that Hinduism's adaptation to Buddhism resulted in Buddhism's rapid decline. Also, Muslim invaders are recorded to have caused massive devastation on monasteries, libraries, and statuary, as they did on Hindu religious life. Many Indian Buddhist populations remained intact in or migrated to places like Sri Lanka, Tibet, and other Asian countries.

Recently, a revival of Buddhism in India has made significant progress. In 1956, B. R. Ambedkar, a freedom fighter during the Indian struggle for independence from the British, and hundreds of thousands of his followers converted to Buddhism in protest against the caste system. Subsequent mass conversions on a lesser scale have occurred since then. Three-quarters of these "neo-Buddhists" live in Maharashtra. Alongside these converts are the Vajrayana Buddhists of Ladakh, Sikkim, and

Arunachal Pradesh, a small number of tribal peoples in the region of Bengal, and Tibetan refugees.

**Jainism**



Jainism, along with Hinduism, Buddhism and Sikhism, is one of the four major Dharma religions originating in India. In general, Jains are extremely well-represented inspite of the fact that they form only 0.4% (around 4.2 million) of India's total population. Many of them rich and an overwhelming majority of them are well to do. As such, it can be said that they hold power and wealth disproportionate to their small population. According to the India Census 2001, Jains have the highest literacy rate (religion-wise) of 94.1% compared to the national average of 64.8%.

**Christianity in India**



Notes

Christianity, according to tradition (and now supported by recent research), arrived in India in the first century through the apostle Thomas. St. Thomas converted many South Indians who continued to practice Christianity until present. It was further consolidated by the arrival of Syriac Jewish-Christians now known as Knanaya people in the second century C.E. This ancient ethnic Christian community of Kerala is known as Nasrani or Syrian Christian. The Nasrani people and especially the Knanaya people within the Nasranis have strong Jewish historical ties. Their form of Christianity is one of the most ancient: Syriac Christianity which is also known as the Eastern Orthodox Church and referred to in India as Saint Thomas Christians. It should be noted that the term "Saint Thomas Christians" is a loose term that many non-Nasranis Christians in Kerala are often labeled. The vast majority of Christians in Kerala are not the original Nasrani/Knanaya but indigenous local converts.

Roman Catholicism reached India during the period of European colonization, which began in 1498 when the Portuguese explorer Vasco da Gama arrived on the Malabar coast.Christian missionary activity increased in the early 1800s. Today Christianity is the third largest religion of India making up 2 - 2.5% of the population. Christians are most prevalent in the northeast in states such as Nagaland,Mizoram, south India, major metro areas, and in western states such as Goa.

**Islam in India**



Gate of the Jami mosque built in 1571

Islam arrived in India as early as the 8th century CE. During the following decades,contributed greatly to the cultural enhancement of an already rich Indian culture, shaping not only the shape of Northern Indian classical music (Hindustani, a melding of Indian and Middle Eastern elements) but encouraging a grand tradition of Urdu (a melding of Hindi, Arabic and Persian languages) literature both religious and secular. Among other monuments, the Taj Mahal is a gift of the Mughals. As of 2001, there are about 130 million Muslims in India, most of whom were converted during the Mughal period and they mostly live in the north and west of the country.

**Ayyavazhi**

**The Holy Symbol of Ayyavazhi Tradition**

Ayyavazhi is a religion originated in south india in the 19th century. Officially it was considered as an offshoot section of Hinduism. But either in Philosophy or in religious practices Ayyavazhi and Hinduism varies a lot. Though it has not received official recognition, it has transformed itself into a distinctive religious phenomenon, making its presence felt in India's southern parts, mostly in southern districts of Tamil Nadu and in some parts of Kerala. But it is one of the fastest growing religions of Southern India, its rapid growth has been noted in the Christian missionary reports of the mid-19th century. It has more

than 7000 worship centers throughout south India, mostly in Tamil Nadu and some in the city of Mumbai.

**Zoroastrianism**

A form of the ancient Persian religion Zoroastrianism continues to be practiced in India, where its followers are called Parsis. Suffering persecution from Muslim rulers in what is now modern-day Iran, Zoroastrian immigrants were granted protection under a Hindu king in the Western section of India many centuries ago.

**Sikhism**

**The Golden Temple**

Sikhism, was founded in India's northwestern Punjab region about 400 years ago. As of 2001 there were 19.3 million Sikhs in India. Many of today's Sikhs are situated in Punjab, the largest Sikh province in the world and the ancestral home of Sikhs. The most famous Sikh temple is the Golden Temple, located in Amritsar, Punjab. Many Sikhs serve in the Indian Army. The current prime minister of India, Manmohan Singh, is a

Sikh. Punjab is the spiritual home of Sikhs and is the only state in India where Sikhs form a majority.

**Indian Jews**

Indian Jews are a religious minority, living among India's predominantly Hindu populace. However, Judaism was one of the first religions to arrive in India and assimilate with local traditions through cultural diffusion. The Jewish population in India is hard to estimate since each Jewish community is distinct with different origins; some arrived during the time of the Kingdom of Judah, others are descendants of Israel's Lost Ten Tribes. Of the total Jewish population in India, about half live in Mizoram and a quarter live in the city of Mumbai. Unlike many parts of the world, Jews have historically lived in India without largescale anti-Semitism. However, Jews in India have recently suffered from terrorist attacks by Lashkar-e-Toiba, which has declared Jews and Hindus to be enemies of Islam. In Mumbai, two synagogues are located in predominantly Muslim inhabited areas.

In addition to Jewish members of various diplomatic corps, there are five native Jewish communities in India:

1. The Cochin Jews arrived in India 2,500 years ago and settled down in Cochin, Kerala as traders.
2. The Baghdadi Jews arrived in the city Mumbai from Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan, and Arab countries about 250 years ago.

3. The Bene Israel arrived in the state of Maharashtra 2,100 years ago.
4. The Bnei Menashe are Mizo and Kuki tribesmen in Manipur and Mizoram who claim descent from the tribe of Menasseh.
5. The Bene Ephraim (also called Telugu Jews) are a small group who speak Telugu; their observance of Judaism dates to 1981.

## 4.4 VEDAS

The predominant religion in ancient India was Hinduism. The roots of Hindu religion can be traced back to the Vedic period. Hinduism is believed to be the oldest of major religions and originated in northern India. Early Aryan, or Vedic, culture was the early Hinduism whose interaction with non-Aryan cultures resulted in what we call Classical Hinduism. It is interesting to note that much of ancient, classical and modern Indian culture has been greatly shaped by Hindu thought.

The Mahabharata and Ramayana, both sacred Hindu texts, served as India's main motivating base for a great deal of literary, artistic and musical creations in subsequent millennia. The Epic Period was a golden era in Indian philosophical thought because of the tolerance of different opinions and teachings. The most popular form of Indian medicine, Ayurveda, was developed by Vedic saints and Jyotish, Hindu astrology, is the most popular form of astrology in India today. Yoga, an internationally-famous system of meditation, is one of six systems of Hindu thought.

Besides Hinduism, other main religions during ancient India were Buddhism, and Jainism. Buddhism originated in northern India in what is today the state of Bihar. It rapidly gained adherents during the Buddha's lifetime. Up to the 9th century, Indian followers numbered in the hundreds of millions. Buddhism, known in ancient India as Buddha Dharma, originated in northern India in what is today the state of Bihar. It rapidly gained adherents during the Buddha's lifetime. Up to the 9th century, Indian followers numbered in the hundreds of millions.

There also developed many heterodox religious sects in ancient India. One such sect was Ajivika, founded by Mahavira's rival Goshala Maskariputra. Ajivikas did not believe in karma and thought that the destiny was predetermined and could not be changed. There were also

several other religious contemporaries to Buddha and Mahavira during the 6th century B.C. Another preacher of the same period was Pakuda Katyayana, who also taught that the soul was superior to good and evil, thus unchanged or untouched by it. He classified everything into seven categories, i.e. earth, water, fire, air, pleasure, pain and soul, which were eternal. Ajita Kesakambalin, another contemporary of Buddha taught complete materialism. He did not believe in the afterlife and considered death as the final phase of all souls.

The Vedas (/ˈveɪdəz, ˈviː-/; Sanskrit: वेद veda, "knowledge") are a large body of religious texts originating in ancient India. Composed in Vedic Sanskrit, the texts constitute the oldest layer of Sanskrit literature and the oldest scriptures of Hinduism. Hindus consider the Vedas to be apauruṣeya, which means "not of a man, superhuman" and "impersonal, authorless".

Vedas are also called śruti ("what is heard") literature, distinguishing them from other religious texts, which are called smṛti ("what is remembered"). The Veda, for orthodox Indian theologians, are considered revelations seen by ancient sages after intense meditation, and texts that have been more carefully preserved since ancient times. In the Hindu Epic the Mahabharata, the creation of Vedas is credited to Brahma. The Vedic hymns themselves assert that they were skillfully created by Rishis (sages), after inspired creativity, just as a carpenter builds a chariot.

According to tradition, Vyasa is the compiler of the Vedas, who arranged the four kinds of mantras into four Samhitas (Collections). There are four Vedas: the Rigveda, the Yajurveda, the Samaveda and the Atharvaveda. Each Veda has been subclassified into four major text types – the Samhitas (mantras and benedictions), the Aranyakas (text on rituals, ceremonies, sacrifices and symbolic-sacrifices), the Brahmanas (commentaries on rituals, ceremonies and sacrifices), and the Upanishads (texts discussing meditation, philosophy and spiritual knowledge). Some scholars add a fifth category – the Upasanas (worship).

The various Indian philosophies and denominations have taken differing positions on the Vedas. Schools of India philosophy which cite the Vedas as their scriptural authority are classified as "orthodox" (āstika). Other

śramaṇa traditions, such as Lokayata, Carvaka, Ajivika, Buddhism and Jainism, which did not regard the Vedas as authorities, are referred to as "heterodox" or "non-orthodox" (nāstika) schools. Despite their differences, just like the texts of the śramaṇa traditions, the layers of texts in the Vedas discuss similar ideas and concepts.

**Check Your Progress 1**

Note: i) Use the space given below for your answer.

ii) See the end of the unit for tips for your answer.

1. Discuss the Religion in Ancient India.

…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………

2. Describe Initiation of religions in India.

…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………

3. What are the Vedas?

…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………

## 4.5 POST-VEDIC RELIGIONS

The Vedic period is held to have ended around 500 BCE. The period between 800 BCE and 200 BCE is the formative period for later Hinduism, Jainism and Buddhism. According to Michaels, the period between 500 BCE and 200 BCE is a time of "ascetic reformism". According to Michaels, the period between 200 BCE and 1100 CE is the time of "classical Hinduism", since there is "a turning point between the Vedic religion and Hindu religions". Muesse discerns a longer period of change, namely between 800 BCE and 200 BCE, which he calls the "Classical Period", when "traditional religious practices and beliefs were reassessed. The brahmins and the rituals they performed no longer enjoyed the same prestige they had in the Vedic period".

The hymn 10.85 of the Rigveda includes the Vivaha-sukta (above). Its recitation continues to be a part of Hindu wedding rituals.

Some scholars consider the term Brahmanism as synonymous with Hinduism and use it interchangeably. Others consider them different, and that the transition from ancient Brahmanism into schools of Hinduism that emerged later as a form of evolution, one that preserved many of the central ideas and theosophy in the Vedas, and synergistically integrated new ideas. Of the major traditions that emerged from Brahmanism are the six darshanas, particular the Vedanta, Samkhya and Yoga schools of Hinduism.

**Vedanta**

Vedic religion was followed by Upanishads which gradually evolved into Vedanta, which is regarded by some as the primary institution of Hinduism. Vedanta considers itself "the purpose or goal [end] of the Vedas."

**Śrauta**

According to David Knipe, some communities in India have preserved and continue to practice portions of the historical Vedic religion, such as in Kerala and Andhra Pradesh state of India and elsewhere. Of the continuation of the Vedic tradition in a newer sense, Fowler writes the following:

“ Despite the radically different nature of the Upanishads in relation to the Vedas it has to be remembered that the material of both form the Veda or "knowledge" which is sruti literature. So the Upanishads develop the ideas of the Vedas beyond their ritual formalism and should not be seen as isolated from them. The fact that the Vedas that are more particularly emphasized in the Vedanta: the efficacy of the Vedic ritual is not rejected, it is just that there is a search for the Reality that informs it.”

**Bhakti**

According to German Professor Axel Michaels, the Vedic gods declined but did not disappear, and local cults were assimilated into the Vedic-

brahmanic pantheon, which changed into the Hindu pantheon. Deities such as Shiva and Vishnu became more prominent and gave rise to Shaivism and Vaishnavism.

**Interpretations of Vedic Mantras in Hinduism**

The various Hindu schools and traditions give various interpretations of the Vedic hymns.

Mīmāṃsā philosophers argue that there was no need to postulate a maker for the world, just as there was no need for an author to compose the Vedas or a god to validate the rituals. Mīmāṃsā argues that the gods named in the Vedas have no existence apart from the mantras that speak their names. To that regard, the power of the mantras is what is seen as the power of gods.

Adi Shankara, an 8th-century CE philosopher who unified and established the main currents of thought in Hinduism, interpreted Vedas as being nondualist or monist. However, the Arya Samaj New religious movement holds the view that the Vedic mantras tend to monotheism. Even the earlier Mandalas of Rig Veda (books 1 and 9) contains hymns which are thought to resemble monotheism. Often quoted isolated pada 1.164.46 of the Rig Veda states (trans. Griffith):

Indraṃ mitraṃ varuṇamaghnimāhuratho divyaḥ sa suparṇo gharutmān,
ekaṃ sad viprā bahudhā vadantyaghniṃ yamaṃ mātariśvānamāhuḥ

"They call him Indra, Mitra, Varuṇa, Agni, and he is heavenly nobly-winged Garutmān.

To what is One, sages give many a title they call it Agni, Yama, Mātariśvan".

Moreover, the verses of 10.129 and 10.130, deal with the one being (Ékam sát). The verse 10.129.7 further confirms this (trans. Griffith):

iyám vísṛṣṭiḥ yátaḥ ābabhūva / yádi vā dadhé yádi vā ná / yáḥ asya ádhyakṣaḥ paramé vyóman / sáḥ aṅgá veda yádi vā ná véda

"He, the first origin of this creation, whether he formed it all or did not, He who surveys it all from his highest heaven, he verily knows it, or perhaps even he does not"

**Sramana tradition**

**Main articles: Śramaṇa, Jainism, and Buddhism**

The non-Vedic śramaṇa traditions existed alongside Brahmanism. These were not direct outgrowths of Vedism, but movements with mutual influences with Brahmanical traditions, reflecting "the cosmology and anthropology of a much older, pre-Aryan upper class of northeastern India". Jainism and Buddhism evolved out of the Shramana tradition.

There are Jaina references to 22 prehistoric tirthankaras. In this view, Jainism peaked at the time of Mahavira (traditionally put in the 6th century BCE). Buddhism, traditionally put from c. 500 BCE, declined in India over the 5th to 12th centuries in favor of Puranic Hinduism and Islam.

**Vedic Sanskrit corpus**

The corpus of Vedic Sanskrit texts includes:

- The Samhitas (Sanskrit *saṃhitā*, "collection"), are collections of metric texts ("mantras"). There are four "Vedic" Samhitas: the Rig-Veda, Sama-Veda, Yajur-Veda, and Atharva-Veda, most of which are available in several recensions (*śākhā*). In some contexts, the term *Veda* is used to refer to these Samhitas. This is the oldest layer of Vedic texts, apart from the Rigvedic hymns, which were probably essentially complete by 1200 BCE, dating to c. the 12th to 10th centuries BCE. The complete corpus of Vedic mantras as collected in Bloomfield's *Vedic Concordance* (1907) consists of some 89,000 padas (metrical feet), of which 72,000 occur in the four Samhitas.
- The Brahmanas are prose texts that comment and explain the solemn rituals as well as expound on their meaning and many connected themes. Each of the Brahmanas is associated with one of the Samhitas or its recensions. The Brahmanas may either form separate texts or can be partly integrated into the text of the Samhitas. They may also include the Aranyakas and Upanishads.
- The Aranyakas, "wilderness texts" or "forest treaties", were composed by people who meditated in the woods as recluses and are the third part of the Vedas. The texts contain discussions and

interpretations of ceremonies, from ritualistic to symbolic meta-ritualistic points of view. It is frequently read in secondary literature.

- Older Mukhya
  Upanishads (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, Chandogya, *Kaṭha*, Kena, Aitareya, and others).

The Vedas (sruti) are different from Vedic era texts such as Shrauta Sutras and Gryha Sutras, which are smriti texts. Together, the Vedas and these Sutras form part of the Vedic Sanskrit corpus.

While production of Brahmanas and Aranyakas ceased with the end of the Vedic period, additional Upanishads were composed after the end of the Vedic period.

The Brahmanas, Aranyakas, and Upanishads, among other things, interpret and discuss the Samhitas in philosophical and metaphorical ways to explore abstract concepts such as the Absolute (Brahman), and the soul or the self (Atman), introducing Vedanta philosophy, one of the major trends of later Hinduism. In other parts, they show evolution of ideas, such as from actual sacrifice to symbolic sacrifice, and of spirituality in the Upanishads. This has inspired later Hindu scholars such as Adi Shankara to classify each Veda into *karma-kanda* (कर्म खण्ड, action/ritual-related sections) and *jnana-kanda* (ज्ञान खण्ड, knowledge/spirituality-related sections).

## 4.6 UPANISHADS

The Upanishads (/uːˈpænɪˌʃædz, uːˈpɑːnɪˌʃɑːdz/; Sanskrit: उपनिषद् Upaniṣad [ʊpɐnɪʂɐd]), a part of the Vedas, are ancient Sanskrit texts of spiritual teaching and ideas of Hinduism, some of which are shared with religious traditions like Buddhism and Jainism. Among the most important literature in the history of Indian religions and culture, the Upanishads played an important role in the development of spiritual ideas in ancient India, marking a transition from Vedic ritualism to new ideas and institutions. Of all Vedic literature, the Upanishads alone are widely known, and their central ideas are at the spiritual core of Hinduism.

The Upanishads are commonly referred to as Vedānta. Vedanta has been interpreted as the "last chapters, parts of the Veda" and alternatively as "object, the highest purpose of the Veda". The concepts of Brahman (ultimate reality) and Ātman (soul, self) are central ideas in all of the Upanishads, and "know that you are the Ātman" is their thematic focus. Along with the Bhagavad Gita and the Brahmasutra, the mukhya Upanishads (known collectively as the Prasthanatrayi) provide a foundation for the several later schools of Vedanta, among them, two influential monistic schools of Hinduism.

More than 200 Upanishads are known, of which the first dozen or so are the oldest and most important and are referred to as the principal or main (mukhya) Upanishads. The mukhya Upanishads are found mostly in the concluding part of the Brahmanas and Aranyakas and were, for centuries, memorized by each generation and passed down orally. The early Upanishads all predate the Common Era, five of them in all likelihood pre-Buddhist (6th century BCE), down to the Maurya period. Of the remainder, 95 Upanishads are part of the Muktika canon, composed from about the last centuries of 1st-millennium BCE through about 15th-century CE. New Upanishads, beyond the 108 in the Muktika canon, continued to be composed through the early modern and modern era, though often dealing with subjects that are unconnected to the Vedas.

With the translation of the Upanishads in the early 19th century they also started to attract attention from a western audience. Arthur Schopenhauer was deeply impressed by the Upanishads and called it "the production of the highest human wisdom". Modern era Indologists have discussed the similarities between the fundamental concepts in the Upanishads and major western philosophers.

Classification

**Muktika canon: major and minor Upanishads**

There are more than 200 known *Upanishads*, one of which, the *Muktikā* Upanishad, predates 1656 CE and contains a list of 108 canonical Upanishads, including itself as the last. These are further divided into Upanishads associated with Shaktism (goddess Shakti), Sannyasa (renunciation, monastic life), Shaivism (god

Shiva), Vaishnavism (god Vishnu), Yoga, and *Sāmānya* (general, sometimes referred to as Samanya-Vedanta).

Some of the Upanishads are categorized as "sectarian" since they present their ideas through a particular god or goddess of a specific Hindu tradition such as Vishnu, Shiva, Shakti, or a combination of these such as the Skanda Upanishad. These traditions sought to link their texts as Vedic, by asserting their texts to be an Upanishad, thereby a *Śruti*. Most of these sectarian Upanishads, for example the Rudrahridaya Upanishad and the Mahanarayana Upanishad, assert that all the Hindu gods and goddesses are the same, all an aspect and manifestation of Brahman, the Vedic concept for metaphysical ultimate reality before and after the creation of the Universe.

**Mukhya Upanishads**

The *Mukhya Upanishads* can be grouped into periods. Of the early periods are the *Brihadaranyaka* and the *Chandogya*, the oldest.

**A page of *Isha Upanishad* manuscript**

The Aitareya, Kauṣītaki and Taittirīya Upanishads may date to as early as the mid 1st millennium BCE, while the remnant date from between roughly the 4th to 1st centuries BCE, roughly contemporary with the earliest portions of the Sanskrit epics. One chronology assumes that the *Aitareya, Taittiriya, Kausitaki, Mundaka, Prasna*, and *Katha Upanishads* has Buddha's influence, and is consequently placed after the 5th century BCE, while another proposal questions this assumption and dates it independent of Buddha's date of birth. After these Principal Upanishads are typically placed the *Kena, Mandukya* and *Isa Upanishads*, but other scholars date these differently. Not much is known about the authors except for those, like Yajnavalkayva and Uddalaka,

mentioned in the texts. A few women discussants, such as Gargi and Maitreyi, the wife of Yajnavalkayva, also feature occasionally.

Each of the principal *Upanishads* can be associated with one of the schools of exegesis of the four Vedas (*shakhas*). Many Shakhas are said to have existed, of which only a few remain. The new *Upanishads* often have little relation to the Vedic corpus and have not been cited or commented upon by any great Vedanta philosopher: their language differs from that of the classic *Upanishads*, being less subtle and more formalized. As a result, they are not difficult to comprehend for the modern reader

## 4.7 VEDANTA

**Vedanta** (/vɪˈdɑːntə/; Sanskrit: वेदान्त, IAST: *Vedānta*) or **Uttara Mīmāṃsā** is the most prominent of the six (*āstika*) schools of Hindu philosophy. Literally meaning "end of the Vedas", *Vedanta* reflects ideas that emerged from the speculations and philosophies contained in the Upanishads, specifically, knowledge and liberation. Vedanta contains many sub-traditions, ranging from dualism to non-dualism, all of which developed on the basis of a common textual connection called the *Prasthanatrayi*: *the Upanishads*, the *Brahma Sutras* and the *Bhagavad Gita.*

All Vedanta schools, in their deliberations, concern themselves but differ in their views regarding ontology, soteriology and epistemology.

Some of the better known sub-traditions of Vedanta include:

1. Advaita Darshan - established by Shankaracharya (788-820 CE)
2. Vishishtadvaita Darshan - established by Ramanujacharya (1017-1137 CE)
3. Dvaita Darshan - established by Madhvacharya (1238-1317 CE)
4. Bhedabhed (or Dvaitadvait) Darshan - established by Nimbarkacharya
5. Shuddhadvait Darshan - established by Vallabhacharya (1479-1531 CE)
6. Achintyabhedabhed Darshan - established by Chaitanya Mahaprabhu (1486-1534 CE)

7. Akshar-Purushottam Darshan - established by Swaminarayan (1781-1830 CE)

**Etymology and nomenclature**

The word *Vedanta* literally means the *end of the Vedas* and originally referred to the *Upanishads*. Vedanta was concerned with the *jñānakāṇḍa* or Vedic knowledge part called the *Upanishads*. The denotation of Vedanta subsequently widened to include the various philosophical traditions based on to the *Prasthanatrayi*.

The *Upanishads* may be regarded as the end of *Vedas* in different senses:

1. These were the last literary products of the Vedic period.
2. These mark the culmination of Vedic thought.
3. These were taught and debated last, in the *Brahmacharya* (student) stage.

**Vedanta** is one of the six orthodox (*āstika*) schools of Indian philosophy. It is also called *Uttara Mīmāṃsā*, the 'latter enquiry' or 'higher enquiry'; and is often contrasted with *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā*, the 'former enquiry' or 'primary enquiry'. *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā* deals with the *karmakāṇḍa* or rituals part (the *Samhita* and *Brahmanas*) in the *Vedas*.

**Prasthanatrayi, the Three Sources**

The *Upanishads*, the *Bhagavad Gita* and the *Brahma Sutras* constitute the basis of Vedanta. All schools of Vedanta propound their philosophy by interpreting these texts, collectively called the *Prasthanatrayi*, literally, *three sources*.

1. The *Upanishads*, or *Śruti prasthāna*; considered the *Sruti*, the “heard” (and repeated) foundation of Vedanta.
2. The *Brahma Sutras*, or *Nyaya prasthana* / *Yukti prasthana*; considered the reason-based foundation of Vedanta.
3. The *Bhagavad Gita*, or *Smriti prasthāna*; considered the *Smriti* (remembered tradition) foundation of Vedanta.

The *Brahma Sutras* attempted to synthesize the teachings of the *Upanishads*. The diversity in the teaching of

the *Upanishads* necessitated the systematization of these teachings. This was likely done in many ways in ancient India, but the only surviving version of this synthesis is the *Brahma Sutras* of *Badarayana*.

**All major Vedantic teachers,**

including Shankara, Bhaskara, Ramanuja, Nimbarka, Vallabha, Madhva, and Swami Bhadreshdas have composed commentaries not only on the *Upanishads* and *Brahma Sutras*, but also on the *Bhagavad Gita*. The *Bhagavad Gita*, due to its syncretism of Samkhya, Yoga, and Upanishadic thought, has played a major role in Vedantic thought.

### History

The *Upanishads* present an associative philosophical inquiry in the form of identifying various doctrines and then presenting arguments for or against them. They form the basic texts and Vedanta interprets them through rigorous philosophical exegesis. Varying interpretations of the *Upanishads* and their synthesis, the *Brahma Sutras*, led to the development of different schools of Vedanta over time of which three, four, five or six are prominent.

1. *Bhedabheda*, as early as the 7th century CE, or even the 4th century CE. Some scholars are inclined to consider it as a "tradition" rather than a school of Vedanta.
    - *Upadhika*, founded by Bhaskara in the 9th Century CE
    - *Svabhavikabhedabheda* or *Dvaitādvaita*, founded by Nimbarka in the 7th century CE
    - *Achintya Bheda Abheda*, founded by Chaitanya Mahaprabhu (1486–1534 CE)
2. *Advaita*, many scholars of which most prominent are Gaudapada (~500 CE) and Adi Shankaracharya (8th century CE)
3. *Vishishtadvaita*, prominent scholars are Nathamuni, Yāmuna and Ramanuja (1017–1137 CE)
4. *Dvaita*, founded by Madhvacharya (1199–1278 CE)
5. *Suddhadvaita*, founded by Vallabha (1479–1531 CE)
6. Akshar-Pushottam Darshan founded by Swaminarayan (1781-1840) and propounded by Shastriji Maharaj

Notes

The history of Vedanta is divided into two periods: one prior to the composition of the *Brahma Sutras* and the other encompassing the schools that developed after the *Brahma Sutras* were written.

### Before the Brahma Sutras

Little is known of schools of Vedanta existing before the composition of the *Brahma Sutras* (400–450 CE). It is clear that Badarayana, the writer of *Brahma Sutras*, was not the first person to systematize the teachings of the *Upanishads*, as he quotes six Vedantic teachers before him – Ashmarathya, Badari, Audulomi, Kashakrtsna, Karsnajini and Atreya. References to other early Vedanta teachers – Brahmadatta, Sundara, Pandaya, Tanka and Dravidacharya – are found in secondary literature of later periods. The works of these ancient teachers have not survived, but based on the quotes attributed to them in later literature, Sharma postulates that Ashmarathya and Audulomi were Bhedabheda scholars, Kashakrtsna and Brahmadatta were Advaita scholars, while Tanka and Dravidacharya were either Advaita or Vishistadvaita scholars.

### Brahma Sutras

Badarayana summarized and interpreted teachings of the *Upanishads* in the *Brahma Sutras*, also called the *Vedanta Sutra*, possibly "written from a Bhedābheda Vedāntic viewpoint." Badarayana summarized the teachings of the classical Upanishads and refuted the rival philosophical schools in ancient India. The Brahma Sutras laid the basis for the development of Vedanta philosophy.

Though attributed to Badarayana, the Brahma Sutras were likely composed by multiple authors over the course of hundreds of years. The estimates on when the Brahma Sutras were complete vary, with Nakamura in 1989 and Nicholson in his 2013 review stating, that they were most likely compiled in the present form around 400–450 CE. Isaeva suggests they were complete and in current form by 200 CE, while Nakamura states that "the great part of the *Sutra* must have been in existence much earlier than that."

The book is composed of four chapters, each divided into four quarters or sections. These sutras attempt to synthesize the diverse teachings of the Upanishads. However, the cryptic nature of aphorisms of the *Brahma Sutras* have required exegetical commentaries. These commentaries have resulted in the formation of numerous Vedanta schools, each interpreting the texts in its own way and producing its own commentary.

**Between the *Brahma Sutras* and Adi Shankara**

Little with specificity is known of the period between the *Brahma Sutras* (5th century CE) and Adi Shankara (8th century CE). Only two writings of this period have survived: the *Vākyapadīya*, written by Bhartṛhari (second half 5th century), and the *Kārikā* written by Gaudapada (early 6th or 7th century CE).

Shankara mentions 99 different predecessors of his school in his commentaries. A number of important early Vedanta thinkers have been listed in the *Siddhitraya* by Yamunācārya (c. 1050), the *Vedārthasamgraha* by Rāmānuja (c. 1050–1157), and the *Yatīndramatadīpikā* by Śrīnivāsa Dāsa. At least fourteen thinkers are known to have existed between the composition of the Brahma Sutras and Shankara's lifetime.

A noted scholar of this period was Bhartriprapancha. Bhartriprapancha maintained that the Brahman is one and there is unity, but that this unity has varieties. Scholars see Bhartriprapancha as an early philosopher in the line who teach the tenet of Bhedabheda.

**Gaudapada, Adi Shankara and Advaita Vedanta**

Gaudapada (c. 6th century CE), was the teacher or a more distant predecessor of Govindapada, the teacher of Adi Shankara. Shankara is widely considered as the founder of Advaita Vedanta. Gaudapada's treatise, the *Kārikā*—also known as the *Māṇḍukya Kārikā* or the *Āgama Śāstra*—is the earliest surviving complete text on Advaita Vedanta.

**Gaudapada's *Kārikā* relied on** the Mandukya, Brihadaranyaka and Chhandogya *Upanishads*. In the *Kārikā*, Advaita (non-dualism) is established on rational grounds (*upapatti*) independent of scriptural revelation; its arguments are devoid

of all religious, mystical or scholastic elements. Scholars are divided on a possible influence of Buddhism on Gaudapada's philosophy. The fact that Shankara, in addition to the *Brahma Sutras*, the principal *Upanishads* and the *Bhagvad Gita*, wrote an independent commentary on the *Kārikā* proves its importance in *Vedāntic* literature.

Adi Shankara (788–820), elaborated on Gaudapada's work and more ancient scholarship to write detailed commentaries on the Prasthanatrayi and the *Kārikā*. The Mandukya Upanishad and the *Kārikā* have been described by Shankara as containing "the epitome of the substance of the import of Vedanta". It was Shankara who integrated Gaudapada work with the ancient *Brahma Sutras*, "and give it a *locus classicus*" alongside the realistic strain of the *Brahma Sutras*. His interpretation, including works ascribed to him, has become the normative interpretation of Advaita Vedanta.

A noted contemporary of Shankara was Maṇḍana Miśra, who regarded Mimamsa and Vedanta as forming a single system and advocated their combination known as *Karma-jnana-samuchchaya-vada*. The treatise on the differences between the Vedanta school and the Mimamsa school was a contribution of Adi Shankara. Advaita Vedanta rejects rituals in favor of renunciation, for example.

**Ramanuja and Vishishtadvaita Vedanta**

Rāmānuja (1017–1137 CE) was the most influential philosopher in the Vishishtadvaita tradition. As the philosophical architect of Vishishtadvaita, he taught qualified non-dualism. Ramanuja's teacher, Yadava Prakasha, followed the Advaita monastic tradition. Tradition has it that Ramanuja disagreed with Yadava and Advaita Vedanta, and instead followed Nathamuni and Yāmuna. Ramanuja reconciled the *Prasthanatrayi* with the theism and philosophy of the Vaishnava Alvars poet-saints.[62] Ramanuja wrote a number of influential texts, such as a bhasya on the *Brahma Sutras* and the *Bhagavad Gita*, all in Sanskrit.

Ramanuja presented the epistemological and soteriological importance of bhakti, or the devotion to a personal God (Vishnu in Ramanuja's case) as a means to spiritual liberation. His theories assert that there exists a

plurality and distinction between Atman (souls) and Brahman (metaphysical, ultimate reality), while he also affirmed that there is unity of all souls and that the individual soul has the potential to realize identity with the Brahman. Vishishtadvaiata provides the philosophical basis of Sri Vaishnavism.

Ramanuja was influential in integrating *Bhakti*, the devotional worship, into Vedanta premises.

**Madhva and Dvaita**

Dvaita Vedanta was propounded by Madhvacharya (1238–1317 CE). He presented the opposite interpretation of Shankara in his Dvaita, or dualistic system. In contrast to Shankara's non-dualism and Ramanuja's qualified non-dualism, he championed unqualified dualism. Madhva wrote commentaries on the chief *Upanishads*, the *Bhagavad Gita* and the *Brahma Sutra*.

Madhva started his Vedic studies at age seven, joined an Advaita Vedanta monastery in Dwarka (Gujarat), studied under guru Achyutrapreksha, frequently disagreed with him, left the Advaita monastery, and founded Dvaita. Madhva and his followers Jayatirtha and Vyasatirtha, were critical of all competing Hindu philosophies, Jainism and Buddhism, but particularly intense in their criticism of Advaita Vedanta and Adi Shankara.

Dvaita Vedanta is theistic and it identifies Brahman with Narayana, or more specifically Vishnu, in a manner similar to Ramanuja's Vishishtadvaita Vedanta. But it is more explicitly pluralistic. Madhva's emphasis for difference between soul and Brahman was so pronounced that he taught there were differences (1) between material things; (2) between material things and souls; (3) between material things and God; (4) between souls; and (5) between souls and God. He also advocated for a difference in degrees in the possession of knowledge. He also advocated for differences in the enjoyment of bliss even in the case of liberated souls, a doctrine found in no other system of Indian philosophy.

**Swaminarayan and Akshar-Purushottam Darshan**

The Akshar-Purushottam Darshan was revealed by Swaminarayan (1781-1830). His followers believed him to be the manifest form of Parabrahman Purushottam. His sermons, many of which were compiled during his lifetime as the Vachanamrut, thus serve as a direct revelation of Akshar-Purushottam Darshan. Although Swaminarayan did not author a commentary on the *Prasthantrayi*, by the instructions, blessings and guidance of Pramukh Swami Maharaj, Bhadreshdas Swami composed the *Swaminarayan-Bhashya*, a five-volume comprehensive commentary on all three sacred texts of the *Prasthāntrayi*, i.e. the Brahmasutras, the ten principal Upanishads, and the Bhagavad Gita, based on the teachings of Swaminarayan and the successive gurus. With the blessings of Mahant Swami Maharaj, Bhadreshdas Swami also authored a vāda-grantha entitled *Swaminarayan-Siddhanta-Sudha*. These texts substantiate Swaminarayan's Akshar-Purushottam Darshan from a scholarly perspective.

The primary sources of Akshar-Purushottam Darshan are the Vachanamrut, which is a compilation of 273 oral discourses delivered by Swaminarayan that were documented by his senior followers during his lifetime; the Vedaras, a comprehensive letter written to his monastic followers explicating his doctrine and providing moral instructions; and the Swamini Vato, a collection of oral commentaries delivered by Gunatitanand Swami, who was Swaminarayan's senior disciple and his successor as guru in the lineage of the Bochasanwasi Akshar Purushottam Sanstha (BAPS). Other sources clarifying Akshar-Purushottam Darshan include Bhagatji Maharaj (1829-1897), Shastriji Maharaj (1865-1951), Yogiji Maharaj (1892-1971), Pramukh Swami Maharaj (1921-2016) and Mahant Swami Maharaj (1933- )who in order are successors to Gunatitanand Swami as Guru in the BAPS Swaminarayan tradition.

Spiritual seekers believe that they can achieve moksha, or freedom from the cycle of birth and death, by becoming aksharrup (or brahmarup), that is, by attaining qualities similar to Akshar (or Aksharbrahman) and worshiping Purushottam (or Parabrahman; the supreme living entity; God). The enlightened guru is always manifest on earth and is a form of

Aksharbrahman, which is an eternal entity above the influence of maya, or worldly attachments and imperfections. By associating with and understanding that Aksharbrahman guru, alternatively referred to as the Satpurush, Ekantik Bhakta or Ekantik Sant, spiritual seekers can transcend the influences of maya and attain spiritual perfection.

**Overview of the schools of Vedanta**

Shankaracharya

**Schools propounding Non-dualism**

**Advaita school**

Advaita Vedanta (IAST *Advaita Vedānta*; Sanskrit: अद्वैत वेदान्त) espouses non-dualism and monism. *Brahman* is held to be the sole unchanging metaphysical reality and identical to the individual *Atman*. The physical world, on the other hand, is always-changing empirical *Maya*. The absolute and infinite *Atman-Brahman* is realized by a process of negating everything relative, finite, empirical and changing.

The school accepts no duality, no limited individual souls (*Atman* / *Jivatman*), and no separate unlimited cosmic soul. All souls and their existence across space and time are considered to be the same oneness. Spiritual liberation in *Advaita* is the full comprehension and realization of oneness, that one's unchanging *Atman* (soul) is the same as the *Atman* in everyone else, as well as being identical to *Brahman*.

**Vishishtadvaita**

**Ramanujacharya depicted with Vaishnava Tilaka and Vishnu statue.**

*Vishishtadvaita* asserts that *Jivatman* (human souls) and *Brahman* (as *Vishnu*) are different, a difference that is never transcended. With this qualification, Ramanuja also affirmed monism by saying that there is unity of all souls and that the individual soul has the potential to realize identity with the *Brahman*.[64] *Vishishtadvaita*, like *Advaita*, is a non-dualistic school of Vedanta in a qualified way, and both begin by assuming that all souls can hope for and achieve the state of blissful liberation. On the relation between the *Brahman* and the world of matter (*Prakriti*), *Vishishtadvaita* states both are two different absolutes, both metaphysically true and real, neither is false or illusive, and that *saguna Brahman* with attributes is also real. Ramanuja states that God, like man, has both soul and body, and the world of matter is the glory of God's body. The path to *Brahman* (*Vishnu*), according to Ramanuja, is devotion to godliness and constant remembrance of the beauty and love of the personal god (*bhakti* of *saguna Brahman*).

**Vallabhacharya**

**Shuddhādvaita**

*Shuddhadvaita* (pure non-dualism) states that the entire universe is real and is subtly *Brahman* only in the form of *Krishna*.[93] Vallabhacharya, the propounder of this philosophy, agreed with Advaita Vedanta's ontology, but emphasized that *prakriti* (empirical world, body) is not separate from the *Brahman*, but just another manifestation of the latter. Everything, everyone, everywhere—soul and body, living and non-living, *jiva* and matter—is the eternal *Krishna*. The way to *Krishna*, in this school, is *bhakti*. Vallabha opposed renunciation of

monistic *sannyasa* as ineffective and advocates the path of devotion (*bhakti*) rather than knowledge (*jnana*). The goal of *bhakti* is to turn away from ego, self-centered-ness and deception, and to turn towards the eternal *Krishna* in everything continually offering freedom from *samsara*.

Swaminarayan

**Akshar-Purushottam Darshan**

Revealed by Swaminarayan (1781-1830) through his sermons, many of which were compiled during his lifetime as the Vachanamrut, serve as a direct revelation of Akshar-Purushottam Darshan. Swaminarayan's philosophy centres around the existence of five eternal realities, as stated in two of his sermons documented in the Vachanamrut, Gadhada 1.7 and Gadhada 3.10: "Puruṣottama Bhagavān, Akṣarabrahman, māyā, īśvara and jīva – these five entities are eternal."[95] One of the key distinguishing factors from other schools of Vedanta is the inclusion of 'Akshar' (also known as Brahman and Aksharbrahman) as a specific metaphysical entity. It is thus ontologically distinct from Purushottam (also known as Parabrahman). Bhadreshdas Swami composed the *Swaminarayan-Bhashya*, a five-volume comprehensive commentary on all three sacred texts of the *Prasthāntrayi* (Brahmasutras, the ten principal Upanishads, and the Bhagavad Gita) based on the teachings of Swaminarayan and the successive gurus.

**School propounding Dualism - Dvaita**

This school is based on the premise of dualism. *Atman* (soul) and *Brahman* (as *Vishnu*) are understood as two completely different entities. *Brahman* is the creator of the universe, perfect in knowledge,

perfect in knowing, perfect in its power, and distinct from souls, distinct from matter. In *Dvaita* Vedanta, an individual soul must feel attraction, love, attachment and complete devotional surrender to *Vishnu* for salvation, and it is only His grace that leads to redemption and salvation. Madhva believed that some souls are eternally doomed and damned, a view not found in *Advaita* and *Vishishtadvaita* Vedanta. While the *Vishishtadvaita* Vedanta asserted "qualitative monism and quantitative pluralism of souls", Madhva asserted both "qualitative and quantitative pluralism of souls".

**Schools propounding Bhedabheda**

*Bhedābheda* means "difference and non–difference" and is more a tradition than a school of Vedanta. The schools of this tradition emphasize that the individual self (*Jīvatman*) is both different and not different from *Brahman*. Notable figures in this school are Bhartriprapancha, Bhāskara (8th–9th century), Ramanuja's teacher Yādavaprakāśa, Nimbārka (7th century) who founded the Dvaitadvaita school, Caitanya (1486–1534) who founded the Achintya Bheda Abheda school and Vijñānabhikṣu (16th century).

Madhvacharya

**Upadhika**

Bhaskara, in postulating *Upadhika*, considers both identity and difference to be equally real. As the causal principle, *Brahman* is considered non-dual and formless pure being and intelligence. The same *Brahman*, manifest as events, becomes the world of

plurality. *Jīva* is *Brahman* limited by the mind. Matter and its limitations are considered real, not a manifestation of ignorance. Bhaskara advocated *bhakti* as *dhyana* (meditation) directed toward the transcendental *Brahman*. He refuted the idea of *Maya* and denied the possibility of liberation in bodily existence.

**Dvaitādvaita**

**Nimbarkacharya's icon at Ukhra, West Bengal**

Nimbārka propounded *Dvaitādvaita*, based upon Bhedābheda as was taught by Bhāskara. *Brahman* (God), souls *(chit)* and matter or the universe *(achit)* are considered as three equally real and co-eternal realities. *Brahman* is the controller *(niyanta)*, the soul is the enjoyer *(bhokta)*, and the material universe is the object enjoyed *(bhogya)*. The Brahman is *Krishna*, the ultimate cause who is omniscient, omnipotent, all-pervading Being. He is the efficient cause of the universe because, as Lord of *Karma* and internal ruler of souls, He brings about creation so that the souls can reap the consequences of their *karma*. God is considered to be the material cause of the universe because creation was a manifestation of His powers of soul *(chit)* and matter *(achit)*; creation is a transformation *(parinama)* of God's powers. He can be realized only through a constant effort to merge oneself with His nature through meditation and devotion.

Chaitanya Mahaprabhu

**Achintya-Bheda-Abheda**

Chaitanya Mahaprabhu was the prime exponent of *Achintya-Bheda-Abheda*. In Sanskrit *achintya* means 'inconceivable'. *Achintya-Bheda-Abheda* represents the philosophy of "inconceivable difference in non-difference", in relation to the non-dual reality of *Brahman-Atman* which it calls (*Krishna*), *svayam bhagavan*. The notion of "inconceivability" (*acintyatva*) is used to reconcile apparently contradictory notions in Upanishadic teachings. This school asserts that *Krishna* is *Bhagavan* of the *bhakti yogins*, the *Brahman* of the *jnana yogins*, and has a divine potency that is inconceivable. He is all-pervading and thus in all parts of the universe (non-difference), yet he is inconceivably more (difference). This school is at the foundation of the *Gaudiya Vaishnava* religious tradition.

**Vedanta philosophy**

The important approaches followed by the most noted proponents of different schools of Vedanta are summarized below:

1. To theorize that the soul (*Ātman* / *Jivātman*) and the physical universe (*Prakriti*) are both identical with and different from *Brahman*. This view is held by Bhartriprapancha.
2. To place non-dualistic ideas in the most important place, relegating dualistic ideas to an interim position. This approach is followed by Shankara.
3. To theorize that non-dualism is qualified by difference. This is Ramanuja's approach.
4. To emphasize dualism, discrediting and offering an alternative explanation of non-dualistic ideas. This is from Madhva.

**Sivananda gives the following explanation:**

Madhva said, "Man is the servant of God," and established his Dvaita philosophy. Ramanuja said, "Man is a ray or spark of God," and established his Visishtadvaita philosophy. Sankara said, "Man is identical

with Brahman or the Eternal Soul," and established his Kevala Advaita philosophy.

**Common features**

Despite their differences, all schools of Vedanta share some common features:

1. *Brahman* exists as the unchanging material cause and instrumental cause of the world.
2. The *Upanishads* are a reliable source of knowledge (*Sruti Śabda* in Pramana); Vedanta is the pursuit of knowledge into the *Brahman* and the *Ātman*.
3. Belief in rebirth and the desirability of release from the cycle of rebirths, *(mokṣa)*.
4. The self (*Ātman*/*Jiva*) is the agent of its own acts (karma) and the recipient of the consequences of these actions.
5. Rejection of Buddhism and Jainism and conclusions of the other Vedic schools (Nyaya, Vaisheshika, Samkhya, Yoga, and, to some extent, the Purva Mimamsa.)

**Metaphysics**

Vedanta philosophies discuss three fundamental metaphysical categories and the relations between the three.

1. *Brahman* or *Ishvara*: the ultimate reality
2. *Ātman* or *Jivātman*: the individual soul, self
3. *Prakriti*/*Jagat*: the empirical world, ever–changing physical universe, body and matter

**Brahman / Ishvara - Conceptions of the Supreme Reality**

Shankara, in formulating Advaita, talks of two conceptions of *Brahman*: the higher *Brahman* as undifferentiated Being, and a lower *Brahman* endowed with qualities as the creator of the universe.

1. *Parā* or Higher *Brahman*: the undifferentiated, absolute, infinite, transcendental, supra-relational Brahman beyond all thought and speech is defined as *parā Brahman*, *nirviśeṣa* Brahman or *nirguṇa* Brahman and is the Absolute of metaphysics.
2. *Aparā* or Lower *Brahman*: the *Brahman* with qualities defined as *aparā Brahman* or *saguṇa Brahman*. The *saguṇa Brahman* is

endowed with attributes and represents the personal God of religion.

Ramanuja, in formulating Vishishtadvaita Vedanta, rejects *nirguṇa*—that the undifferentiated Absolute is inconceivable—and adopts a theistic interpretation of the *Upanishads*, accepts *Brahman* as *Ishvara*, the personal God who is the seat of all auspicious attributes, as the One reality. The God of Vishishtadvaita is accessible to the devotee, yet remains the Absolute, with differentiated attributes.

Madhva, in expounding Dvaita philosophy, maintains that *Vishnu* is the supreme God, thus identifying the *Brahman*, or absolute reality, of the *Upanishads* with a personal god, as Ramanuja had done before him.[124] Nimbarka, in his dvaitadvata philosophy, accepted the *Brahman* both as *nirguṇa* and as *saguṇa*. Vallabha, in his shuddhadvaita philosophy, not only accepts the triple ontological essence of the *Brahman*, but also His manifestation as personal God (*Ishvara*), as matter and as individual souls.

**Relation between Brahman and Jiva / Atman**

The schools of Vedanta differ in their conception of the relation they see between *Ātman* / *Jivātman* and *Brahman* / *Ishvara*:

- According to Advaita Vedanta, *Ātman* is identical with *Brahman* and there is no difference.
- According to Vishishtadvaita, *Jīvātman* is different from *Ishvara*, though eternally connected with Him as His mode.[127] The oneness of the Supreme Reality is understood in the sense of an organic unity (*vishistaikya*). *Brahman* / *Ishvara* alone, as organically related to all *Jīvātman* and the material universe is the one Ultimate Reality.
- According to Dvaita, the *Jīvātman* is totally and always different from *Brahman* / *Ishvara*.
- According to Shuddhadvaita (pure monism), the *Jīvātman* and *Brahman* are identical; both, along with the changing empirically-observed universe being Krishna.

**Epistemology**




Epistemology in Dvaita and Vishishtadvaita Vedanta. Advaita and some other Vedanta schools recognize six epistemic means.

**Pramana**

*Pramāṇa* (Sanskrit: प्रमाण) literally means "proof", "that which is the means of valid knowledge". It refers to epistemology in Indian philosophies, and encompasses the study of reliable and valid means by which human beings gain accurate, true knowledge. The focus of Pramana is the manner in which correct knowledge can be acquired, how one knows or does not know, and to what extent knowledge pertinent about someone or something can be acquired.[132] Ancient and medieval Indian texts identify six *pramanas* as correct means of accurate knowledge and truths:

*Pratyakṣa* (perception)

1. *Anumāṇa* (inference)
2. *Upamāṇa* (comparison and analogy)
3. *Arthāpatti* (postulation, derivation from circumstances)
4. *Anupalabdi* (non-perception, negative/cognitive proof)
5. *Śabda* (scriptural testimony/ verbal testimony of past or present reliable experts).

The different schools of Vedanta have historically disagreed as to which of the six are epistemologically valid. For example, while Advaita Vedanta accepts all six *pramanas*, Vishishtadvaita and Dvaita accept only three *pramanas* (perception, inference and testimony).

Advaita considers *Pratyakṣa* (perception) as the most reliable source of knowledge, and *Śabda*, the scriptural evidence, is considered secondary except for matters related to Brahman, where it is the only evidence. In Vishistadvaita and Dvaita, *Śabda*, the scriptural testimony, is considered the most authentic means of knowledge instead.

**Theories of cause and effect**

All schools of Vedanta subscribe to the theory of *Satkāryavāda*, which means that the effect is pre-existent in the cause. But there are two different views on the status of the "effect", that is, the world. Most schools of Vedanta, as well as Samkhya, support *Parinamavada*, the idea that the world is a real transformation (*parinama*) of Brahman.[138] According to Nicholson (2010, p. 27), "the *Brahma Sutras* espouse the realist Parinamavada position, which appears to have been the view most common among early Vedantins". In contrast to Badarayana, Adi Shankara and Advaita Vedantists hold a different view, *Vivartavada*, which says that the effect, the world, is merely an unreal (*vivarta*) transformation of its cause, Brahman.

Influence

**Hindu traditions**

Vedanta, adopting ideas from other orthodox (*āstika*) schools, became the most prominent school of Hinduism. Vedanta traditions led to the development of many traditions in Hinduism. Sri Vaishnavism of south and southeastern India is based on Ramanuja's *Vishishtadvaita* Vedanta. Ramananda led to the *Vaishnav Bhakti* Movement in north, east, central and west India. This movement draws its philosophical and theistic basis from *Vishishtadvaita*. A large number of devotional *Vaishnavism* traditions of east India, north India (particularly the Braj region), west and central India are based on various sub-schools of *Bhedabheda* Vedanta. *Advaita* Vedanta influenced *Krishna Vaishnavism* in the northeastern state of Assam. The Madhva school of Vaishnavism found in coastal Karnataka is based on *Dvaita* Vedanta.

*Āgamas*, the classical literature of *Shaivism*, though independent in origin, show Vedanta association and premises. Of the 92 *Āgamas*, ten are (*dvaita*) texts, eighteen (*bhedabheda*), and sixty-four (*advaita*)

texts. While the *Bhairava Shastras* are monistic, *Shiva Shastras* are dualistic. Isaeva (1995, pp. 134–135) finds the link between Gaudapada's *Advaita* Vedanta and *Kashmir Shaivism* evident and natural. Tirumular, the Tamil *Shaiva Siddhanta* scholar, credited with creating "Vedanta–Siddhanta" (Advaita Vedanta and Shaiva Siddhanta synthesis), stated, "becoming *Shiva* is the goal of Vedanta and *Siddhanta*; all other goals are secondary to it and are vain."

*Shaktism*, or traditions where a goddess is considered identical to *Brahman*, has similarly flowered from a syncretism of the monist premises of *Advaita* Vedanta and dualism premises of *Samkhya–Yoga* school of Hindu philosophy, sometimes referred to as *Shaktadavaitavada* (literally, the path of nondualistic *Shakti*).

**Neo-Vedanta**

*Main articles: Neo-Vedanta, Hindu nationalism, and Hindu reform movements*

Neo-Vedanta, variously called as "Hindu modernism", "neo-Hinduism", and "neo-Advaita", is a term that denotes some novel interpretations of Hinduism that developed in the 19th century, presumably as a reaction to the colonial British rule. King (2002, pp. 129–135) writes that these notions accorded the Hindu nationalists an opportunity to attempt the construction of a nationalist ideology to help unite the Hindus to fight colonial oppression. Western orientalists, in their search for its "essence", attempted to formulate a notion of "Hinduism" based on a single interpretation of Vedanta as a unified body of religious praxis.[150] This was contra-factual as, historically, Hinduism and Vedanta had always accepted a diversity of traditions. King (1999, pp. 133–136) asserts that the neo-Vedantic theory of "overarching tolerance and acceptance" was used by the Hindu reformers, together with the ideas of Universalism and Perennialism, to challenge the polemic dogmatism of Judaeo-Christian-Islamic missionaries against the Hindus.

The neo-Vedantins argued that the six orthodox schools of Hindu philosophy were perspectives on a single truth, all valid and complementary to each other. Halbfass (2007, p. 307) sees these interpretations as incorporating western ideas into traditional systems,

especially Advaita Vedanta. It is the modern form of Advaita Vedanta, states King (1999, p. 135), the neo-Vedantists subsumed the Buddhist philosophies as part of the Vedanta tradition and then argued that all the world religions are same "non-dualistic position as the philosophia perennis", ignoring the differences within and outside of Hinduism. According to Gier (2000, p. 140), neo-Vedanta is Advaita Vedanta which accepts universal realism:

Ramakrishna, Vivekananda and Aurobindo have been labeled neo-Vedantists (the latter called it realistic Advaita), a view of Vedanta that rejects the Advaitins' idea that the world is illusory. As Aurobindo phrased it, philosophers need to move from 'universal illusionism' to 'universal realism', in the strict philosophical sense of assuming the world to be fully real.

A major proponent in the popularization of this Universalist and Perennialist interpretation of Advaita Vedanta was Vivekananda,[156] who played a major role in the revival of Hinduism. He was also instrumental in the spread of Advaita Vedanta to the West via the Vedanta Society, the international arm of the Ramakrishna Order.

**Criticism of Neo-Vedanta label**

Nicholson (2010, p. 2) writes that the attempts at integration which came to be known as neo-Vedanta were evident as early as between the 12th and the 16th century–

... certain thinkers began to treat as a single whole the diverse philosophical teachings of the Upanishads, epics, Puranas, and the schools known retrospectively as the "six systems" (*saddarsana*) of mainstream Hindu philosophy.

Matilal criticizes Neo-Hinduism as an oddity developed by West-inspired Western Indologists and attributes it to the flawed Western perception of Hinduism in modern India. In his scathing criticism of this school of reasoning, Matilal (2002, pp. 403–404) says:

The so-called 'traditional' outlook is in fact a construction. Indian history shows that the tradition itself was self-conscious and critical of itself, sometimes overtly and sometimes covertly. It was never free from internal tensions due to the inequalities that persisted in a hierarchical society, nor was it without confrontation and challenge throughout its

history. Hence Gandhi, Vivekananda and Tagore were not simply 'transplants from Western culture, products arising solely from confrontation with the west.

...It is rather odd that, although the early Indologists' romantic dream of discovering a pure (and probably primitive, according to some) form of Hinduism (or Buddhism as the case may be) now stands discredited in many quarters; concepts like neo-Hinduism are still bandied about as substantial ideas or faultless explanation tools by the Western 'analytic' historians as well as the West-inspired historians of India.

**Influence on Western thinkers**

An exchange of ideas has been taking place between the western world and Asia since the late 18th century as a result of colonization of parts of Asia by Western powers. This also influenced western religiosity. The first translation of *Upanishads*, published in two parts in 1801 and 1802, significantly influenced Arthur Schopenhauer, who called them the consolation of his life. He drew explicit parallels between his philosophy, as set out in *The World as Will and Representation*, and that of the Vedanta philosophy as described in the work of Sir William Jones. Early translations also appeared in other European languages. Influenced by Śaṅkara's concepts of *Brahman* (God) and *māyā* (illusion), Lucian Blaga often used the concepts *marele anonim* (the Great Anonymous) and *cenzura transcendentă* (the transcendental censorship) in his philosophy.

**Reception**

According to Nakamura (1950, p. 3), the Vedanta school has had a historic and central influence on Hinduism:

The prevalence of Vedanta thought is found not only in philosophical writings but also in various forms of (Hindu) literature, such as the epics, lyric poetry, drama and so forth. ...the Hindu religious sects, the common faith of the Indian populace, looked to Vedanta philosophy for the theoretical foundations for their theology. The influence of Vedanta is prominent in the sacred literatures of Hinduism, such as the various Puranas, Samhitas, Agamas and Tantras...

Frithjof Schuon summarizes the influence of Vedanta on Hinduism as follows:

The Vedanta contained in the Upanishads, then formulated in the *Brahma Sutra*, and finally commented and explained by Shankara, is an invaluable key for discovering the deepest meaning of all the religious doctrines and for realizing that the *Sanatana Dharma* secretly penetrates all the forms of traditional spirituality.

**Flood (1996, pp. 231–232, 238) states,**

..the most influential school of theology in India has been Vedanta, exerting enormous influence on all religious traditions and becoming the central ideology of the Hindu renaissance in the nineteenth century. It has become the philosophical paradigm of Hinduism "par excellence".

Similarities with Spinoza's philosophy

German Sanskritist Theodore Goldstücker was among the early scholars to notice similarities between the religious conceptions of the Vedanta and those of the Dutch Jewish philosopher Baruch Spinoza, writing that Spinoza's thought was

... so exact a representation of the ideas of the Vedanta, that we might have suspected its founder to have borrowed the fundamental principles of his system from the Hindus, did his biography not satisfy us that he was wholly unacquainted with their doctrines [...] comparing the fundamental ideas of both we should have no difficulty in proving that, had Spinoza been a Hindu, his system would in all probability mark a last phase of the Vedanta philosophy.

Max Müller noted the striking similarities between Vedanta and the system of Spinoza, saying,

The Brahman, as conceived in the Upanishads and defined by Sankara, is clearly the same as Spinoza's 'Substantia'."

Helena Blavatsky, a founder of the Theosophical Society, also compared Spinoza's religious thought to Vedanta, writing in an unfinished essay,

As to Spinoza's Deity—*natura naturans*—conceived in his attributes simply and alone; and the same Deity—as *natura naturata* or as conceived in the endless series of modifications or correlations, the direct outflowing results from the properties of these attributes, it is the Vedantic Deity pure and simple.

**Check Your Progress 2**

Note: i) Use the space given below for your answer.

ii) See the end of the unit for tips for your answer.

1. Discuss the Post-Vedic religions.

…………………………………………………………………

…………………………………………………………………

…………………………………………………………………

2. Describe Upanishads.

…………………………………………………………………

…………………………………………………………………

…………………………………………………………………

3. Discuss about the Vedanta.

…………………………………………………………………

…………………………………………………………………

…………………………………………………………………

## 4.8 LET US SUM UP

The Vedas are perhaps the oldest written text on our planet today. They date back to the beginning of Indian civilization and are the earliest literary records of the whole Aryan race. They are supposed to have been passed through oral tradition for over 100,000 years. They came to us in written form between 4-6,000 years ago.

The Vedas are divided into four groups, Rigveda, Yajurveda, Samaveda and Atharvaveda. Each group has an original text (Mantra) and a commentary portion (Brahmana).

The Brahmana again has two portions, one interpreting ritual and the other the philosophy. The portions interpreting the philosophy of the original texts constitute the Upanishads.

There are also auxiliary texts called Vedangas. Vedic literature refers to the whole of this vast group of literature. The whole of Rgveda and most of Atharvaveda are in the form of poetry, or hymns to the deities and the elements.

Samaveda is in verses that are to be sung and Yajurveda is largely in short prose passages. Both Samaveda and Yajurveda are concerned with rituals rather than philosophy - especially Yajurveda.

## 4.9 KEY WORDS

Vedanta: Vedanta or Uttara Mīmāṃsā is the most prominent of the six (āstika) schools of Hindu philosophy. Literally meaning "end of the Vedas", Vedanta reflects ideas.

Vedas:

## 4.10 QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

1. Discuss the Religion in Ancient India
2. Describe Initiation of religions in India
3. What are the Vedas?
4. Discuss the Post-Vedic religions
5. Describe Upanishads
6. Discuss about the Vedanta

## 4.11 SUGGESTED READINGS AND REFERENCES


- Anthony, David W. (2007). The Horse, the Wheel, and Language. How Bronze-Age riders from the Eurasian steppes shaped the modern world. Princeton University Press.
- Basham, Arthur Llewellyn (1989). The Origins and Development of Classical Hinduism. Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780195073492.
- Beckwith, Christopher I. (2011). Empires of the Silk Road. A history of central Eurasia from the Bronze Age to the present. Princeton University Press.
- Bryant, Edwin (2001). The Quest for the Origins of Vedic Culture: The Indo-Aryan migration debate. Oxford University Press.
- Bryant, Edwin F.; Patton, Laurie L., eds. (2005). The Indo-Aryan Controversy: Evidence and inference in Indian history. London: Routledge. ISBN 0-7007-1463-4.
- Kak, Subhash. "Vedic astronomy and early Indian chronology". In Bryant & Patton (2005).
- Flood, Gavin D. (1996). An Introduction to Hinduism. Cambridge University Press.

- Flood, Gavin (2008). The Blackwell Companion to Hinduism. John Wiley & Sons.
- Hiltebeitel, Alf (2002). "Hinduism". In Kitagawa, Joseph (ed.). The Religious Traditions of Asia: Religion, history, and culture. Routledge. ISBN 9781136875977.
- Hiltebeitel, Alf (2007). "Hinduism". In Kitagawa, Joseph (ed.). The Religious Traditions of Asia: Religion, History, and Culture (Digital printing ed.). Routledge. ISBN 9781136875908.
- Jamison, Stephanie W. (2006). "The Indo-Aryan controversy: Evidence and inference in Indian history" (PDF). Book review. Journal of Indo-European Studies. 34: 255–261.
- Kak, Subhash (2005). "Vedic astronomy and early Indian chronology". In Bryant, Edwin; Patton, Laurie (eds.). Indo-Aryan Controversy: Evidence and Inference in Indian History. Routledge.
- King, Richard (1999). Orientalism and Religion: Post-Colonial Theory, India and "The Mystic East". Routledge.
- Knipe, David M. (2015). Vedic Voices: Intimate narratives of a living Andhra tradition. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Laumakis, Stephen J. (21 February 2008). An Introduction to Buddhist Philosophy. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9781139469661.
- Mallory; Adams (2006). The Oxford Introduction to Proto-Indo-European and the Proto-Indo-European World. Oxford University Press.
- Melton, Gordon J.; Baumann, Martin (2010). Religions of the World: A comprehensive encyclopedia of beliefs and practices. ABC-CLIO.
- Michaels, Axel (2004). Hinduism. Past and present. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Muesse, Mark William (2003). Hinduism. Great World Religions.
- Samuel, Geoffrey (2010). The Origins of Yoga and Tantra. Indic religions to the thirteenth century. Cambridge University Press.
- Singh, Upinder (2008). A History of Ancient and Early Medieval India: From the Stone Age to the 12th century. Pearson Education India. ISBN 978-81-317-1120-0.

- Smart, Ninian (2003). Godsdiensten van de wereld [The World's Religions]. Kampen: Uitgeverij Kok.
- von Stietencron, Heinrich (2005). Hindu Myth, Hindu History: Religion, art, and politics. Orient Blackswan.
- White, David Gordon (2006). Kiss of the Yogini: "Tantric Sex" in its South Asian Contexts. University of Chicago Press. ISBN 9780226027838.
- Witzel, Michael (1995). "Early Sanskritization: Origin and Development of the Kuru state" (PDF). EJVS. 1 (4). Archived from the original (PDF) on 11 June 2007.
- Zimmer, Heinrich (1989). Pholosophies of India. Princeton University Press.

## 4.12 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

**Check Your Progress 1**

1. See Section 4.2
2. See Section 4.3
3. See Section 4.4

**Check Your Progress 2**

1. See Section 4.5
2. See Section 4.6
3. See Section 4.7

# UNIT 5: SIX SCHOOLS OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

**STRUCTURE**

5.0 Objectives
5.1 Introduction
5.2 Charvaka School
5.3 Samkhya School of Indian Philosophy
5.4 Yoga School of Indian Philosophy
5.5 Nyaya School of Indian Philosophy
5.6 Vaisheshika School of Indian Philosophy
5.7 Mimansa School of Indian Philosophy
5.8 Vedanta School of Indian Philosophy
5.9 Let us sum up
5.10 Key Words
5.11 Questions for Review
5.12 Suggested readings and references
5.13 Answers to Check Your Progress

## 5.0 OBJECTIVES

After this unit we can able to know:

- Charvaka School
- Samkhya School of Indian Philosophy
- Yoga School of Indian Philosophy
- Nyaya School of Indian Philosophy
- Vaisheshika School of Indian Philosophy
- Mimansa School of Indian Philosophy
- Vedanta School of Indian Philosophy

## 5.1 INTRODUCTION

Indian philosophy refers to ancient philosophical traditions of the Indian subcontinent. The principal schools are classified as either orthodox or heterodox – āstika or nāstika – depending on one of three alternate

criteria: whether it believes the Vedas as a valid source of knowledge; whether the school believes in the premises of Brahman and Atman; and whether the school believes in afterlife and Devas.

There are six major schools of orthodox[when defined as?] Indian Hindu philosophy—Nyaya, Vaisheshika, Samkhya, Yoga, Mīmāṃsā and Vedanta, and five major Shramanic schools—Jain, Buddhist, Ajivika, Ajñana, and Charvaka. However, there are other methods of classification; Vidyaranya for instance identifies sixteen schools of Indian philosophy by including those that belong to the Śaiva and Raseśvara traditions.

The main schools of Indian philosophy were formalised chiefly between 1000 BCE to the early centuries of the Common Era. Competition and integration between the various schools was intense during their formative years, especially between 800 BCE and 200 CE. Some schools like Jainism, Buddhism, Yoga, Śaiva and Vedanta survived, but others, like Ajñana, Charvaka and Ājīvika did not.

Ancient and medieval era texts of Indian philosophies include extensive discussions on Ontology (metaphysics, Brahman-Atman, Sunyata-Anatta), reliable means of knowledge (epistemology, Pramanas), value system (axiology) and other topics.

During later Vedic period, the concepts related to nature of soul and cosmic principle, or the Atman and Brahman developed in form of six different schools of philosophies. these are known as 'Shada Darshan'. Apart from these orthodox systems which consider the Vedas as the final authority, there is another school of philosophy which developed prior to these six schools.

Note that, in total there are three Nastika Schools in Indian Philosophy – Charvaka, Jaina, and Buddhism.

## 5.2 CHARVAKA SCHOOL

It is an Nastika system, which do not believe in the Vedas and the God.

Charvaka system believes only in materialism.

Brihaspati is considered as the founder of Charvaka School.

It is mentioned in Vedas and Brihadaranyaka Upanishad.

It is also known as Lokayata Philosophy or the philosophy of the masses.

It considers that there no other world after death. Therefore, there is no existence other than this material world.

Charvaka does not recognises God, soul and heaven since they cannot be perceived.

They consider the whole universe as consisting only 4 elements: earth, water, fire and air.

Other Nastika Philosophy systems are: Jain and Buddhism, which also do not recognize the authority of Veda and presence of God.

Here, we are giving basic characteristics details of the 6 (Six) 'Aastika' schools of Indian Philosophy.

Charvaka (Sanskrit: चार्वाक; IAST: Cārvāka), also known as Lokāyata, is an ancient school of Indian materialism. Charvaka holds direct perception, empiricism, and conditional inference as proper sources of knowledge, embraces philosophical skepticism and rejects ritualism, and supernaturalism.

Brihaspati is usually referred to as the founder of Charvaka or Lokāyata philosophy. During the Hindu reformation period in the 600 BCE, when Buddhism and Jainism arose, the philosophy was well documented and refuted by the new religions. Much of the primary literature of Charvaka, the Barhaspatya sutras, were lost either due to waning popularity or other unknown reasons. Its teachings have been compiled from historic secondary literature such as those found in the shastras, sutras, and the Indian epic poetry as well as in the dialogues of Gautama Buddha and from Jain literature.

One of the widely studied principles of Charvaka philosophy was its rejection of inference as a means to establish valid, universal knowledge, and metaphysical truths. In other words, the Charvaka epistemology states that whenever one infers a truth from a set of observations or truths, one must acknowledge doubt; inferred knowledge is conditional.

Charvaka is categorized as a heterodox school of Indian philosophy. It is considered an example of atheistic schools in the Hindu tradition.

**Etymology and meaning**

The etymology of Charvaka (Sanskrit: चार्वाक) is uncertain. Bhattacharya quotes the grammarian Hemacandra, to the effect that the word cārvāka

is derived from the root carv, 'to chew' : "A Cārvāka chews the self (carvatyātmānaṃ cārvākaḥ). Hemacandra refers to his own grammatical work, Uṇādisūtra 37, which runs as follows: mavāka-śyāmāka-vārtāka-jyontāka-gūvāka-bhadrākādayaḥ. Each of these words ends with the āka suffix and is formed irregularly."[19] This may also allude to the philosophy's hedonistic precepts of "eat, drink, and be merry".[20]
Others believe it to mean "agreeable speech" or pejoratively, "sweet-tongued", from Sanskrit's cāru "agreeable" and vāc "speech" (which becomes vāk in the nominative singular and in compounds). Yet another hypothesis is that it is eponymous, with the founder of the school being Charvaka, a disciple of Brihaspati.[21]

### As Lokayata

According to Chattopadhyaya 1992, p. 1, the traditional name of Charvaka is Lokayata. It was called Lokayata because it was prevalent (ayatah) among the people (lokesu), and meant the world-outlook of the people. The dictionary meaning of Lokāyata (लोकायत) signifies "directed towards, aiming at the world, worldly".[20][e]
In early to mid 20th century literature, the etymology of Lokayata has been given different interpretations, in part because the primary sources are unavailable, and the meaning has been deduced from divergent secondary literature.[23] The name Lokāyata, for example, is found in Chanakya's Arthashastra, which refers to three ānvīkṣikīs (अन्वीक्षिकी, literally, examining by reason,[24] logical philosophies) – Yoga, Samkhya and Lokāyata. However, Lokāyata in the Arthashastra is not anti-Vedic, but implies Lokāyata to be a part of Vedic lore.[25] Lokāyata here refers to logic or science of debate (disputatio, "criticism").[26] Rudolf Franke translated Lokayata in German as "logisch beweisende Naturerklärung", that is "logically proving explanation of nature".[27]
In 8th century CE Jaina literature, Saddarsanasamuccaya by Haribhadra,[28] Lokayata is stated to be the Hindu school where there is "no God, no samsara (rebirth), no karma, no duty, no fruits of merit, no sin."[29]

The Buddhist Sanskrit work Divyavadana (ca. 200–350 CE) mentions Lokayata, where it is listed among subjects of study, and with the sense of "technical logical science".[30] Shantarakshita and Adi Shankara use the word lokayata to mean materialism,[9][31] with the latter using the term Lokāyata, not Charvaka.[32]

In Silāṅka's commentary on Sūtra-kṛtāṅgna, the oldest Jain Āgama Prakrt literature, he has used four terms for Cārvāka viz. (1) Bṛhaspatya (2) Lokāyata (3) Bhūtavādin (4) Vāmamārgin.[33]

**Origin**

The tenets of the Charvaka atheistic doctrines can be traced to the relatively later composed layers of the Rigveda, while substantial discussions on the Charvaka is found in post-Vedic literature.[9][34][f] The primary literature of Charvaka, such as the Brhaspati Sutra is missing or lost.[9][34] Its theories and development has been compiled from historic secondary literature such as those found in the shastras (such as the Arthashastra), sutras and the epics (the Mahabharata and Ramayana) of Hinduism as well as from the dialogues of Gautama Buddha and Jain literature.[9][10]

Substantial discussions about the Charvaka doctrines are found in texts during 600 BCE because of emergence of competing philosophies such as Buddhism and Jainism.[9][34][36] Bhattacharya posits that Charvaka may have been one of several atheistic, materialist schools that existed in ancient India during the 600 BCE.[37] Though there is evidence of its development in Vedic era,[38] Charvaka school of philosophy predated the Āstika schools as well as a philosophical predecessor to subsequent or contemporaneous philosophies such as Ajñana, Ājīvika, Jainism and Buddhism in the classical period of Indian philosophy.[39]

The earliest Charvaka scholar in India whose texts still survive is Ajita Kesakambali. Although materialist schools existed before Charvaka, it was the only school which systematised materialist philosophy by setting them down in the form of aphorisms in the 6th century BCE. There was a base text, a collection sūtras or aphorisms and several commentaries were written to explicate the aphorisms. This should be seen in the wider context of the oral tradition of Indian philosophy. It was in the 600 BCE

onwards, with the emergent popularity of Buddhism that ancient schools started codifying and writing down the details of their philosophy.[40]

E. W. Hopkins, in his The Ethics of India (1924) claims that Charvaka philosophy predated Jainism and Buddhism, mentioning "the old Cārvāka or materialist of the 6th century BC". Rhys Davids assumes that lokāyata in ca. 500 BC came to mean "skepticism" in general without yet being organised as a philosophical school. This proves that it had already existed for centuries and had become a generic term by 600 BCE. Its methodology of skepticism is included in the Ramayana, Ayodhya kanda, chapter 108, where Jabāli tries to persuade Rāma to accept the kingdom by using nāstika arguments (Rāma refutes him in chapter 109):[41]

O, the highly wise! Arrive at a conclusion, therefore, that there is nothing beyond this Universe. Give precedence to that which meets the eye and turn your back on what is beyond our knowledge. (2.108.17)

There are alternate theories behind the origins of Charvaka. Bṛhaspati is sometimes referred to as the founder of Charvaka or Lokāyata philosophy. Billington 1997, p. 43 states that a philosopher named Charvaka lived in or about the 6th century BCE, who developed the premises of this Indian philosophy in the form of Brhaspati Sutra. These sutras predate 150 BC, because they are mentioned in the Mahābhāṣya (7.3.45).[41]

Basham 1981, pp. 11–17, citing the Buddhist Samaññaphala Sutta, suggests six schools of heterodox, pre-Buddhist and pre-Jain, atheistic Indian traditions in 6th century BCE, that included Charvakas and Ajivikas. Charvaka was a living philosophy up to the 12th century in India's historical timeline, after which this system seems to have disappeared without leaving any trace.[42]

**Philosophy**

The Charvaka school of philosophy had a variety of atheistic and materialistic beliefs. They held perception and direct experiments to be the valid and reliable source of knowledge.[43]

**Epistemology**

The Charvaka epistemology holds perception as the primary and proper source of knowledge, while inference is held as prone to being either right or wrong and therefore conditional or invalid.[13][44] Perceptions are of two types, for Charvaka, external and internal. External perception is described as that arising from the interaction of five senses and worldly objects, while internal perception is described by this school as that of inner sense, the mind.[13] Inference is described as deriving a new conclusion and truth from one or more observations and previous truths. To Charvakas, inference is useful but prone to error, as inferred truths can never be without doubt.[45] Inference is good and helpful, it is the validity of inference that is suspect – sometimes in certain cases and often in others. To the Charvakas there were no reliable means by which the efficacy of inference as a means of knowledge could be established.[11]

Charvaka's epistemological argument can be explained with the example of fire and smoke. Kamal states that when there is smoke (middle term), one's tendency may be to leap to the conclusion that it must be caused by fire (major term in logic).[13] While this is often true, it need not be universally true, everywhere or all the times, stated the Charvaka scholars. Smoke can have other causes. In Charvaka epistemology, as long as the relation between two phenomena, or observation and truth, has not been proven as unconditional, it is an uncertain truth. Such methods of reasoning, that is jumping to conclusions or inference, is prone to flaw in this Indian philosophy.[13][45] Charvakas further state that full knowledge is reached when we know all observations, all premises and all conditions. But the absence of conditions, state Charvakas, can not be established beyond doubt by perception, as some conditions may be hidden or escape our ability to observe.[13] They acknowledge that every person relies on inference in daily life, but to them if we act uncritically, we err. While our inferences sometimes are true and lead to successful action, it is also a fact that sometimes inference is wrong and leads to error.[37] Truth then, state Charvaka, is not an unfailing character of inference, truth is merely an accident of inference, and one that is separable. We must be skeptics, question what we know by inference, question our epistemology.[13][34]

This epistemological proposition of Charvakas was influential among various schools of in Indian philosophies, by demonstrating a new way of thinking and re-evaluation of past doctrines. Hindu, Buddhist and Jain scholars extensively deployed Charvaka insights on inference in rational re-examination of their own theories.[13][46]

### Comparison with other schools of Hinduism

Charvaka epistemology represents minimalist pramāṇas (epistemological methods) in Hindu philosophy. The other schools of Hinduism developed and accepted multiple valid forms of epistemology.[47][48] To Charvakas, Pratyakṣa (perception) was the one valid way to knowledge and other means of knowledge were either always conditional or invalid. Advaita Vedanta scholars considered six means of valid knowledge and to truths: Pratyakṣa (perception), Anumāṇa (inference), Upamāṇa (comparison and analogy), Arthāpatti (postulation), Anupalabdhi (non-perception, cognitive proof) and Śabda (word, testimony of past or present reliable experts).[47][48][49] While Charvaka school accepted just one, the valid means of epistemology in other schools of Hinduism ranged between 2 and 6.[47][48]

### Metaphysics

Since none of the means of knowing were found to be worthy to establish the invariable connection between middle term and predicate, Charvakas concluded that the inference could not be used to ascertain metaphysical truths. Thus, to Charvakas, the step which the mind takes from the knowledge of something to infer the knowledge of something else could be accounted for by its being based on a former perception or by its being in error. Cases where inference was justified by the result were seen only to be mere coincidences.[50]

Therefore, Charvakas denied metaphysical concepts like reincarnation, an extracorporeal soul, the efficacy of religious rites, other worlds (heaven and hell), fate and accumulation of merit or demerit through the performance of certain actions.[40] Charvakas also rejected the use of supernatural causes to describe natural phenomena. To them all natural

phenomena was produced spontaneously from the inherent nature of things.[51]

The fire is hot, the water cold, refreshing cool the breeze of morn;
By whom came this variety ? from their own nature was it born.[51]

**Consciousness and afterlife**

[icon]

This section needs expansion. You can help by adding to it. (July 2015)

The Charvaka did not believe in karma, rebirth or an afterlife. To them, all attributes that represented a person, such as thinness, fatness etc., resided in the body. The Sarvasiddhanta Samgraha states the Charvaka position as follows,[52]

There is no other world other than this;
There is no heaven and no hell;
The realm of Shiva and like regions,
are fabricated by stupid imposters.

— Sarvasiddhanta Samgraha, Verse 8[52]

Pleasure

Part of a series on

Hedonism

Thinkers[show]

Schools of hedonism[show]

Key concepts[show]

Related articles[show]

vte

Charvaka believed that there was nothing wrong with sensual pleasure. Since it is impossible to have pleasure without pain, Charvaka thought that wisdom lay in enjoying pleasure and avoiding pain as far as possible. Unlike many of the Indian philosophies of the time, Charvaka did not believe in austerities or rejecting pleasure out of fear of pain and held such reasoning to be foolish.[43]

The Sarvasiddhanta Samgraha states the Charvaka position on pleasure and hedonism as follows,[53]

The enjoyment of heaven lies in eating delicious food, keeping company of young women, using fine clothes, perfumes, garlands, sandal paste... while moksha is death which is cessation of life-breath... the wise therefore ought not to take pains on account of moksha. A fool wears himself out by penances and fasts. Chastity and other such ordinances are laid down by clever weaklings.

— Sarvasiddhanta Samgraha, Verses 9-12[54]

Religion

Charvakas rejected many of the standard religious conceptions of Hindus, Buddhists and Jains, such as an afterlife, reincarnation, samsara, karma and religious rites. They were critical of the Vedas, as well as Buddhist scriptures.[55]

The Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha with commentaries by Madhavacharya describes the Charvakas as critical of the Vedas, materialists without morals and ethics. To Charvakas, the text states, the Vedas suffered from several faults – errors in transmission across generations, untruth, self-contradiction and tautology. The Charvakas pointed out the disagreements, debates and mutual rejection by karmakanda Vedic priests and jñānakanda Vedic priests, as proof that either one of them is wrong or both are wrong, as both cannot be right.[55][56][57]

Charvakas, according to Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha verses 10 and 11, declared the Vedas to be incoherent rhapsodies whose only usefulness was to provide livelihood to priests. They also held the belief that Vedas were invented by man, and had no divine authority.[51]

Charvakas rejected the need for ethics or morals, and suggested that "while life remains, let a man live happily, let him feed on ghee even though he runs in debt".[51]

The Jain scholar Haribhadra, in the last section of his text Saddarsanasamuccaya, includes Charvaka in his list of six darśanas of Indian traditions, along with Buddhism, Nyaya-Vaisheshika, Samkhya, Jainism and Jaiminiya.[58] Haribhadra notes that Charvakas assert that there is nothing beyond the senses, consciousness is an emergent property, and that it is foolish to seek what cannot be seen.[59]

The accuracy of these views, attributed to Charvakas, has been contested by scholars.[60][61]

**Public administration**

An extract from Aaine-Akbari (vol.III, tr. by H. S. Barrett, pp217–218) written by Abul Fazl, the famous historian of Akbar's court, mentions a symposium of philosophers of all faiths held in 1578 at Akbar's instance. The account is given by the historian Vincent Smith, in his article titled "The Jain Teachers of Akbar". Some Carvaka thinkers are said to have participated in the symposium. Under the heading "Nastika" Abul Fazl has referred to the good work, judicious administration and welfare schemes that were emphasised by the Charvaka law-makers. Somadeva has also mentioned the Charvaka method of defeating the enemies of the nation.[62][63]

**Works**

No independent works on Charvaka philosophy can be found except for a few sūtras composed by Brihaspati. The 8th century Tattvopaplavasimha of Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa with Madhyamaka influence is a significant source of Charvaka philosophy. Shatdarshan Samuchay and Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha of Vidyaranya are a few other works which elucidate Charvaka thought.[64]

In the epic Mahabharata, Book 12 Chapter 39, a villain who dresses up like a scholar, appoints himself as spokesperson for all scholars, and who then advises Yudhishthira to act unethically, is named Charvaka.[65]

One of the widely studied references to the Charvaka philosophy is the Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha (etymologically all-philosophy-collection), a famous work of 14th century Advaita Vedanta philosopher Mādhava Vidyāraṇya from South India, which starts with a chapter on the Charvaka system. After invoking, in the Prologue of the book, the Hindu gods Shiva and Vishnu ("by whom the earth and rest were produced"), Vidyāraṇya asks, in the first chapter:[66]

“ ...but how can we attribute to the Divine Being the giving of supreme felicity, when such a notion has been utterly abolished by Charvaka, the crest-gem of the atheistic school, the follower of the

doctrine of Brihaspati? The efforts of Charvaka are indeed hard to be eradicated, for the majority of living beings hold by the current refrain:

While life is yours, live joyously;
None can escape Death's searching eye:
When once this frame of ours they burn,
How shall it e'er again return?[66]

”Sanskrit poems and plays like the Naiṣadha-carita, Prabodha-candrodaya, Āgama-dambara, Vidvanmoda-taraṅgiṇī and Kādambarī contain representations of the Charvaka thought. However, the authors of these works were thoroughly opposed to materialism and tried to portray the Charvaka in unfavourable light. Therefore, their works should only be accepted critically.[40]

### Loss of original works

Main article: Barhaspatya sutras

There was no continuity in the Charvaka tradition after the 12th century. Whatever is written on Charvaka post this is based on second-hand knowledge, learned from preceptors to disciples and no independent works on Charvaka philosophy can be found.[40] Chatterjee and Datta explain that our understanding of Charvaka philosophy is fragmentary, based largely on criticism of its ideas by other schools, and that it is not a living tradition:

"Though materialism in some form or other has always been present in India, and occasional references are found in the Vedas, the Buddhistic literature, the Epics, as well as in the later philosophical works we do not find any systematic work on materialism, nor any organised school of followers as the other philosophical schools possess. But almost every work of the other schools states, for refutation, the materialistic views. Our knowledge of Indian materialism is chiefly based on these."[67]

### Controversy on reliability of sources

Bhattacharya 2011, pp. 10, 29–32 states that the claims against Charvaka of hedonism, lack of any morality and ethics and disregard for spirituality is from texts of competing religious philosophies (Buddhism, Jainism and Hinduism). Its primary sources, along with commentaries by

Charvaka scholars is missing or lost. This reliance on indirect sources raises the question of reliability and whether there was a bias and exaggeration in representing the views of Charvakas. Bhattacharya points out that multiple manuscripts are inconsistent, with key passages alleging hedonism and immorality missing in many manuscripts of the same text.[60]

The Skhalitapramathana Yuktihetusiddhi by Āryadevapāda, in a manuscript found in Tibet, discusses the Charvaka philosophy, but attributes a theistic claim to Charvakas - that happiness in this life, and the only life, can be attained by worshiping gods and defeating demons. Toso posits that as Charvaka philosophy's views spread and were widely discussed, non-Charvakas such as Āryadevapāda added certain points of view that may not be of the Charvakas'.[68]

Buddhists, Jains, Advaita Vedantins and Nyāya philosophers considered the Charvakas as one of their opponents and tried to refute their views. These refutations are indirect sources of Charvaka philosophy. The arguments and reasoning approach Charvakas deployed were significant that they continued to be referred to, even after all the authentic Charvaka/Lokāyata texts had been lost. However, the representation of the Charvaka thought in these works is not always firmly grounded in first-hand knowledge of Charvaka texts and should be viewed critically.[40]

Likewise, states Bhattacharya, the charge of hedonism against Charvaka might have been exaggerated.[60] Countering the argument that the Charvakas opposed all that was good in the Vedic tradition, Riepe 1964, p. 75 states, "It may be said from the available material that Cārvākas hold truth, integrity, consistency, and freedom of thought in the highest esteem."

**Commentators**

Aviddhakarṇa, Bhavivikta, Kambalasvatara, Purandara and Udbhatabhatta are the five commentators who developed the Carvaka/Lokayata system in various ways. [69] [70]

**Influence**

Epicurus was clearly much influenced by Carvaka, perhaps through intervening materialists, despite the 300 years that separated them. In some sense, one can view Epicurus as a more sophisticated version of Carvaka.[71]

Dharmakirti, a 7th-century philosopher deeply influenced by Carvaka philosophy wrote in Pramanvartik.[72]

Pyrrho

The influence of this heterodox doctrine is seen in other spheres of Indian thought.

References in the modern world

In her newly-published book, controversial US Indologist Wendy Doniger says the Narendra Modi government, by making excessive claims about the scientific content of the Arthashatra, Kamasutra and other ancient texts, including sceptic Charvakas, is "promoting" mythoscience.[73][74]

**Organisations**

The Charvaka Ashram founded by Boddu Ramakrishna in 1973 has stood the test of time and continues to further the cause of the rationalist movement.[75]

Criticism from Abrahamic philosophers

Ain-i-Akbari, a record of the Mughal Emperor Akbar's court, mentions a symposium of philosophers of all faiths held in 1578 at Akbar's insistence[76](also see Sen 2005, pp. 288–289). In the text, the Mughal historian Abu'l-Fazl ibn Mubarak summarizes the Charvaka philosophy as "unenlightened" and characterizes their works of literature as "lasting memorials to their ignorance". He notes that Charvakas considered paradise as "the state in which man lives as he chooses, without control of another", while hell as "the state in which he lives subject to another's rule". On state craft, Charvakas believe, states Mubarak, that it is best when "knowledge of just administration and benevolent government" is practiced.

India has always been a land of ideas. Our civilisation has evolved enormously over time and so has our views of the world. Philosophy is deeply rooted in our culture. The ancient wisdom of the Vedas, the

Puranas, and even the Buddhist and Jain schools of thought have left a deep impression on our collective mythology and cultural heritage.

Nonetheless, the Hindu religion has predominantly been polytheistic with immensely diverse narratives. Today this faith is so predominant in our conscience that any scope for atheism and radical rationalism often becomes heresy. Even Buddhist and Jain spirituality have a supernatural connotation. However, more detailed analyses of these religious and philosophical texts do provide clues that reveal that atheistic materialism was indeed a part of India's ancient legacy.

Charvaka, otherwise called Lokayata, emerged as one of the earliest materialist schools of thought, long before Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, that is, before the west started reassessing its beliefs in God. Lokayata, as the name infers, is the 'philosophy of the real world'. The Charvakas denied the existence of God, or rather the existence of anything that was unverifiable.

Their epistemology emphasised on perception/evidence (pramana) and observation (anubhava) of the real, material world and to subject the inferences thus obtained to doubt. Only thus could the truth be found. That, perhaps, was the beginning of logic and scientific theory – a legacy often misattributed. Surprisingly, evidence for such ideas is found in the great Hindu epic Ramayana: "O, the highly wise! Arrive at a conclusion, therefore, that there is nothing beyond this Universe. Give precedence to that which meets the eye and turn your back on what is beyond our knowledge."

Charvaka ethics was one of hedonism. They believed in sensual pleasures as the only true purpose of human existence and denied any obligations for an afterlife, or karma. There was, however, a sense of subjective moral principle of avoiding pain and suffering in the process of pleasure. Death was considered an eventuality and therefore, to live one's life to the fullest was the only wise act.

"While life is yours, live joyously;
None can escape Death's searching eye:
When once this frame of ours they burn,
How shall it e'er again return?"

But why do we need to reconsider Charvaka again?

In a world filled with hatred born out of differences in firmly established and seemingly unquestionable beliefs, the Charvakas teach us that scepticism is the way to liberation. To observe, to think, and to act only as per the rational argument is what science too has been telling us. The legacy of the Lokayata is one of a liberal approach to faith. It holds us responsible for our actions rather than comforting us with the utopia of dharma and karma.

Perhaps a saner world is possible only when people are not afraid of questioning dogmatic belief systems and instead work tirelessly to build a life that creates happiness for all.

**Lokayata/Carvaka—Indian Materialism**

In its most generic sense, "Indian Materialism" refers to the school of thought within Indian philosophy that rejects supernaturalism. It is regarded as the most radical of the Indian philosophical systems. It rejects the existence of other worldly entities such an immaterial soul or god and the after-life. Its primary philosophical import comes by way of a scientific and naturalistic approach to metaphysics. Thus, it rejects ethical systems that are grounded in supernaturalistic cosmologies. The good, for the Indian materialist, is strictly associated with pleasure and the only ethical obligation forwarded by the system is the maximization of one's own pleasure.

The terms Lokāyata and Cārvāka have historically been used to denote the philosophical school of Indian Materialism. Literally, "Lokāyata" means philosophy of the people. The term was first used by the ancient Buddhists until around 500 B.C.E. to refer to both a common tribal philosophical view and a sort of this-worldly philosophy or nature lore. The term has evolved to signify a school of thought that has been scorned by religious leaders in India and remains on the periphery of Indian philosophical thought. After 500 B.C.E., the term acquired a more derogatory connotation and became synonymous with sophistry. It was not until between the 6th and 8th century C.E. that the term "Lokāyata" began to signify Materialist thought. Indian Materialism has also been named Cārvāka after one of the two founders of the school.

Cārvāka and Ajita Kesakambalin are said to have established Indian Materialism as a formal philosophical system, but some still hold that Bṛhaspati was its original founder. Bṛhaspati allegedly authored the classic work on Indian Materialism, the Bṛhaspati Sῡtra. There are some conflicting accounts of Bṛhaspati's life, but, at the least, he is regarded as the mythical authority on Indian Materialism and at most the actual author of the since-perished Bṛhaspati Sῡtra. Indian Materialism has for this reason also been named "Bṛhaspatya."

## 5.3 SAMKHYA SCHOOL OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

Samkhya is one of the most prominent and one of the oldest of Indian philosophies. An eminent, great sage Kapila was the founder of the Samkhya School.

Based on the Upanishads, two schools of philosophy developed in India: (1) The realistic (e.g. Samkhya) (2) The idealistic (e.g.Vedanta). The Samkhya philosophy combines the basic doctrines of Samkhya and Yoga. However it should be remembered that the Samkhya represents the theory and Yoga represents the application or the practical aspects.

The word Samkhya is based upon the Sanskrit word samkhya which means ‘number’. The school specifies the number and nature of the ultimate constituents of the universe and thereby imparts knowledge of reality. In fact, the term Samkhya also means perfect knowledge. Hence it is a system of perfect knowledge.

Samkhya is dualistic realism. It is dualistic because it advocates two ultimate realities: Prakriti, matter and Purusha, self (spirit). Samkhya is realism as it considers that both matter and spirit are equally real. Samkhya is pluralistic also because of its teaching that Purusha is not one but many.

Samkhya, to some extent, differs from Nyaya -Vaisheshika and Jainism. While Nyaya-Vaisheshika and Jainism contend that the atoms are the ultimate constituents of the physical world, Samkhya differs on the issue. According to Samkhya the cause is always subtler than the effect. The Samkhya theory argues: How can so gross atoms of matter can be the

cause of such subtle and fine objects as mind and intellect? The Samkhya proposes that some finest and subtlest stuff or principle underlies all physical existence. Samkhya names it as Prakriti. Prakriti is the primordial substance behind the world. It is the material cause of the world. Prakriti is the first and ultimate cause of all gross and subtle objects.

Prakriti is the non-self. It is devoid of consciousness Prakriti is unintelligible and gets greatly influenced by the Purusha, the self. It can only manifest itself as the various objects of experience of the Purusha

Prakriti is constituted of three gunas, namely sattva, rajas and tamas. The term guna, in ordinary sense means quality or nature. But here, it is to be understood in the sense of constituent (component) in Samkhya. Sattva is concerned with happiness. While rajas is concerned with action, tamas is associated with ignorance and inaction.

Sattva is the guna whose essence is purity, fineness and subtlety. Sattva is the component concerned with lightness, brightness and pleasure. Sattva is associated with ego, mind and intelligence. Its association with the consciousness is the strongest. Though sattva is an essential condition for consciousness, it is not sufficient. It should be remembered that consciousness is exclusively the Purusha.

Rajas is concerned with the actions of objects. It is associated with activity and motion. In material objects, motion and action are the results of rajas. In living beings not only activity and restlessness, but pain also are caused by rajas.

Tamas is the constituent concerned with the inertia and inaction. In material objects, it resists motion and activity. In living beings, it is associated with coarseness, negligence, indifference and inactivity. In man, it manifests itself as ignorance, insensitivity and inaction.

There are two views on the theory of causation in the Indian philosophy:

(1) Satkaryavada(pre-existence of the effect in the cause): It maintains that karya (effect) is sat or real. It is present in the karana (cause) in a potential form, even before its manifestation.

(2) Asatkaryavada (non-existence of the effect in the cause): It maintains that karya (effect) is asat or unreal until it comes into being.

Every effect, then, is a new beginning and is not born out of cause. Charvakism and Nyaya -Vaisheshika systems favour asatkaryavada.

The Samkhya as well as the Vedanta uphold the satkaryavada but their interpretations are different.

There are two different interpretations of satkaryavada – Prakriti -parinamavada and Brahma-vivartavada.

The Parinamavada suggests that the effect is the real parinama (or transformation) of the cause. On the other hand, the Brahma-vivartavada suggests that the effect is an apparent or distorted appearance of the cause. The Advaita Vedanta supports the Brahma-vivartavada. It defends vivartavada and holds that transformation is only apparent, as the Brahman is the only true cause and the world is a distorted appearance of the cause. The Samkhya favours Prakriti-parinamavada.

In accordance with the satkaryavada, the Samkhya maintains that the three gunas of Prakriti are also associated with all the world-objects. Prakriti is the primordial and ultimate cause of all physical existence. Naturally the three gunas which constitute Prakriti also constitute every object of the physical world. Prakriti is never static. Even before evolution, the gunas are relentlessly changing and balancing each other. As a result, Prakriti and all the physical objects that are effected or produced by Prakriti, are also in a state of constant change and transformation. This is further confirmed by the scientists today. It is now proved beyond doubt that ultra-minute particles of objects – like electrons – are in a state of incessant motion and transformation.

According to Samkhya, the efficient cause of the world is Purusha and the material cause is the Prakriti. Here Purusha stands for the 'Supreme spirit' and Prakriti stands for 'matter'. Purusha (spirit) is the first principle of Samkhya. Prakriti is the second, the material principle of Samkhya.

Purusha is neither produced nor does it produce. Prakriti is not produced but it produces.

Prakriti is uncaused. It is eternal. It itself is not produced but it has inherent potential or tendency to produce.

Purusha(like the Brahmanof Vedanta) is the Transcendental Self. It is absolute, independent, free, imperceptible, unknowable, above any

experience and beyond any words or explanation. It remains pure, “nonattributive consciousness ”.

Prakriti is the material cause of the world. Prakriti is dynamic. Its dynamism is attributed to its constituent gunas. The gunas are not only constituents, nor are they simply qualities. The gunas are the very essence of Prakriti. Gunas are constituents not only of Prakriti but also of all world-objects as they are produced by Prakriti. Prakriti is considered homogeneous and its constituent gunas cannot be separated. The gunas are always changing, rendering a dynamic character to Prakriti. Still a balance among three gunas is maintained in Prakriti. The changes in the gunas and in the Prakriti may take two forms: Homogeneous and Heterogeneous. Homogeneous changes do not affect the state of equilibrium in the Prakriti. As a result, worldly objects are not produced. Heterogeneous changes involve radical interaction among the three gunas. They disturb the state of equilibrium. This is the preliminary phase of the evolution. The evolutionary process is initiated by the rajas, which activates sattva and then the two gunas overpower the inertia of the tamas. An important factor behind the disturbance is Purusha . The relation between Purusha and Prakriti may be compared to that between a magnet and a piece of iron. Purusha itself does not come into contact with Prakriti. But it influences Prakriti. Thus, the Prakriti is prompted to produce. As the gunas undergo more and more changes, Prakriti goes on differentiating into numerous, various world-objects. Thus it becomes more and more determinate. This is what is termed as evolution.

In evolution, Prakriti is transformed and differentiated into multiplicity of objects. Evolution is followed by dissolution. In dissolution the physical existence, all the worldly objects mingle back into Prakriti, which now remains as the undifferentiated, primordial substance. This is how the cycles of evolution and dissolution follow each other.

According to Samkhya the radical interactions among the three gunas disturb the state of equilibrium in Prakriti. Then there may be dominance of one or the other guna. This disequilibrium, with certain other influencing factors, prompts Prakriti to differentiate into world-objects.

The evolution results in 23 different categories of objects. They comprise of three elements of Antahkaranas or the internal organs as well as the ten Bahyakaranas or the external organs.

Among all these, the first to evolve is Mahat(the great one). Mahat evolves as a result of preponderance of sattva. Since it is an evolute of Prakriti, it is made of matter. But it has psychological, intellectual aspect known as buddhi or intellect. Mahat or intellect is a unique faculty of human beings. It helps man in judgment and discrimination. Mahat helps to distinguish between the subject and the object. Man comes to understand the self and the non-self, the experiencer and the experienced as distinct entities with Mahat. Mahat, by its inherent association with sattva, possesses qualities like luminosity and reflectivity. Buddhi can reflect Purusha owing to these qualities.

The second evolute is ahamkara (ego). It arises out of the cosmic nature of Mahat. Ahamkara is the self-sense. It is concerned with the self-identity and it brings about awareness of "I" and "mine".

According to the Samkhya there emanates two sets of objects from ahamkara. The first set comprises of the manas (mind), the five sense-organs and the five motor organs. The second set consists of the five elements which may exist in two forms, subtle and gross.

The five subtle elements are also called tanmatras. These five subtle elements or tanmatras are: elemental sound, elemental touch, elemental colour, elemental taste and elemental smell. They are shabda, sparsha, rupa, rasa and gandha respectively. The gross elements arise as a result of combination of the subtle elements.

The five gross elements are space or ether (akasa), water, air, fire and earth.

Let us elaborate on the above. Ahamkara has three aspects that differ according to the preponderance of the three gunas- sattva, rajas and tamas. With the dominant sattva-guna, the Sattvika-ahamkara produces manas (mind), the five sense organs and the five motor organs. The five sense organs are chakshu (to see), sroto (to hear), rasna (to taste), ghrana (to smell) and tvak (to feel). The five motor organs are concerned with the powers of speech, handling, movement, excretion and procreation. These organs, in Sanskrit, are referred to as vak, pani, pada, paya and

upastha respectively. All these ten organs together form external organs (bahyakaranas). Mahat, ahamkara and manas form internal organs (antahkaranas.)

It should be noted here that the manas or the mind is different from Mahat or the buddhi. Manas or the mind in co-ordination with the sense-organs, receives impressions from the external world, transforms them into determinate perceptions and conveys them to the experiencer or the ego. Thus manas is produced and is capable of producing also. But though Mahat is produced, it can not produce.

As we have seen ahamkara produces both the subtle and the gross elements. These gross elements are produced by various combinations of subtle elements. For example shabda produces akasha (space) while shabda and sparsha together produce marut (air). Rupa produces teja (fire). Shabda, sparsha, rupa and rasa together form ap (water). All five elements combine to produce kshiti (the earth). The five gross elements combine in different ways to form all gross objects. All the gross elements and the gross objects in the world are perceivable.

**Samkhya and the Theory of Knowledge**

Samkhya accepts three sources of valid knowledge: Perception, inference and testimony.

According to Samkhya, the manas(mind), the Mahat (intellect = buddhi) and the purusha play a role in 'producing' knowledge. When the sense-organs come in contact with an object, the sensations and impressions reach the manas. The manas processes these impressions into proper forms and converts them into determinate percepts. These percepts are carried to the Mahat. By its own applications, Mahat gets modified. Mahat takes the form of the particular object. This transformation of Mahat is known as vritti or modification of buddhi. But still the process of knowledge is not completed. Mahat is a physical entity. It lacks consciousness so it can not generate knowledge on its own. However, it can reflect the consciousness of the Purusha(self). Illumined by the consciousness of the reflected self, the unconscious Mahat becomes conscious of the form into which it is modified (i.e. of the form of the

object). This is better explained by an illustration. The mirror cannot produce an image on its own. The mirror needs light to reflect and produce the image and thereby reveal the object. Similarly, Mahat needs the 'light' of the consciousness of the Purusha to produce knowledge.

**Samkhya cites out two types of perceptions:**

Indeterminate (nirvikalpa) perceptions and determinate (savikalpa) perceptions.

Indeterminate perceptions are sort of pure sensations or crude impressions. They reveal no knowledge of the form or the name of the object. There is vague awareness about an object. There is cognition, but no recognition. An infant's initial experiences are full of confusion. There is a lot of sense-data, but there are improper or inadequate means to process them. Hence they can neither be differentiated nor be labeled. Most of them are indeterminate perceptions.

Determinate perceptions are the mature state of perceptions which have been processed and differentiated appropriately. Once the sensations have been processed, categorized and interpreted properly, they become determinate perceptions. They can lead to identification and also generate knowledge.

**Samkhya and God**

Kapila, the proponent of the Samkhya School, rules out the existence of God. He asserts that the existence of God can not be proved and that God does not exist. Samkhya argues that if God exists and if God is eternal and unchanging as is widely claimed, then he can not be the cause of the world. A cause has to be active and changing. However some of the later commentators of Samkhya seem to bend towards theistic interpretation.

**Bondage and Salvation**

Like other major systems of Indian philosophy, Samkhya regards ignorance as the root cause of bondage and suffering. According to Samkhya, the self is eternal, pure consciousness. Due to ignorance, the self identifies itself with the physical body and its constituents - Manas, ahamkara and Mahat, which are products of Prakriti. Once the self

becomes free of this false identification and the material bonds, the salvation is possible.

## 5.4 YOGA SCHOOL OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

Patanjali was the proponent of the Yoga system. Yoga is closely associated with Samkhya. Yoga is largely based on the Samkhya philosophy. They are two sides of the same coin. Samkhya is the theory, Yoga is the practice. It should be noted, however, that Samkhya is basically an atheistic system, but Yoga is theistic.

Patanjali propagated his philosophy of Yoga in his great work – Yoga-Sutra. Yoga-Sutra consists of four parts.

While Samkhya uses three terms - Mahat, ahamkara and manas - to refer to antahkarana, Yoga has only one word – Chitta. Yoga adopts a single term, chitta, to refer to a complex of Mahat, ahamkara and manas.

Chitta is considered as being composed of intellect, ego and mind. Chitta has a predominance of sattva guna.

Patanjali shows the way to emancipation by ashtanga-yoga. Yoga is a self-disciplining process of concentration and meditation. Such a Yogic practice leads one to higher states of consciousness. This helps one in acquiring direct knowledge and the result is Self–Realization.

Patanjali lays emphasis on the complete control and mastery of chitta. He proposes the practice of certain physical and mental exercises. They form the basis of ashtanga–yoga.

**Ashtanga–yoga comprises of eight anga (steps):**

yama, niyama, asana, pranayama, pratyahara, dharana, dhyana and samadhi.

These eight steps are divided into two parts:

External part of five anga: yama, niyama, asana, pranayama and pratyahara.

Internal part of three anga: dharana, dhyana and samadhi.

Yama means restraint. One must turn to ethics by refraining himself from immoral activities. This is the first step towards self–discipline. Niyama means observance. It refers to the cultivation of values and virtues in life.

These two anga –Yama and Niyama – protects the aspirant from irresistible temptations and desires and offer a protection from the distractions.

The next two steps, asana and pranayama, prepares the physical body for the Yogic practice.

Asana means posture of the body. A steady but comfortable posture is essential for Yoga. Pranayama is concerned with the control of breath. The cycles of inspiration, kumbhaka and expiration have to be carefully monitored. Both these anga enhances the steadiness of the body and mind.

Pratyahara is concerned with the withdrawal of the senses. The senses, by their inherent nature, remain focused on the external world. Pratyahara helps to detach the sense organs from the objects of the world. The isolation from the world objects facilitates the concentration of the mind on any particular object.

The ultimate three steps are: dharana (concentration), dhyana (meditation) and Samadhi (spiritual absorption).

Dharana is concerned with the concentration. It is concerned with concentrating the chitta on a single object. The subject is focusing on an object. If the mind diverts to some other object, it has to be fixed again on the chosen object of concentration.

Dhyana is concerned with contemplation. In this stage, the aspirant can keep the mind steady on the object chosen for contemplation. The mind is focused without interruptions and there is unidirectional flow of chitta. Though the mind is steadfast, yet there is awareness of the mind of the self. There is an observer; there is also the one that is being observed.

Samadhi is the ultimate stage of Yogic practice. Now all self-awareness of the mind disappears. The aspirant (seeker) becomes aware that his attachment to the Prakriti was owing to the ignorance (avidya). The illusion is gone. This is the ultimate, nirbeej Samadhi. There is the unification of the subject and the object. Now there is no object at all. The duo, the subject and the object, mingles into unity. They are no separate entities. There is only one, but it is not an object. There is oneness devoid of material existence; it is pure Consciousness.

Samkhya system is based on atheism but Yoga believes in God. Both Yoga and Samkhya holds that there are many purushas. Unlike Samkhya, Yoga holds that there is one Supreme Purusha (God) who is above all purushas and that no other Purusha can be like that Supreme Purusha. This Supreme Purusha does not create the Prakriti or other purushas.

## 5.5 NYAYA SCHOOL OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

Nyaya is an orthodox school of philosophy. It was founded by a great sage called Gautama, not to be confused with the Lord Buddha.

Nyaya accepts the basic philosophy of Vaisheshika system. It can be said that the Vaisheshika system is theory, Nyaya is the practice.

Nyaya recognizes god but Gautama does not deal with the problem of existence of god in any detail.

Like the Vaisheshika, Nyaya holds that the self is an individual substance, eternal and all pervading. Consciousness is not an essential attribute of the self, but it is only an accidental one. According to Nyaya, salvation is the state of absolute freedom. It is freedom from all pains and pleasures. Then there is freedom from the cycle of the birth and death also.

**Check Your Progress 1**

Note: i) Use the space given below for your answer.

ii) See the end of the unit for tips for your answer.

1. Discuss the Charvaka School.

   ……………………………………………………………………………

   ……………………………………………………………………………

   ……………………………………………………………

2. What is Samkhya School of Indian Philosophy?

……………………………………………………………………………

……………………………………………………………………………

…………………………………………………………

3. Discuss the Yoga School of Indian Philosophy.

……………………………………………………………………………

……………………………………………………………

4. Describe the Nyaya School of Indian Philosophy.

……………………………………………………………………………

……………………………………………………………………………

……………………………………………………………………………

## 5.6 VAISHESHIKA SCHOOL OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

Kanada, a learned sage, founded this system. This system is believed to be as old as Jainism and Buddhism. Kanada presented his detailed atomic theory in Vaisheshika-Sutra. Basically, Vaisheshika is a pluralistic realism. It explains the nature of the world with seven categories:

Dravya (substance), guna (quality), karma(action), samanya(universal), vishesha (particular), amavaya(inherence) and abhava (non-existence).

Vaisheshika contends that every effect is a fresh creation or a new beginning. Thus this system refutes the theory of pre-existence of the effect in the cause. Kanada does not discuss much on God. But the later commentators refer to God as the Supreme Soul, perfect and eternal. This system accepts that God (Ishvara ) is the efficient cause of the world. The eternal atoms are the material cause of the world.

Vaisheshika recognizes nine ultimate substances : Five material and four non-material substances.

The five material substances are: Earth, water, fire, air and akasha.

The four non-material substances are: space, time, soul and mind.

Earth, water, fire and air are atomic but akasha is non-atomic and infinite.

Space and time are infinite and eternal. The concept of soul is comparable to that of the self or atman. This system considers consciousnessas an accidental property. In other words, when the soul associates itself to the body, only then it ‘acquires’ consciousness. Thus, consciousness is not considered an essential quality of the soul.

The mind (manas) is accepted as atomic but indivisible and eternal substance. The mind helps to establish the contact of the self to the external world objects.

The soul develops attachment to the body owing to ignorance. The soul identifies itself with the body and mind. The soul is trapped in the bondage of karma, as a consequence of actions resulted from countless desires and passions. It can be free from the bondage only if it becomes free from actions. Liberation follows the cessation of the actions.

## 5.7 MIMANSA SCHOOL OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

**Purva Mimamsa**

The first major orthodox philosophical system to develop was Purva Mimamsa. The other one to follow was the Uttar Mimamsa. The orthodox systems accept the authority of the Vedas.

The Sanskrit word 'mimamsa means a 'revered thought'. The word is originated from the root 'man' which refers to 'thinking' or 'investigating'. The word 'mimamsa' suggests "probing and acquiring knowledge" or "critical review and investigation of the Vedas".

Each of the Vedas is considered to be composed of four parts: The Samhitas, the Brahmanas, the Aranyakas and the Upanishads. The first two parts are generally focused on the rituals and they form the Karma-kanda portion of the Vedas. The later two parts form the Jnana-kanda (concerned with knowledge) portion of the Vedas.

Purva-Mimamsa is based on the earlier (Purva = earlier) parts of the Vedas.

Uttar-Mimamsa is based on the later (Uttar = later) parts of the Vedas.

Purva-Mimamsa is also known as Karma Mimamsa since it deals with the Karmic actions of rituals and sacrifices. Uttar-Mimamsa is also known as Brahman Mimamsa since it is concerned with the knowledge of Reality. In popular terms, Purva-Mimamsa is known simply as Mimamsa and Uttar-Mimamsa as Vedanta.

Jaimini is credited as the chief proponent of the Mimamsa system. His glorious work is Mimamsa-Sutra written around the end of the 2nd century A.D. Mimamsa-Sutra is the largest of all the philosophical Sutras. Divided into 12 chapters, it is a collection of nearly 2500 aphorisms which are extremely difficult to comprehend.

Earlier scholars wrote commentaries on Mimamsa-Sutra. Unfortunately they are lost with the passage of time. The earliest available commentary is Sabarasvamin's Sabara-bhasya, which is still the authoritative basis of all subsequent works on Mimamsa. Renowned scholars Kumarila Bhatta and Prabhakara independently wrote their commentaries on Sabara-bhasya. Prabhakara was a student of Kumarila Bhatta. However, they differed, to some degree, on the interpretation of Sabara-bhasya and wrote separate commentaries. (Mandan Mishra, the erudite scholar, was a follower of Kumarila Bhatta. He also wrote a commentary, but at a later stage he changed his thinking and became a disciple of Shamkaracharya.)

This system out rightly accept the Vedas as the eternal source of 'revealed truth.' Thus though it differs from the earlier four philosophical systems (Vaisheshika, Nyaya, Samkhya, Yoga which neither accept nor reject the authority of the Vedas), a great chunk of Mimamsa philosophy is derived from the Vaisheshika-Nyaya duo.

Mimamsa system attaches a lot of importance to the Verbal testimony which is essentially the Vedic testimony. Jaimini accepts the 'Word" or the 'Shabda' as the only means of knowledge. The 'word' or the 'Shabda' is necessarily the Vedic word, according to Jaimini. This system strongly contends that the Vedas are not authored by an individual. Since they are 'self-revealed' or 'apaurusheya', they manifest their own validity.

The system is a pluralistic realist. It endorses the reality of the world as well as that of the individual souls. The soul is accepted as an eternal and infinite substance. Consciousness is an accidental attribute of the soul. The soul is distinct from the body, the senses and the mind. Though Kumarila Bhatta and Prabhakara differ on issues like the self, the soul and it attribute. The earlier mimamsakas do not give much importance to the deities. Hence they do not endorse God as the creator of the universe. But later mimamsakas show a bent towards theism.

This system has a profound faith in the Vedas. The system supports the law of karma. It believes in the Unseen Power or 'apurva'. Apart from accepting the heaven and the hell, the system supports the theory of liberation.

**Uttar Mimamsa**

Uttar Mimamsa is the Vedanta, one of the most significant of all Indian philosophies. As compared to other systems, its advent and growth is recent. Still it is the most influential orthodox philosophical systems of India.

The Vedas are the most valuable scriptures of the mankind. They present the most exalted form of superhuman knowledge and wisdom. The Vedas are eternal. They are timeless since they might have taken ages to acquire the written form.

The four Vedasare: Rig Veda, Yajur Veda, Sama Veda and Atharva Veda. Each of the Vedas is divided into four parts : The Samhitas, the Brahmanas, the Aranyakas and the Upanishads. The Upanishads are the concluding parts of the Vedas. They expound the supreme philosophical knowledge. The word 'Vedanta' usually refers to the Upanishads. The word is a compound of 'Veda' and 'Anta'. It means the ending portion of the Vedas. However, the word 'Vedanta', in a broad sense, covers not only the Upanishads but all the commentaries and interpretations associated with the Upanishads. All these works constitute the Vedanta philosophy.

The great scholar Badarayana(?500-200 B.C) initiated the efforts to simplify the Upanishadic philosophy. Badarayana is also known as Ved Vyasa. He was the first scholar to take up the challenging task of systemizing the immensely vast philosophical doctrines of the Upanishads. The result of his efforts was one of the most illustrious works on Vedanta. Badarayana's work is known as Brahma-Sutra or Vedanta-Sutra. It is also referred to as Uttar-Mimamsa-Sutra. The Brahma-Sutra has 555 sutras. Most of them are aphoristic and almost unintelligible at first sight. Hence, a number of commentaries were written to interpret them. Among these the commentaries of Shamkaracharya, Ramnujacharya and Madhavacharya are regarded authentic and are held in very high view. They are regarded as the greatest scholars of Indian philosophy. They are not only the principal commentators of Brahma-Sutra (Vedanta-Sutra) but are also its leading interpreters. Thus, we have three major schools of Vedanta based on the philosophy of the distinguished trio: Advaita(non-dualism) of

Shamkaracharya, Vishishtadvaita (qualified non-dualism) of Ramnujacharya and Dvaita(dualism) of Madhvacharya.

All three schools are founded on the Vedanta philosophy. However, there have been differences among them. Even the followers of a particular system, within their own fold, differ to some degree on certain issues.

The Vedanta philosophy is focused on the Jagat(the universe), the Jiva(individual soul) and the Brahman (the Supreme Being). Brahman is the repository of all knowledge and power. Jivas are trapped in the Jagat. Attached to the physical world and driven by passions and desires, they remain chained to ceaseless actions (karma). As a result, they subject themselves to countless births in various forms. Their transmigration from this birth (life) to the next depends on the karma (the quality of action). Moksha or mukti (liberation) is the goal of life. This philosophy, in general, is accepted by all the three schools. Now let us understand the basic difference among the three schools.

Dvaita refers to 'two'. Dvaita school is based on the concept of dualism. Madhavacharya emphasizes the distinction between God and individual soul (Jiva). In addition, the school differentiates God from matter as well as the soul from matter. The school maintains that the God, Jiva and the Jagat are three separate and everlasting entities. God governs the world and has control over the souls. The souls in its ignorance remains shackled in the world. By devotion and God's mercy, the soul can migrate to the Heaven above. It can obtain Mukti from the cycle of life and death and live with God forever in the Heaven.

Vishishtadvaita literally means "qualified non-dualism". Ramanujacharya stresses that God alone exists. He says that Brahman is God. He is not formless. The Cosmos and the Jivas form his body. When the Jiva (soul) realises that he is a part of Paramatman (God), the soul is liberated. On liberation, his soul enjoys infinite consciousness and infinite bliss of God. The soul is in communion with God, but it does not share the power of the creation or destruction.

Advaita means "non-dualism". Brahman is the sole Supreme Reality. Brahman, Jagat and Jiva are not different, separate entities.

# 5.8 VEDANTA SCHOOL OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

**The Basic Concepts of Advaita Vedanta**

The Advaita Vedanta focuses on the following basic concepts:

Brahman, atman, vidya (knowledge), avidya (ignorance), maya, karma and moksha.

(1) Brahman is the Ultimate, Supreme Reality. Brahman is eternal. Brahman is beyond words. It is beyond names and forms. Brahman can not be perceived nor could it be described by words. It is beyond senses and intellect. It is indefinable. However, if at all it has to be described; Brahman can be considered as Pure Consciousness.

In Vedanta philosophy, the svaroop of Brahman is referred to as Sachchidananda. Brahman is Sachchidananda i.e. Sat-Chitta-Ananda(Pure Existence-Pure Consciousness-Pure Bliss). Brahman is eternal, immutable, inexpressible and unthinkable pure-existence, but it is not the cause or the creator of the universe.

(2) Atman is the inmost Self or Spirit of man but different from the 'empirical ego'. Atman is the fundamental, ultimate, eternal, immutable pure consciousness. Thus, it appears that Brahman is the ultimate reality behind all world-objects and Atman is pure spirit in all beings. Truly speaking, both Brahman and Atman are not different realities. They are identical. For practical purposes, they are referred to separately, which they are not. They are the eternal, all-pervading realities underlying all existence. They are two different 'labels' for one and the same reality behind all the objects, all matter, all beings of the universe.

(3) Maya is the unique power (shakti) of Brahman. Maya is trigunatmika; it has three gunas or attributes. But Shuddha Brahman is nirguna and is free from attributes. Shuddha Nirguna Brahman alone is the Supreme Reality. When Nirguna Brahman comes to acquiesce Maya and acknowledges the gunas of maya, it is known as Saguna Brahman. Saguna Brahman is God, the creator, sustainer and destroyer of the world. Saguna Brahman is Ishvara or a 'personal god.' Man worships gods in different forms and names.

(4) Brahman manifests itself in the world with the help of Maya. The world and the world objects come into existence due to the power of maya. Maya and its creation is termed illusory. It does not mean that the world is not real. Unreality and illusion are different. An illusion may not be an unreality for an illusion is grounded in reality. Reality is that which exists on its own. Maya is dependent on Brahman. Maya has created the world of appearances. So the world is illusion. But this does not mean at all that the world is non-existent. The AdvaitaVedanta, with the help of the famous "rope–snake" illustration, maintains that 'it is neither ultimately real, nor wholly unreal, illusory and non existent.'

(5) Avidya (ignorance) has its seat in the human intellect. Avidya means not only absence of knowledge, but also erroneous knowledge. A man trapped in Avidya does not know what is real and thinks that the appearances are real. An individual identifies himself with empirical self. He equates his existence with the physical body. Under the influence of Maya and Avidya, he dissociates himself from the Ultimate Reality. When the man acquires knowledge, the duality of the self and Brahman disappears. He realizes that the self is really one with Brahman. This realization of the self puts an end to the ignorance (avidya).

(6) Moksha is freedom from bondage of ignorance. Man suffers in the grip of incessant desires and ignorance. Upon realization of the self, one becomes free from the shackles of desires, aspirations, passions, karma and avidya. This is Moksha (kaivalya) or liberation. Moksha is to be attained here and now during this life-span only.

(7) Knowledge and truth are of two kinds: the lower one and the higher one. The lower, conventional knowledge and truth is referred to as vyavavahrika satya. It is a product of the senses and the intellect. The higher one is referred to the paramarthika satya. It is absolute. It is beyond words, thoughts, perception or conception. It is in no way, related to the senses and the intellect. It is non-perceptual and non-conceptual. It is a product of sublime intuition and "divine vision". The higher knowledge and truth brings about radical transformation in an individual so it is soteriological.

Notes

(8) Advaita Vedanta recognizes the six pramanas (sources and criteria of valid knowledge) on the basis of the Mimamsa school of Kumarila Bhatta. They are as follows:

(1) Perception (pratyaksha) (2) Inference (anumana) (3) Testimony(shabda) (4) Comparison (upamana) (5) Postulation (arthapatti) (6) Non-cognition (anupalabdhi)

**Check Your Progress 2**

Note: i) Use the space given below for your answer.

ii) See the end of the unit for tips for your answer.

1. Discuss the Vaisheshika School of Indian Philosophy.

   ………………………………………………………………………

   ………………………………………………………………………

   ………………………………………………………………………

2. What is Mimansa School of Indian Philosophy?

   ………………………………………………………………………

   ………………………………………………………………………

   ………………………………………………………………………

3. Discuss the Vedanta School of Indian Philosophy.

   ………………………………………………………………………

   ………………………………………………………………………

   ………………………………………………………………………

## 5.9 LET US SUM UP

Indian philosophy refers to ancient philosophical traditions of the Indian subcontinent. The principal schools are classified as either orthodox or heterodox – āstika or nāstika – depending on one of three alternate criteria: whether it believes the Vedas as a valid source of knowledge; whether the school believes in the premises of Brahman and Atman; and whether the school believes in afterlife and Devas.

There are six major schools of orthodox[when defined as?] Indian Hindu philosophy—Nyaya, Vaisheshika, Samkhya, Yoga, Mīmāṃsā and Vedanta, and five major Shramanic schools—Jain, Buddhist, Ajivika, Ajñana, and Charvaka. However, there are other methods of classification; Vidyaranya for instance identifies sixteen schools of

Indian philosophy by including those that belong to the Śaiva and Raseśvara traditions.

The main schools of Indian philosophy were formalised chiefly between 1000 BCE to the early centuries of the Common Era. Competition and integration between the various schools was intense during their formative years, especially between 800 BCE and 200 CE. Some schools like Jainism, Buddhism, Yoga, Śaiva and Vedanta survived, but others, like Ajñana, Charvaka and Ājīvika did not.

Ancient and medieval era texts of Indian philosophies include extensive discussions on Ontology (metaphysics, Brahman-Atman, Sunyata-Anatta), reliable means of knowledge (epistemology, Pramanas), value system (axiology) and other topics.

Charvakism is one of the unorthodox systems of Indian philosophy.

Charvakism is materialism. It is believed to have stemmed in the post-Upanishadic era, but before the rise of Buddhism. A sage, Charvaka, is believed to be the founder of this Indian system of materialism.

Like other schools of philosophy, Charvakism explores the sources and validity of man's knowledge of reality. The Charvaka materialists validate 'Pratyaksa' (perception) as the sole source and criterion of knowledge. For the materialist, the sense perception (pratyaksa) is the only acceptable source and hence they rule out 'inference' and 'testimony' as the source and criterion of knowledge. The materialists emphasize that what you perceive with your senses alone is true. They challenge the inference as the source or criterion of knowledge. They argue, "The man you have encountered are mortal. May be, yes. But how can you say that all men in the past, present and future are mortal?" They contend that limited, perceived instances cannot lead to unrestricted universal generalizations.

The materialists hold that matter is the only reality. They straight away reject gods and souls, as they are beyond perceptual experience. They also regard heaven and hell as non-existent as they are not perceivable. For the Charvakas, matter has always existed and will always exist. Matter is both the material and efficient cause of the universe. Hedonism seems to be a feature of Charvakism. However not all followers seem to

endorse them. Many of them acknowledge the importance of society, law and order.

## 5.10 KEY WORDS

Vedanta: Vedanta (/vɪˈdɑːntə/; Sanskrit: वेदान्त, IAST: Vedānta) or

Uttara Mīmāṃsā is the most prominent of the six (āstika) schools of Hindu philosophy. Literally meaning "end of the Vedas", Vedanta reflects ideas that emerged from the speculations and philosophies contained in the Upanishads, specifically, knowledge and liberation. Vedanta contains many sub-traditions, ranging from dualism to non-dualism, all of which developed on the basis of a common textual connection called the Prasthanatrayi: the Upanishads, the Brahma Sutras and the Bhagavad Gita.

Samkhya: Samkhya or Sankhya is one of the six āstika schools of Hindu philosophy. It is most related to the Yoga school of Hinduism, and it was influential on other schools of Indian philosophy.

## 5.11 QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

1. Discuss the Charvaka School
2. What is Samkhya School of Indian Philosophy?
3. Discuss the Yoga School of Indian Philosophy
4. Describe the Nyaya School of Indian Philosophy
5. Discuss the Vaisheshika School of Indian Philosophy
6. What is Mimansa School of Indian Philosophy?
7. Discuss the Vedanta School of Indian Philosophy

## 5.12 SUGGESTED READINGS AND REFERENCES


- Bhatta, Jayarashi. Tattvopaplavasimha (Status as a Carvaka text disputed)
- Gokhale, Pradeep P. The Cārvāka Theory of Pramāṇas: A Restatement, Philosophy East and West (1993).

- Nambiar, Sita Krishna (1971). Prabodhacandrodaya of Krsna Misra. Delhi: Motilal Banarasidass.
- Abu'l-Fazl ibn Mubarak (1989) [1927]. Phillott, D. C. (ed.). The Ain-i Akbari. Translated by Heinrich Blochmann (3 vols. ed.). Delhi: Low Price Publications. ISBN 978-81-85395-19-7.


## 5.13 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

**Check Your Progress 1**

1. See Section 5.2
2. See Section 5.3
3. See Section 5.4
4. See Section 5.5

**Check Your Progress 2**

1. See Section 5.6
2. See Section 5.7
3. See Section 5.8

# UNIT 6: JAINISM

**STRUCTURE**


6.0 Objectives

6.1 Introduction

6.2 Jain Philosophy

6.3 Metaphysics

6.4 Epistemology and Logic

6.5 Ethics

6.6 Let us sum up

6.7 Key Words

6.8 Questions for Review

6.9 Suggested readings and references

6.10 Answers to Check Your Progress


## 6.0 OBJECTIVES

After this unit, we can able to know:

- To know the Jain Philosophy
- To discuss the Metaphysics
- To discuss the Epistemology and Logic
- To know Ethics

## 6.1 INTRODUCTION

Jainism (/ˈdʒeɪnɪzəm/), traditionally known as Jain Dharma, is an ancient Indian religion. Followers of Jainism are called "Jains", a word derived from the Sanskrit word jina (victor) referring to the path of victory in crossing over life's stream of rebirths by destroying karma through an ethical and spiritual life. Jainism is a transtheistic religion, and Jains trace their spiritual ideas and history through a succession of twenty-four victorious saviours and teachers known as tirthankaras, with the first being Rishabhanatha, who according to Jain tradition lived millions of years ago, the twenty-third Tirthankara Parshvanatha in 900 BCE, and the twenty-fourth Tirthankara the Mahāvīra around 500 BCE. Jains believe that Jainism is an eternal dharma with the tirthankaras guiding

every cycle of the Jain cosmology. Their religious texts are called Agamas.

The main religious premises of Jainism are ahiṃsā (non-violence), anekāntavāda (many-sidedness), aparigraha (non-attachment) and asceticism. Devout Jains take five main vows: ahiṃsā (non-violence), satya (truth), asteya (not stealing), brahmacharya (celibacy or chastity or sexual continence), and aparigraha (non-possessiveness). These principles have affected Jain culture in many ways, such as leading to a predominantly vegetarian lifestyle that avoids harm to animals and their life cycles. Parasparopagraho Jīvānām (the function of souls is to help one another) is the motto of Jainism. Ṇamōkāra mantra is the most common and basic prayer in Jainism.

Jainism has two major ancient sub-traditions, Digambaras and Śvētāmbaras; Several smaller sub-traditions emerged in the 2nd millennium CE. The Digambaras and Śvētāmbaras have different views on ascetic practices, gender and which Jain texts can be considered canonical. Jain mendicants are found in all Jain sub-traditions except Kanji Panth sub-tradition, with laypersons (śrāvakas) supporting the mendicants' spiritual pursuits with resources.

Jainism has between four and five million followers, with most Jains residing in India. Outside India, some of the largest Jain communities are present in Canada, Europe, Kenya, the United Kingdom, Hong Kong, Suriname, Fiji, and the United States. Major Jain festivals include Paryushana and Daslakshana, Ashtanika, Mahavir Janma Kalyanak, and Dipawali.

The fundamental principles of Jainism can be briefly stated as follows.

1. The first fundamental principle of Jainism is that, man's personality is dual, that is, material and spiritual. Jaina philosophy regards that every mundane soul is bound by subtle particles of matter known as Karma from the very beginning. It considers that just as gold is found in an alloy form in the mines, in the same way mundane souls are found along with the Karma bondage from time eternal. The impurity of the mundane soul is thus treated as an existing condition.

2. The second principle that man is not perfect is based on the first principle. The imperfectness in man is attributed to the existence of Karma in his soul. The human soul is in a position to attain perfection and in that true and eternal state it is endowed with four characteristics, viz., Ananta-darsana, Ananta-Jnana, Ananta-virya and Ananta-sukha, i. e., infinite perception or faith, infinite knowledge, infinite power and infinite bliss.
3. Even though man is not perfect, the third principle states that by his spiritual nature man can and must control his material nature. It is only after the entire subjugation of matter that the soul attains perfection, freedom and happiness. It is emphatically maintained that man will be able to sail across the ocean of births and achieve perfection through the control of senses and thought.
4. The last basic principle stresses that it is only each individual that can separate his own soul and the matter combined with it. The separation cannot be effected by any other person. This means that man himself, and he alone, is responsible for all that is good or bad in his life. He cannot absolve himself from the responsibility of experiencing the fruits of his actions. This principle distinguishes Jainism from other religions, e. g., Christianity, Islam and Hinduism.

No God, nor His prophet or deputy or beloved can interfere with human life. The soul, and that alone, is directly and necessarily responsible for all that it does. God is regarded as completely unconcerned with creation of the universe or with any happening in the universe. The universe goes on of its own accord. Because of this definite attitude towards God, Jainism is accused of being atheistic. It is true in the sense that Jainism does not attribute the creation of universe to God. But at the same time Jainism cannot be labeled as atheistic because it believes in Godhood, in innumerable gods, in Punya and Papa, i. e., merit and demerit, in religious practices, etc. According to Jainism the emancipated soul is considered as God and it is absolutely not concerned with the task of creation of this world.

## 6.2 JAIN PHILOSOPHY

Jainism is properly the name of one of the religious traditions that have their origin in the Indian subcontinent. According to its own traditions, the teachings of Jainism are eternal, and hence have no founder; however, the Jainism of this age can be traced back to Mahavira, a teacher of the sixth century BCE, a contemporary of the Buddha. Like those of the Buddha, Mahavira’s doctrines were formulated as a reaction to and rejection of the Brahmanism (religion based on the Hindu scriptures, the Vedas and Upanisads) then taking shape. The brahmans taught the division of society into rigidly delineated castes, and a doctrine of reincarnation guided by karma, or merit brought about by the moral qualities of actions. Their schools of thought, since they respected the authority of the Vedas and Upanisads, were known as orthodox darsanas ('darsanas' means literally, ‘views’). Jainism and Buddhism, along with a school of materialists called Carvaka, were regarded as the unorthodox darsanas, because they taught that the Vedas and Upanisads, and hence the brahman caste, had no authority.

Jain philosophy can be described in various ways, but the most acceptable tradition is to describe it in terms of Tattvas or fundamentals. They are:

## Notes

1. **Jiva (Soul):** All living beings are called Jivas. Jivas have consciousness known as the soul, which is also called the atma (soul – chetan). The soul and body are two different entities. The soul can not be reproduced. It is described as a sort of energy which is indestructible, invisible, and shapeless. Jainism divides jivas into five categories ranging from one-sensed beings to five-sensed beings. The body is merely a home for the soul. At the time of death, the soul leaves the body to occupy a new one. Tirthankaras have said that the soul has an infinite capacity to know and perceive. This capacity of the soul is not experienced in its present state, because of accumulated karmas.
2. **Ajiva (non-living matter):** Anything that is not a soul is called ajiva. Ajiva does not have consciousness. Jainism divides ajiva in five broad categories: dharmastikay (medium of motion), adharmastikay (medium of rest), akashastikay (space), pudgalastikay (matter), and kala (time).
3. **Punya (results of good deeds):** By undertaking these wholesome activities, we acquire punya or good karmas. Such activities are: providing food or other items to the needy people, doing charity work, propagating religion, etc. When punya matures, it brings forth worldly comfort and happiness. Digambar consider "Punya" as part of Asrava.
4. **Pap (results of bad deeds):** By undertaking bad activities, we acquire pap or bad karmas. Such activities are: being cruel or violent, showing disrespect to parents or teachers, being angry or greedy and showing arrogance or indulging in deceit. When pap matures, it brings forth worldly suffering, misery, and unhappiness. Digambar consider "Pap" as part of Asrava.
5. **Asrava (influx of karmas):** The influx of karman particles to the soul is known as asrav. It is caused by wrong belief, vowlessness (observing no vows), passions, negligence, and psychophysical activities. Such an influx of karmas is facilitated by mental, verbal, or physical activities.

6. **Bandh (bondage of karmas):** This refers to the actual binding of karman particles to the soul. Bandh occurs, when we react to any situation with a sense of attachment or aversion.
7. **Samvar (stoppage of karmas):** This is the process by which the influx of karman particles is stopped. This is achieved by observing samiti (carefulness), gupti (control), ten fold yati-dharma (monkshood), contemplating the twelve bhavanas (mental reflections), and parishaha (suffering).
8. **Nirjara (eradication of karmas):** The process by which we shed off karmas is called nirjara. Karmas can be shed off either by passive or active efforts. When we passively wait for karmas to mature and give their results in due time, it is called Akam Nirjara. On the other hand, if we put active efforts for karmas to mature earlier than due time, it is called Sakam Nirjara. Sakam Nirjara can be achieved by performing penance, repentance, asking for forgiveness for the discomfort or injury we might have caused to someone, meditation, etc.
9. **Moksha (liberation):** When we get rid of all the karmas, we attain liberation or moksha.

Now, let us use a simple analogy to illustrate these Tattvas. There lived a family in a farm house. They were enjoying the fresh cool breeze coming through the open doors and windows. The weather suddenly changed, and a terrible dust storm set in. Realizing it was a bad storm, they got up to close the doors and windows. By the time they could close all the doors and windows, much dust had entered the house. After closing all of the doors and windows, they started cleaning away the dust that had come into the house.

We can interpret this simple illustration in terms of Nav-Tattvas as follows:

1. Jivas are represented by the people.
2. Ajiva is represented by the house.
3. Punya is represented by worldly enjoyment resulting from the nice cool breeze.
4. Pap is represented by worldly discomfort resulting from the sand storm, which brought dust into the house.

5. Asrava is represented by the influx of dust through the doors and windows of the house which is similar to the influx of karman particles to the soul.
6. Bandh is represented by the accumulation of dust in the house, which is similar to bondage of karman particles to the soul.
7. Samvar is represented by the closing of the doors and windows to stop the dust from coming into the house, which is similar to the stoppage of influx of karman particles to the soul.
8. Nirjara is represented by the cleaning up of accumulated dust from the house, which is similar to shedding off accumulated karmic particles from the soul.
9. Moksha is represented by the clean house, which is similar to the shedding of all karmic particles from the soul.

**Living Being (Jiv -Soul)**

In Jainism, Jiva and soul are more or less described synonymously. When the spiritual or psychic status is described it is referred to as the soul, and when the physical structure is described, it is called Jiva. The jiva which grows, decays, fluctuates, varies, eats, sleeps, awakes, acts, fears, rests, has knowledge and perception, attempts to self defend, and reproduces. These and many more qualities of the jiva are obvious through a physical body when the soul is present in it but when the soul leaves these qualities cease. These qualities are external features and consciousness (chetan) is the basic inner feature of the soul. This also makes it clear for us that the body and the soul are separate entities.

Since the soul is flexible, it pervades the entire body it occupies. For example, the same soul can occupy the body of an ant or an elephant. Such bodies stay alive as long as there is a soul. A live body, or rather, a body with a soul is described here as a Jiva.

Jivas are categorized in two groups:

- Liberated or Siddha Jiva
- Non-liberated or Sansari Jiva

Liberated souls have no karmas and therefore, they are no longer in the cycle of births and deaths. They do not live among us, but reside at the uppermost part of this universe called Siddhashila. They are formless and

shapeless, have perfect knowledge and perception, and have infinite vigor and bliss. All Siddhas are equal, and there is no difference in their status.

On the other side, non-liberated (worldly) jivas have karmas, and are continually going through the cycle of birth and death. They experience happiness and pain and have passions, which in turn cause the soul to wander more. Except for the jiva of Arihants, non-liberated jivas have limited knowledge and perception.

Jivas are found on earth, as well as in water, air, and sky, and are scattered all over the universe. Human beings, celestial beings, infernal beings, animals, fish, birds, bugs, insects, plants, etc. are the most common forms of Jiva with which we can easily relate. However, Jain scriptures state that there are 8.4 million species of Jiva in all. They are known by the senses they possess. There are five senses in all, namely touch, taste, smell, sight, and hearing. Different types of Jivas possess one or more of these senses.

Based upon the number of senses and mobility, Jivas are classified into different categories.

Based on mobility, all Jivas are divided into two broad categories:

- Non-mobile or Sthävar Jiva – those that can not move on their own and have only one sense.
- Mobile or Trasa jiva – those that can move on their own and have two to five senses.

(A) Non-Mobile (Sthavar Jiva, Single Sensed Being, or Ekendriya Jiva): Jivas having only one sense, the sense of touch are called Ekendriya. They are further divided into the following five sub-categories.

1. **Prithwikäya or Earth Bodied Jiva:** Seemingly inanimate forms of earth are actually living beings, e.g. clay, sand, metal, coral, etc. They have earthly bodies, hence the name prithwikaya which is derived from the Sanskrit term for earth, which is prithwi.
2. **Apkäya or Water Bodied Jiva:** Seemingly inanimate forms of different types of water are living beings. Examples are dew, fog, iceberg, rain, etc. They have water bodies, hence the name apkäya which is derived from the Sanskrit term for water, which is ap.

3. **Teukäya or Fire Bodied Jiva:** Seemingly inanimate forms of different types of fires are living beings. Examples are flames, blaze, lightening, forest fire, hot ash, etc. They have fire bodies, hence the name teukaya which is derived from the Sanskrit term for fire, which is tejas.
4. **Väyukäya or Air Bodied Jiva:** Seemingly inanimate forms of air are actually living beings. Examples are wind, whirlwinds, cyclones, etc. They have air bodies, hence the name vayukay which is derived from the Sanskrit term for gas, which is väyu.
5. **Vanaspatikäya or Plant Bodied Jiva:** It is well known that plants grow, reproduce, etc., and they are accepted as living beings. Trees, plants, branches, flowers, leaves, seeds, etc. are some examples of plant life. The Sanskrit term for plant is vanaspati and therefore such jivas are called vanaspatikäya jiva.

A plant life can have one or more souls in a single body and, depending upon this, plant life is further divided into the following two sub-categories:

**Pratyek Vanaspatikäya Jiva:**

Pratyek means each or one. Such plant life have one soul in one body. Therefore, they are called pratyek vanaspatikäya. Trees, plants, bushes, stem, branches, leaves, and seeds, etc., are all examples of pratyek vanaspatikäya jiva.

**Sädhäran Vanaspatikäya Jiva:**

Sädhäran means common. In such plant life many souls occupy the same body making this type of plant life multi-organic. Therefore, such plant life is called sädhäran vanaspatikäya jiva. This kind of plants life have an infinite number of souls in one body are called "Anantkäya". Roots such as potatoes, carrots, onions, garlic, beats, etc., belong to this category.

(B) Mobile (Tras Jiva, Multi Sensed Being, Bahu Indriya) Jiva:

Mobile jivas have two, three, four or five senses and are divided into the following categories:

**Two Sensed Beings (Beindriya Jiva):**

Two sensed beings have the senses of touch and taste. Examples are shells, worms, insects, microbes in stale food, termites, etc.

Three Sensed Beings (Treindriya Jiva):

Three sensed beings have the senses of touch, taste, and smell. Examples are bugs, lice, white ants, moths, insects in wheat, grains, and centipedes, etc.

**Four Sensed Beings (Chaurindriya Jiva):**

Four sensed beings have the senses of touch, taste, smell and sight. Examples are scorpions, crickets, spiders, beetles, locusts, flies, etc.

Five Sensed Beings (Panchendriya Jiva):

Five sensed beings have all the five senses of touch, taste, smell, sight, and hearing. Examples are human beings, cow, lions, fish, birds, etc.

The following are four sub-categories of the Panchendriya Jivas.

1. Näraki (Infernal) – Jivas living in hell,
2. Tiryancha (Animals) – elephants, lions, birds, fish, etc.,
3. Dev (Celestial) – heavenly beings,
4. Manushya – Human beings.

Among the five sensed beings some have minds and some do not. Those having a mind are called sangni panchendriya and those without a mind are called asangni panchendriya.

Among all of these Jivas the most worldly happiness is found in the celestial being, while the most worldly suffering is found in the infernal beings. Neither celestial nor infernal beings can take any vows. They cannot attain salvation during that life. Animals possess limited restraint only and, therefore, they also cannot attain salvation directly. The human state of existence is the most preferable to attain salvation, because during that life one can use logic to the fullest extent, can perform austerities, can live with restrain. Thus, only through this human phase can a jiva attain salvation or Moksha.

All jivas have special attributes related to the body such as paryäpti (power) and pran (vitality). The inert substance or ajiva does not possess any such quality. The following is the discussion relating to paryapti and pran.

**Paryapti:**

Paryapti means a special power through which the jiva takes in matter (pudgals) like food and converts it into separate kinds of energy. There are six kinds of paryaptis:

1. Ahar (food)

2. Sharir (body)
3. Indriya (senses)
4. Shwasochchhwas (respiration)
5. Bhasha (speech)
6. Man (mind)

When the life of a jiva is over, the soul along with tejas and karman bodies leaves the current body and acquires a new body. As soon as a jiva is born, the first thing it does is consume food. The jiva, with the help of Tejas body, digests the food. After this, the jiva gradually attains the power of a body and the power of senses. The activities of consuming the food, developing the body, and forming and strengthening the sense-organs goes on continuously. The body is formed in a duration called the Antarmuhurt (within 48 minutes). Next, the jiva, receives the matter of respiration, which allows it to acquire the power of respiration and eventually the power of mind.
The ekendriya, one sensed jivas have Ahar, Sharir, Indriya, and Shwasochchhwas Paryaptis. The beindriya, the treindriya, the chaurindriya and the asangni panchendriya jivas also possess (5) Bhasha paryapti in addition to the above four. The sangni panchendriya jivas also possess (6) Man paryapti in addition to the above five. Depending upon the development of the paryaptis the jivas are also classified as (1) Paryapta Jiva, (2) Aparyapta Jiva. The paryapta jiva means that their corresponding paryaptis have developed to their fullest capacity. The aparyapta jiva means that their paryaptis are not developed to their full capacity.

**Pran (Vitality):**

Depending upon the development of the Jiva, there are up to ten kinds of prans or vitalities present in each jiva. These vitalities are:

1. Sparsh-Indriya (Touch): The ability to feel the sensation of touch
2. Ras-Indriya (Taste): the ability to taste
3. Ghran-Indriya (Smell): the ability to smell
4. Chakshu-Indriya (Vision): the ability to see
5. Shravan-Indriya (Hearing): the ability to hear
6. Mano-bal (Mind): the ability to think

7. Vachan-bal (Speech): the ability to speak
8. Kaya-bal (Body): the ability to move the body
9. Shwasochchhwas (Respiration): the ability to inhale and exhale
10. Ayushya (Longevity): the ability to live

The Ekendriya jivas possess only four prans:

1. Touch
2. Respiration
3. Body
4. Longevity

The beindriya jivas possess six prans. They possess the taste and speech vitality in addition, to the above four prans.
The treindriya jivas possess seven prans. They possess the smell vitality, in addition, to the above six prans.
The chaurindriya jivas possess eight prans. They possess the vision vitality in addition to the above seven prans.
The panchendriya jivas are divided into two groups: The asangni (non-sentient) jivas, whose minds are not developed and The sangni (sentient) jivas, whose minds are fully developed.
The asangni panchendriya jivas possess nine prans. They possess the hearing vitality in addition to the above eight prans.
The sangni panchendriya jivas possess ten pranas. They possess mind vitality in addition to the above nine prans.
The reason we need to know these prans is because any injury, no matter how little it may be to any of these prans, is considered himsa (violence). When himsa is done by us, our soul accumulates the bad karmas or pap (sin). Therefore to prevent accumulation of karma observe ahimsa (non-violence) related to all of these ten prans for all the categories of the Jivas. The first vow of non-violence is very important for the householders, monks and nuns. Now you may understand why we say "Ahimsa Parmo Dharma" (nonviolence is supreme religion), because by observing ahimsa we are protecting the vitality of the soul.
The summary of number of paryaptis and prans in various Jivas.

| **Abilities** | **Paryaptis** | **Prans** |
|---|---|---|
| Ekendriya – those having one sense | 4 | 4 |

| Abilities | Paryaptis | Prans |
|---|---|---|
| Dwindriya – those having two senses | 5 | 6 |
| Treindriya – those having three senses | 5 | 7 |
| Chaurindriya – those having four senses | 5 | 8 |
| Asangni Panchendriya- those having five senses without a mind | 5 | 9 |
| Sangni Panchendriya- those having five senses with a mind | 6 | 10 |

**Non-Living things (Ajiv)**

Anything that does not have the life or a consciousness is Ajiva. Ajiva literally means without a soul and therefore, they cannot accumulate any karmas. They have no birth, death, pleasure, or pain; they are achetan (inert). Examples of Ajivas are: a box, car, fan, television, photo frame, iron, watch, etc.
The Jain Philosophy has divided Ajivas into the following five categories:

1. Dharmastikay (Medium of Motion).
2. Adharmastikay (Medium of Rest).
3. Akashastikay (Space).
4. Pudgalastikay (Matter).
5. Kal (Time).

1. **Dharmastikay**

   Dharmastikay is formed from two words: Dharma + Astikay. The term Dharma here does not refer to religion, but means the medium of motion. Astikay means collection of spaces. Dharmastikay denotes the medium of motion for things in the universe. In the absence of this medium, Jivas and other things would be unable to move. This medium prevails in lok, but is absent in alok.

2. **Adharmastikay**

   This term is also formed of two terms: Adharma + Astikay. Here again, Adharma does not refer to a lack of religion, but rather it means the medium of rest. In the absence of this medium, jivas and other things would continuously move. This medium also prevails in lok, but is absent in alok.

3. **Äkäshtikay**

   Äkäshtikay is formed of two words: Äkäsh and Astikay. Whole space in the universe is called Äkäsh. In Jainism, Akash is divided into two parts: Lokakash (Lok) and Alokakash (Alok). Jiva, Pudgal, Kal, Dharmästikäy, and Adharmästikäy exist only in Lokäkäsh. Alokakash is an empty space and does not contain any Jiva, Pudgal, kal, Dharmästikäy, and Adharmästikäy.

4. **Pudgalastikay**

   The word Pudgal is made up of two terms: Pud means addition and Gal means division. In other words, what continuously changes by addition and/or division is called the Pudgal or the matter. All the matters in the universe are called Pudgals.

   
   

   A pudgal has the form or a shape. A pudgal can be experienced by touching, tasting, smelling, or seeing. Like Jiva, Pudgal is also mobile. The karman particles that attach to our souls are the pudgal. Pudgal can only be divided and subdivided to a certain extent. This indivisible smallest part of pudgal is called Paramänu. A paramänu is much more minute than even an atom. When a Paramänu is attached to the main pudgal, it is called a Pradesh. These sub-atomic paramänus are too minute to be detected by normal vision, but they can be combined. Thus, when a paramänu is combined with other paramänus, they are called a skandha. A part of a skandha is called the desh. Such skandhas may be large or small. Small skandhas may be invisible to the eye, but they can be seen when the combinations are larger.

5. **Kal**

   Käl means time, which brings forth changes. A child becomes a young person, a young person becomes an old person, and the old person dies. In other words, something which is new becomes old, worn, and torn with the time. All of these changes involve the time. The past, present, and future are the different modes of the time and

Notes

are measured in terms of the years, months, days, hours, minutes or seconds. For all practical purposes a second happens to be the smallest measurement of time. Jainism however, recognizes a very tiny measurement of time known as samay which is an infinite small part of a second.

The following are the measurements of the time as adopted by the Jainism:

Indivisible time = 1 Samay (finest units of measurement)
Countless Samayas = 1 Ävalikä
16777216 Ävalikäs = 1 Muhurt
30 Muhurtas = 1 Day and night
15 Days and nights = 1 Paksha
2 Pakshas = 1 Month
12 Months = 1 Year
Countless years = 1 Palyopam
10 Crores of Crores of Palyopams = 1 Sägaropam
10 Crores of Crores of Sägaropams = 1 Utsarpini or 1 Avasarpini.
1 Utsarpini + Avasarpini = 1 Kälchakra (One time cycle).

**Auspecious results (Punya)**

**Punya and Pap**

Why are some people live in more favorable situations than the others? Why are some rich, while the others struggle? Why do some suffer more sickness than the others? Why is science unable to explain all these questions? The answer to such a disparity lies in the understanding of the punya and the pap. What are the punya and the pap? A punya is earned when our activities are good and comforting to others while a pap is earned when our activities are bad and cause suffering to the others. When the punya mature or give the result, it brings worldly happiness and comfort, and when the pap mature or give the result, it brings nothing but the worldly suffering.
Now, it would be obvious that what we see in the world is nothing other than the result of our past actions. Knowing this would remind us that

our activities should be wholesome if we want happiness and comfort in life, otherwise we should be ready to accept the unhappiness and discomfort. When talking about the activities, people mostly think of physical activities, but we should not forget that verbal expressions, and mental thoughts are also considered the activities. For this reason, not only our physical activities be wholesome, but our speech and thoughts should also be pure. We should also remember that we accumulate punya and pap (karmas) by asking someone else to do something for us or by encouraging someone else to do something.
Lord Mahavira's message is "Live and let live". Everybody desires to live and enjoy the comforts of life. Therefore, we should not come in the way of anyone seeking the same. If we can properly understand the implications of this message, it will go long way in molding our attitude towards other creatures. But, around us we see and hear that many people hunt or fish and they eat meat, chicken, fish, eggs, etc. Some meat eating people argue that they do not actually kill animals or these creatures were created for our food. Therefore, eating meat or other animals foods would not affect them. However, they do not realize that by eating meat or other animal foods they are directly or indirectly instrumental in killing animals, birds, fish, etc., The more they eat, the more killing there will be. They are not realizing that their direct as well as indirect actions bring pap or punya. Unfortunately, because most of paps do not show their results immediately, the people do not care about the consequences. We also hear about the riots in which people plunder, hit, and kill the others and set fire to the shops, the homes, and buildings. By doing so, they put a lot of people through unnecessary suffering. These people undertaking such heinous activities may think that they are getting even; however, they fail to realize that by causing suffering to others they themselves will have to suffer the consequences of their evil acts at some point, if not in this life, then in coming lives.
Consequently, our actions should not involve disturbing the comforts of other living beings, hurting or killing them in any way, directly or indirectly. By providing comfort and security to others, we gain punya. Punya brings happiness during this life or following lives. On the other hand, if we cause suffering or unhappiness to the others then we acquire

Päp. Such Päp brings the unhappiness in this or future lives. Let us understand from the following examples how we accumulate the punya and the pap.

1. A long time ago a poor widow had a young son. She had to work hard to provide for herself and her son. Once, there was a day of a great festival and neighboring families prepared the tasteful pudding of milk and rice called kheer in order to celebrate. The neighborhood kids were enjoying the kheer, and seeing this the poor boy went to his mother and asked her to make the kheer for him too. He did not realize that his mother did not have enough money to buy the milk, rice, and sugar needed for making the kheer. The mother tried to explain the situation, but the boy started crying for the kheer.
2. The mother could not tolerate his crying, so she said, "Don't cry, my son, I will make the kheer for you." She went to the neighbors and borrowed some milk, sugar and rice and made the kheer. She served the kheer in an earthen plate, and told him to wait until it had cooled. Then she left to get the water from the well.
3. While the kheer was cooling, a monk came to the boy's home to ask for the alms (to get a food). The boy felt very happy and invited the monk to come in. While he was serving the kheer, all the kheer slipped into the monk's bowl. The boy did not regret this, but instead felt very happy to that he could offer the food to the monk. After the monk left, he ate whatever kheer was stuck to the plate and the pot. His thoughts did not change. He had offered the kheer to the monk willingly; therefore, he earned tremendous punya. As a result of this punya, in his next life he was born into a very wealthy family with all luxuries. His name was Shalibhadra. Shalibhadra during his life realized what life is all about. He renounced the luxuries of life, and uplifted his soul by becoming a monk of Lord Mahävira.
4. There lived a butcher in Magadha city. He enjoyed his job. One day, King Shrenik decided that there would be no more killing in the city. All the killing in the city stopped except for this butcher's killing. When he was asked why he did not observe

King Shrenik's order, he said he loved killing and could not stop. King Shrenik decided to put him in a dry well so that there would be nothing for him to kill. To everyone's surprise, the killing did not stop there either. The butcher made animals from wet clay and then pretended to kill them. Since, he was enjoying killing so much, he accumulated pap (bad karmas) that gave rise to a situation where he has to suffer again in his next life.

From these two stories, we learn that if we want happiness and comfort, then we should offer comfort to others. As the saying goes you reap what you saw.

The following is a list of some activities that can bring comfort to others and can ultimately provide the same for us. They are:

1. offering food to the needy (only vegetarian food)
2. offering clothes to the needy
3. helping the sick
4. helping others to acquire knowledge
5. giving charity (be sure that the money is used for a good cause)
6. helping parents, brothers, sisters, grandparents, and others in need
7. helping animals or organizations that help animals
8. studying religion and following its precepts in our daily lives
9. worshipping Tirthankaras like Lord Mahävira.

Here is a list of some of the activities that can cause discomfort to others and can ultimately cause discomfort to us. They are:

1. being cruel or violent to the others including the humans, animals, birds, bugs, etc.
2. killing the humans, animals, birds, bugs, etc.
3. showing disrespect to parents, teachers or others
4. speaking harsh words or planning violence
5. not following the religious principles in the daily life
6. being angry or greedy
7. being arrogant
8. to be deceptive.

**Punya and Pap**

Why are some people live in more favorable situations than the others? Why are some rich, while the others struggle? Why do some suffer more sickness than the others? Why is science unable to explain all these questions? The answer to such a disparity lies in the understanding of the punya and the pap. What are the punya and the pap? A punya is earned when our activities are good and comforting to others while a pap is earned when our activities are bad and cause suffering to the others. When the punya mature or give the result, it brings worldly happiness and comfort, and when the pap mature or give the result, it brings nothing but the worldly suffering.

Now, it would be obvious that what we see in the world is nothing other than the result of our past actions. Knowing this would remind us that our activities should be wholesome if we want happiness and comfort in life, otherwise we should be ready to accept the unhappiness and discomfort. When talking about the activities, people mostly think of physical activities, but we should not forget that verbal expressions, and mental thoughts are also considered the activities. For this reason, not only our physical activities be wholesome, but our speech and thoughts should also be pure. We should also remember that we accumulate punya and pap (karmas) by asking someone else to do something for us or by encouraging someone else to do something.

Lord Mahavira's message is "Live and let live". Everybody desires to live and enjoy the comforts of life. Therefore, we should not come in the way of anyone seeking the same. If we can properly understand the implications of this message, it will go long way in molding our attitude towards other creatures. But, around us we see and hear that many people hunt or fish and they eat meat, chicken, fish, eggs, etc. Some meat eating people argue that they do not actually kill animals or these creatures were created for our food. Therefore, eating meat or other animals foods would not affect them. However, they do not realize that by eating meat or other animal foods they are directly or indirectly instrumental in killing animals, birds, fish, etc., The more they eat, the more killing there will be. They are not realizing that their direct as well as indirect actions

bring pap or punya. Unfortunately, because most of paps do not show their results immediately, the people do not care about the consequences.
We also hear about the riots in which people plunder, hit, and kill the others and set fire to the shops, the homes, and buildings. By doing so, they put a lot of people through unnecessary suffering. These people undertaking such heinous activities may think that they are getting even; however, they fail to realize that by causing suffering to others they themselves will have to suffer the consequences of their evil acts at some point, if not in this life, then in coming lives.
Consequently, our actions should not involve disturbing the comforts of other living beings, hurting or killing them in any way, directly or indirectly. By providing comfort and security to others, we gain punya. Punya brings happiness during this life or following lives. On the other hand, if we cause suffering or unhappiness to the others then we acquire Päp. Such Päp brings the unhappiness in this or future lives. Let us understand from the following examples how we accumulate the punya and the pap.

1. A long time ago a poor widow had a young son. She had to work hard to provide for herself and her son. Once, there was a day of a great festival and neighboring families prepared the tasteful pudding of milk and rice called kheer in order to celebrate. The neighborhood kids were enjoying the kheer, and seeing this the poor boy went to his mother and asked her to make the kheer for him too. He did not realize that his mother did not have enough money to buy the milk, rice, and sugar needed for making the kheer. The mother tried to explain the situation, but the boy started crying for the kheer.
2. The mother could not tolerate his crying, so she said, “Don’t cry, my son, I will make the kheer for you.” She went to the neighbors and borrowed some milk, sugar and rice and made the kheer. She served the kheer in an earthen plate, and told him to wait until it had cooled. Then she left to get the water from the well.
3. While the kheer was cooling, a monk came to the boy’s home to ask for the alms (to get a food). The boy felt very happy and invited the monk to come in. While he was serving the kheer, all the kheer slipped into the monk’s bowl. The boy did not regret this, but instead

felt very happy to that he could offer the food to the monk. After the monk left, he ate whatever kheer was stuck to the plate and the pot. His thoughts did not change. He had offered the kheer to the monk willingly; therefore, he earned tremendous punya. As a result of this punya, in his next life he was born into a very wealthy family with all luxuries. His name was Shalibhadra. Shalibhadra during his life realized what life is all about. He renounced the luxuries of life, and uplifted his soul by becoming a monk of Lord Mahävira.

4. There lived a butcher in Magadha city. He enjoyed his job. One day, King Shrenik decided that there would be no more killing in the city. All the killing in the city stopped except for this butcher's killing. When he was asked why he did not observe King Shrenik's order, he said he loved killing and could not stop. King Shrenik decided to put him in a dry well so that there would be nothing for him to kill. To everyone's surprise, the killing did not stop there either. The butcher made animals from wet clay and then pretended to kill them. Since, he was enjoying killing so much, he accumulated pap (bad karmas) that gave rise to a situation where he has to suffer again in his next life.

From these two stories, we learn that if we want happiness and comfort, then we should offer comfort to others. As the saying goes you reap what you saw.

The following is a list of some activities that can bring comfort to others and can ultimately provide the same for us. They are:

1. offering food to the needy (only vegetarian food)
2. offering clothes to the needy
3. helping the sick
4. helping others to acquire knowledge
5. giving charity (be sure that the money is used for a good cause)
6. helping parents, brothers, sisters, grandparents, and others in need
7. helping animals or organizations that help animals
8. studying religion and following its precepts in our daily lives
9. worshipping Tirthankaras like Lord Mahävira.

Here is a list of some of the activities that can cause discomfort to others and can ultimately cause discomfort to us. They are:

1. being cruel or violent to the others including the humans, animals, birds, bugs, etc.
2. killing the humans, animals, birds, bugs, etc.
3. showing disrespect to parents, teachers or others
4. speaking harsh words or planning violence
5. not following the religious principles in the daily life
6. being angry or greedy
7. being arrogant
8. to be deceptive.

**Influx of Karmas (Asrav)**

Asrav means inflow and according to Jain philosophy defined as the inflow of karmas to the soul. The influx of karmas occurs at every second in life. It is this process that keeps our souls wandering in this universe and prevents it from being free. Let us say that you went boating and were having a good time. Suddenly, you noticed water spurting from the floor of the boat. What would go through your mind? What would you do? The first thing that would go through your mind is that there is a hole, let me fix it before the boat sinks. You may be lucky if it was just one hole, but there could be more than one. In the same way, we know that karmas are accumulating to our souls through one or more of our activities and unless we stop them they are going to choke our souls.

Asrav can be described as two types.

1. Physical or Objective
2. Psychic or Subjective

The physical type refers to actual activities which lead to the inflow of karmas. The psychic refers to mental engrossment in such activities.

There are forty-two ways through which the soul is exposed to the inflow of karmas. Of the forty-two, five are senses, four are passions, five are

avratas, three are yogas, and twenty-five are activities. The first seventeen of these are regarded as the major ones, while the other rest twenty-five are the minor asrava.

These asrav can also be named in eighteen different forms (sins), such as; violence, falsehood, stealing, sexual activity, possessiveness, anger, ego, deceit, greed, attachment, hatred , quarrelsomeness, false accusations, divulging someone's secrets, backbiting, taking delight in committing sins, being unhappy with religious acts, lying maliciously, trusting false belief, religious teachers, and religions.

In Jainism, karmas enter due to following five reasons:

1. Wrong Belief (Mithyatva),
2. Vowlessness (Avirati),
3. Passions (Kashayas),
4. Negligence (Pramad),
5. Psychophysical activities (Yoga).

**Mithyatva (False Belief):**

Mithyatva means wrong attitude, wrong taste, wrong activities, and lack of faith in the nine fundamentals (tattvas) explaind by the Jinas. Mithyatva also means not having interest and faith in the path of Moksha shown by the Jina, but having interest and faith in a so called path of Moksha expounded by ignorant and unenlightened people. In other words, instead of having faith in the Arihants, great spiritual heads, and a great dharma, those with mithyatva believe in a short cuts shown by people or religions without true deep knowledge of fundmentals.

The false preceptor is one who does not act according to the great vows such as non-violence (Ahimsa), Truth (Satya), Non-stealing (Asteya), Celibacy (Brahamcharya), and Non-possessiveness (Aparigraha). He keeps wealth and woman, and approves of such actions. He does not abide by the code of conduct of monks. Such a person is a false spiritual head.

The false religion, is that which is devoid of samyakdarshan (the right faith), samyakjnan (the right knowledge), and samyakcharitra (the right character). A false religion does not explain the true nature of jiva and ajiva. A false religion deems it right to enjoy sensual pleasures, to have passions, and to commit sins.

Having faith in such a false spiritual head and dharma; having partiality for them and interest in them constitute false belief or mithyatva.

The five kinds of mithyatva:

**The Anabhogik Mithyatva (Total ignorance):**

This is a state of ignorance in which one cannot distinguish between good and bad, or true and false doctrines. This state is also present in all the jivas that do not have a mind. Such jivas range from the Ekendriya up to the Asamjni Panchendriya (do not possess a mind).

**The Abhigrahik Mithyatva (Fanatic false faith):**

This refers to those having a fanatic faith and interest in a false dharma (religion). In such a state one believes that their dharma is the only right one, even though its propagator may have derogation like attachments, hatred, and violence, etc.

The Anabhigrahik Mithyatva (Accepting other faiths without comparing their qualities):

In this state people are simple; they are not extremists. People in this state believe that all religions are equal even though other religions may not be observing principles like Ahimsa and truthfulness. They do not completely accept celibacy, non-possessiveness, or anything which is not offered, etc. How can we consider them equal when they do not follow these principles to the full extent?

**The Abhiniveshik Mithyatva (Insistence in false faith):**

State in which one knows that his or her religion is not right, but continues to live in accord with that faith.

**The Samshayik Mithyatva (Skepticism):**

State in which there is doubt or skepticism about the dharma expounded by the Jina.

False belief is the greatest enemy of the soul. Because of mithyatva, one can not have faith in the fundamentals (tattvas), the path of Moksha, Tirthankars, Arihants, spiritual heads and dharma. One will have a strong interest in the sinful activities like violence and sensual pleasures. As a result of this, man moves farther away from a noble dharma. All the devotion and austerities carried out through various previous lives become wasted on account of the excitement caused by sins and sensual

enjoyments. We should discard mithyatva which is the basic cause of our distraction from true religion.

**Avirati (Vowlessness)**

Avirati means the stage of vowlessness during which one has no restraint from doing or contemplating upon bad things. Unless we take a vow to restrain or cut our association with any undesirable activities, all such activities will bring bad karmas to our soul. By taking a vow, we are saying that we will not have anything to do with these activities. In this way, we will not accumulate any bad karmas related to such activities.

**Passions (Kashayas)**

Kash means Samsar and Aya means gain. Therefore, kashayas means that which helps to gain or keep the jiva in samsar. In other words, kashayas are those things which keep Jivas in the cycle of births and deaths. Kashayas are also called passions and refer specially to anger, ego, deception, and greed. These passions have many forms such as attachments, hatred, enmity, hostility, arrogance, craftiness, trickery, lust, greed, and possessive propensity, etc. While fun, sorrow, delight, excitement, fear, disgust, abhorrence and sexual craving, etc., provoke kashayas. They themselves are not kashayas, but are rather referred to as nokashayas.

Anger, greed, deception, and ego are further subdivided into four types depending upon their severity: The four types are:

1. Severe (Anantanubandhi Kashaya),
2. Moderate (Apratyakhyan Kashaya),
3. Mild (Pratyakhyan Kashaya),
4. Slight (Samjwalan Kashay).

**Anantanubandhi Kashay**

This kashay binds the soul to endless worldly lives (samsar). It adds bondage and impels the cycle of life and death to go on forever. This kashay dwells in person who lives in false belief or Mithyatva . The jiva, under the influence of this kashay, commits very violent sins and has very severe attachments and hatred towards others. On account of the influence of this kashay, the jiva commits sins without realizing what is right and what is wrong, and carries out evil actions without any fear. This kashaya undermines righteousness or samyaktva which in this

context means faith in religious fundamentals, tattvas. Therefore, it is necessary to realize that a sin is a sin and should be considered an ignoble action. In this respect, when one destroys the Anantanubandhi kashaya, one will develop the right faith in the tattvas and will develop Samyaktva. If Anantanubandhi Kashaya arises it will destroy the faith and will throw the jiva down from the level of Samyaktva to Mithyatva or false belief.

**Apratyakhyan Kashay**

Sins like violence should not be committed. Though jivas know and realize this truth, they have not developed the strength to discard such sinful activities. In other words, the idea that a vow should be taken or restraint should be used to discard these sins does not arise. Even if one desires to take such vows, the apratyakhyan kashay would paralyze such desires. When this kashaya surfaces, it even drags those who are observing partial restraints to a level of no restraints (vowlessness). Under the influence of this kashay, the jiva, in spite of knowing it, becomes so inactive and apathetic that he or she cannot even say, "I will take a vow to refrain from this sin of this magnitude". Pratyakhyan kashay

**Pratyakhyan Kashaya** does not oppose partial restraints, vows, or pachchakhanas (accepting a vow to discard sins), but it eclipses the idea of total vows. Even though the first two extreme kashayas are gone, and faith and a desire to take total vows may appear, this kashaya still proves harmful towards acceptance of the total vows. During the effect of this kashaya, even though jiva may realize that violence is a sin and would like to abstain totally from committing such sins, he or she will only be able to restrain partially. Violence towards the sthavar jivas may continue but when this kashaya is destroyed, suppressed, or both one can totally restrain from causing violence to all lives. Therefore, depending upon the effect of this kashaya person may follow partial or total vows.

**Samjwalan Kashay**

At the point when this is the only kashaya left, the soul has dropped passions greatly in severity to the level of slight passions. At this level a person may either suppress this kashaya or destroy it completely. When this kashaya is suppressed, it will appear as if the jiva is devoid of any

attachment or hatred, but such a state does not always last for long. Within the next half antah muharat (twenty-eight minutes), the jiva will fall prey to newly surfacing kashayas, and may regress all the way back to the influence of anantanubandhi kashaya. On the other hand, if this kashay is completely destroyed then, the soul will arise to the true non-attached stage from which there is no rolling back. Therefore, when all samjwalan kashayas are destroyed this jiva will become a Kevali. Thus it can be seen that even a slight kashayas holds the Vitragata (status of equanimity) as a hostage.

**Pramad (Indolence)**

Pramad means that soul is inactive in contemplating on its own form. Pramad is caused by five things:

1. Arrogance
2. Sensual cravings
3. Passions
4. Sleep
5. Engaging in gossiping

It may be described that the pramad is also caused by eight other things:

1. Attachments
2. Hatred
3. Ignorance
4. Doubt
5. Illusion
6. Forgetfulness
7. Harmful activities of the mind, body and voice
8. Not caring for, and not having enthusiasm for any religious activities

If there is slight indolence (pramad) when a person has discarded all sinful activities and is initiated as a monk or a nun, then that monk or nun is called a Pramatta (one who is under the impact of pramad). When a monk or nun discards gross pramad he or she is an Apramatta monk or nun. Even after one becomes an Apramatta, passions may arise, but they will be very subtle. Thus, these passions can be destroyed or controlled. At such a time, the jiva will be strongly awakened. Therefore, a very small degree of passion is not called pramad. When the jiva transcends

from this state of spiritual awareness, the vitrag state appears. Consequently, senses are the cause for passions and passions lead to one's downfall.

**Senses:**

Senses are so slippery that if we are not vigilant, they get involved into what is happening around us and provoke our passions. Passions in turn may drag our souls from spiritual path. Let us understand how the five senses can hinder our spiritual progress.

**Hearing:**

A person may become involved in listening to sensual songs, music or talk and may spend so much time in it that he or she may not be able to concentrate on doing the necessary things. One should listen to religious sermons and devotional songs which help to improve our conation, cognition, conduct, and ultimately lead us to liberation.

**Sight:**

People spend so much time watching television that involves violence, sensual or demoralizing episodes, or MTV which increase one's lust and makes the mind more violent. Instead, one should spend time watching moral episodes and sermons by monks and nuns if available which would, in turn, also increase our conation, cognition, conduct and lead us to liberation.

**Smell:**

We should not be engrossed in pleasures of perfumes and scents that will increase our lust as well as other's lust. Such engrossment will bring the downfall of all parties involved. We should also be reminded that there is a great deal of violence involved in the creation of such products. Some people pluck flowers to smell, but they forget that they have caused a death. Nonetheless, such is violence. For these reasons, one should keep desires low, and stay away from such things.

**Taste:**

Many people eat meat because they consider meat to be a tasty food. Sometimes people overlook the violence involved in meat production. A similar incident occurs when some one drinks liquor. Even though, some may say we do not drink too much, we hear cries about driving while intoxicated. Not only do these people harm themselves, but they cause

many innocent lives to be lost. There are many unwanted incidents occurring in the society due to the influence of the sense of taste. In order to prevent such occurrences, let us control our taste and stay away from such things. Let us learn to live on simplistic tasteful food so that austerity like Ayambil can easily be performed.

Touch:

What do kissing, hugging, or even shaking hands bring to our minds? They bring sensual pleasure and increase our lust and therefore, we should avoid these things. We can greet a person by saying "Jai-Jinendra" with folded hands.

**Yoga (Psychophysical Activity)**

In Jainism, yoga means psychophysical activities. In other words, the thoughts, the words, and the physical activities of the jiva are called yogas. There are fifteen types of activities. If these activities are meritorious, the soul gathers auspicious karmas, and if they are demeritorious, the soul gathers inauspicious karmas.

The Manoyoga (the activity of the mind) is divided into four subtypes:

Satyamanoyoga – thinking about an object or its condition for what it is. For example: "Right knowledge, right faith, and right conduct action would lead to Moksha."

Asatyamanoyoga – thinking about a thing or its condition, in such a way which is contrary to what it truly is. For example: "Right conduct is not necessary for Moksha."

Satyashatyamanoyoga (mixed activities of the mind) – thinking that something may have some truth, but not the whole truth, or may have some falseness, but not totally so. For example: "Knowledge itself is enough to attain Moksha".

Vyavaharmanoyoga – thinking about something which is of a general nature. In this the truth or falseness, does not matter very much. For example: "Let me tell Ramesh that it is nine oï¿½clock because if he does not get ready, he will be late." "Let me tell Bhavesh, it is lunch time even though there is half hour more to go."

The Vachan yoga (the activity of the speech)is divide into four subtypes:

Satyavachan yoga – speaking the truth about an object.

Asatyavachan yoga – telling lie about an object.

Satyashatyavachan yoga (mix vachan) – saying something that may have some truth and some falseness.

Vyavaharvachan yoga – refers to casual words like; "You may go. You may come in, etc."

The Kaya yoga (the activity of the body) is divided into seven subtypes which are related to the following five types of bodies:

The human beings, animals and birds have the audarik body.

The heavenly beings and the inhabitants of hell have the vaikriya body.

The highly spiritual monks, who have mastered the shastras (fourteen poorvas) go to Samavasaran when they need clarification of their doubts where Lord Arihant is giving a sermon, by creating a special extra body called the aharak sharir. Their real body stays with them wherever they are.

The tejas body gives energy to the whole body.

The karman body carries the imprints of karmas to the next birth.

When the soul departs from the current body, at the time of death, the tejas and karman bodies go with it to the next life. Kaya yoga means the activities of these bodies, any organs, or any sense organs of all jivas. The seven types of kaya yogas are divided into:

Two Audarik Kaya yoga – (1) Mishra Audarik, and (2) Pure Audarik

Two Vaikriya Kaya yoga – (1) Mishra Vaikriya, and (2) Pure Vaikriya

Two Aharak Kaya yoga – (1) Mishra aharak, and (2) Pure Aharak, and One Karman Kaya yoga

Mishra Audarik Kaya Yoga: As a jiva is reborn in the next life, a new body is not ready at the very first moment, but the body is formed with the help of the Karman sharir, a collection of karmas, and with Audarik Pudgals. This activity is called the Mishra Audarik Kaya Yoga.

Pure Audarik Kaya yoga: Whatever activities that occur after the body has been fully formed are called the Audarik Kaya Yoga.

The same is for:

Mishra Vaikriya Yoga, and 4) Pure Vaikriya Yoga

Mishra Aharak Yoga, and 6) Pure Aharak Yoga

Karman kaya Yoga: When the soul (jiva) travels to the next life, it first goes straight up and then, it usually turns twice. When the soul turns for the first time, it does not have any connection with a body because it has

just discarded its current body and has not reached its next. At that time, the activity of the soul is due to the Karman body. This activity is called the Karman Kaya Yoga.

All together there are 15 yogas. These activities could be the auspicious ones or the inauspicious ones. Truthful activities relating to religious principles are auspicious activities. Untruthful activities relating to religious principles are inauspicious. We attain punya (merit) by means of auspicious yogas and papa (demerit or sin) by means of inauspicious yogas.

Different activities:

The following twenty-five activities cause influx of karmas, and one should take care to avoid them:

1. Kayiki activity: When carefree physical activities cause injury.
2. Adhikarniki activity: When someone engages in the activity of creating or supporting the instruments or weapons of violence.
3. Pradvesiki activity: When someone is causing injury due to anger.
4. Paritapaniki activity: When someone acts in grief and sorrow, causing others grief or sorrow.
5. Pranatipatiki activity: When someone kills or injures any part of the body.
6. Arambhiki activity: When someone begins activities which would cause injury. For example: building a house, or tilling a farm, etc.
7. Parigrahiki activity: Activities which cause hoarding of grains, cattle, wealth, and other material things.
8. Mayapratyayiki activity: When someone is causing injury by way of deceptive activities.
9. Mithyadarshanapratyayiki activity: When someone acts contrary to the path shown by the Jina and follows a false faith.
10. Apratyakhaniki activity: When one carries on activities without taking their vows.
11. Dristiki activity: When one looks at someone else with lust, hatred or attachment.

12. Spristiki activity: When one touches or hugs or kisses someone else with lust.
13. Pratityaki activity: When one reacts to unrelated matters.
14. Samantopanipatiki activity: When one enjoys praise for possessing wealth.
15. Naishastriki activity: When one causes injury or death on the job due to compulsion or command from a superior.
16. Svahastiki activity: As an employer, when one commands an employee to perform any action which may cause injury.
17. Ajnanpaniki activity: When one acts contrary to the Jinaï¿½s teaching while thinking he or she is a wise person.
18. Vaidaraniki activity: When one unjustly speaks ill of another person in order to defame others.
19. Anabhogiki activity: One should be very careful when voiding urine or defecating bowel movements, etc.
20. Anavakanksapratyayiki activity: When one shows disregard to and disbelief in the effectiveness of laws of life and conduct as proclaimed by the Jina.
21. Prayogiki activity: When one does not control mind, speech, and bodily movements as taught in the Jain Scriptures.
22. Samudayiki activity: When one acts with such wide implications that all eight karmas become attracted. For example, many people go to see acts of violence such as hanging, and have thoughts which make them wonder why it is taking so long to hang someone.
23. Premiki activity: When a person does things under the influence of deceit and greed.
24. Dvesiki activity: When a person does things under the influence of pride and anger.
25. Iryapahiki activity: Any passionless movements or activities.

Bandage of Karma (Bandh) Theory of Karma

**Bondage of Karma (Bandh) Theory of Karma**

As a student, you have seen that some students do very well in class even when they don't study, while others struggle to maintain their good

Notes

grades in spite of studying very hard. In the same way, you might have heard that for some people the money come easily, while others cannot even find a job. You might have also heard that some people stay sick all the time, while others never get sick. You might have heard someone lives over hundred years, while someone dies as a young child. Everybody is looking for an answer to these strange disparity. Some may say it is the God's will, others may say it is his luck, and so on. The Jainism says every thing happens due to the result of our past doings. You reap what you saw and no God or someone else can make this happen or change.

We and only we are the reason for our suffering or happiness. This can be explained by the theory of Karma. Therefore, it is very important that we understand this process very clearly. It also explains what karmas are, why and what role karmas play in our life (with soul), and how do we accumulate different kinds of karmas as well as how we get rid of them.

If you sit back and think, then you will realize that you are doing something all the time. Sometimes you might be talking or listening if you are not doing anything physically or you might be thinking. So you are always busy doing something. This is our nature. These activities may involve harm to others or help to others. We do not realize that everything we do brings karmas to our souls. When these karmas are mature that is when they are ready to depart form the soul that process results into happiness or suffering in our lives. This is how the karmas are responsible for our happiness or suffering




Karmas are the derivatives of the karman particles. The Karman particles are made up of the non-living matter (pudgals). They are scattered and

floating all over the universe (Lok). They are very very fine particles and we are neither able to see them with our eyes or with the regular microscope. A cluster of such innumerable karman particles is called a karman vargana. The karman varganas is one of the eight kinds of pudgal varganas. The karman vargana has the most subtle particles. When the soul acts with a passion like aversion or attachment; or anger, greed, ego, or deceitfulness, it attracts these karman varganas to itself. When these karman varganas get attached to the soul, they are called karmas. Karmas are classified into eight categories depending upon their nature. The karmas can be good (punya) or bad (Pap). The good karmas are the result of good or pious activities while the bad karmas are the result of bad or sinful activities.

**Process of The Bondage (Bandh) of The Karmas**

Once again as said earlier, whenever, we think, talk or do something, karman varganas are attracted to our soul, and get attached to it and these karman varganas are then called the karmas. This process is also called the bondage of karmas to the soul. When our activities are unintentional or without any passions, these karmas are called the Dravya Karmas. On the other side, when our activities are intentional or with passions, like anger, ego, greed and deceit these karmas are called the Bhava Karmas. The passions work as the gluing factors, and that is why the bhava karmas stay for a longer time with the soul while dravya karmas fall off almost immediately and easily from the soul.

Our activities are:

1. physical
2. verbal
3. mental

We further do these activities in three different ways,

1. We do the activities ourselves
2. We ask someone else to do for us
3. We encourage someone else to carry on these activities

Thus, in different combinations, we do our activities in nine different ways that cause bondage of the karmas to the soul. At the time of the bondage of karmas to the soul, the following four characteristics are determined about the karmas. They are:




What Kind of (Nature) Karmas will these be?

1. How many Karma particles (Quantity) will attach?
2. How long (Duration) will these karmas stay with soul?
3. How strong (Intensity) will be the bondage of these karmas?

The nature and the quantity of the bondage of the karmas depend on the vigor of activities while the duration and the intensity of the bondage of the karmas depend on the intensity of the desires behind those activities.

**Nature of the Bondage of The Karmas**

Depending upon the nature of the results of the karmas, they are grouped into eight types. They are:

1. Knowledge-Obscuring (Jnanavarniya) Karma
2. Perception-Obscuring (Darshanavarniya) Karma
3. Obstructive (Antarāy) Karma
4. Deluding (Mohniya) Karma
5. Feeling-Producing (Vedniya) Karma
6. Body-Determining (Nam) Karma
7. Status-Determining (Gotra) Karma
8. Age-Determining (Ayushya) Karma

These eight karmas are also grouped into two categories,

1. Destructive (Ghati) Karmas
2. Non-destructive (Aghati) Karmas

Ghati means destruction. Those karmas that destroy the true nature of the Soul are called destructive or ghati karmas. Those karmas that do not destroy the true nature of the soul, but only affect the body in which the soul resides are called non-destructive or Aghati karmas. The first four types of karmas from above list are destructive (ghati) karmas, and last four are non-destructive (aghati) karmas.

**The Quantity of The Bondage of The Karmas**

If the physical vigor of our activities is weak, then we accumulate smaller number of karman particles, but if the physical vigor is stronger, then we accumulate larger number of karman particles on our soul.

**Duration of The Bondage of The Karmas**

Duration of the karmic particles on the soul is decided by how intense are our desires at the time of our activities. If the desire for the activity is mild, then the duration of the bondage will be for a short time, but on the other side if the desire is stronger, then the duration of the bondage will be for a long time. The minimum time could be a fraction of a second and a maximum time could be thousands or even millions of years.

**INTENSITY OF THE BONDAGE OF THE KARMAS**

The intensity of karmas depends upon how intense our passions are at the time of our activities. The lesser the intensity of our passions, the less strong is the resulting bondage; the greater the intensity the more stronger the resulting bondage.

The intensity of the bondage of the karmas to the soul is described in four different levels.

1. Loose Bondage: This would be like a loose knot in the shoe string which can easily be untied. Same way, the Karmas which are attached loose to the soul could be easily untied (shed off) by simple thing like repentance.
2. Tight Bondage: This would be a tight knot which needs some efforts to untie it. Same way, the Karmas which are attached tight to the soul could be untied (Shed off) with some efforts like the atonement.
3. Tighter Bondage: This would be a tighter knot which needs too much efforts to untie it. Same way, the Karmas which are attached tighter to the soul could be untied (Shed off) with special efforts like the austerities.
4. Tightest Bondage: This would be a knot which could not be untied no matter how hard you work at it. Same way, the Karmas which are attached so tight to the soul would not shed off by any kind of efforts but we would have to bear their results to shed off.

There are the few terms, which we should know, are related to the bondage and the manifestation of the karmas.

1. Bandh means when the bondage of the karmas to the soul happen.
2. Uday means when the karmas mature at their own set time and manifest their results. (As the karmas mature and give the results they fall off the soul.)
3. Udirana means when the karmas are brought to the maturity prior to their set time of maturity with the active efforts like penance, active sufferings, etc.
4. Satta means when the karmas are bonded with the soul in the dormant form and are yet to mature.
5. Abadhakal means the duration of the bondage of the karmas to the soul. It starts from the time of their bondage to the soul until their maturity.

Many of us do nothing special but just wait for accumulated karmas to mature (to produce their results) and fall off thinking that they cant do anything about them. But by understanding udirna, we should realize that we can do something to our accumulated karmas. We don’t have to wait for them to fall off themselves if we want to accelerate our progress. Because, we can get rid off accumulated karmas ahead of their due time by special efforts. This means we have a control on our own destiny (to liberate) and it is us not God or someone else who decides when that will happen. Now it may be more clearer why many people follow austerities or take up monkshood or nunhood.

## 6.3 METAPHYSICS

According to Jain thought, the basic constituents of reality are souls (jiva), matter (pudgala), motion (dharma), rest (adharma), space (akasa), and time (kala). Space is understood to be infinite in all directions, but not all of space is inhabitable. A finite region of space, usually described as taking the shape of a standing man with arms akimbo, is the only region of space that can contain anything. This is so because it is the only region of space that is pervaded with dharma, the principle of motion (adharma is not simply the absence of dharma, but rather a principle that causes objects to stop moving). The physical world resides in the narrow

part of the middle of inhabitable space. The rest of the inhabitable universe may contain gods or other spirits.

While Jainism is dualistic—that is, matter and souls are thought to be entirely different types of substance—it is frequently said to be atheistic. What is denied is a creator god above all. The universe is eternal, matter and souls being equally uncreated. The universe contains gods who may be worshipped for various reasons, but there is no being outside it exercising control over it. The gods and other superhuman beings are all just as subject to karma and rebirth as human beings are. By their actions, souls accumulate karma, which is understood to be a kind of matter, and that accumulation draws them back into a body after death. Hence, all souls have undergone an infinite number of previous lives, and—with the exception of those who win release from the bondage of karma—will continue to reincarnate, each new life determined by the kind and amount of karma accumulated. Release is achieved by purging the soul of all karma, good and bad.

Every living thing has a soul, so every living thing can be harmed or helped. For purposes of assessing the worth of actions (see Ethics, below), living things are classified in a hierarchy according to the kinds of senses they have; the more senses a being has, the more ways it can be harmed or helped. Plants, various one-celled animals, and 'elemental' beings (beings made of one of the four elements—earth, air, fire, or water) have only one sense, the sense of touch. Worms and many insects have the senses of touch and taste. Other insects, like ants and lice, have those two senses plus the sense of smell. Flies and bees, along with other higher insects, also have sight. Human beings, along with birds, fish, and most terrestrial animals, have all five senses. This complete set of senses (plus, according to some Jain thinkers, a separate faculty of consciousness) makes all kinds of knowledge available to human beings, including knowledge of the human condition and the need for liberation from rebirth.

## 6.4 EPISTEMOLOGY AND LOGIC

Underlying Jain epistemology is the idea that reality is multifaceted (*anekanta*, or 'non-one-sided'), such that no one view can capture it in its

entirety; that is, no single statement or set of statements captures the complete truth about the objects they describe. This insight, illustrated by the famous story of the blind men trying to describe an elephant, grounds both a kind of fallibilism in epistemology and a sevenfold classification of statements in logic.

Every school of Indian thought includes some judgment about the valid sources of knowledge (*pramanas*). While their lists of *pramanas* differ, they share a concern to capture the common-sense view; no Indian school is skeptical. The Jain list of *pramanas* includes sense perception, valid testimony (including scriptures), extra-sensory perception, telepathy, and *kevala*, the state of omniscience of a perfected soul. Notably absent from the list is inference, which most other Indian schools include, but Jain discussion of the *pramanas* seem to indicate that inference is included by implication in the *pramana* that provides the premises for inference. That is, inference from things learned by the senses is itself knowledge gained from the senses; inference from knowledge gained by testimony is itself knowledge gained by testimony, etc. Later Jain thinkers would add inference as a separate category, along with memory and *tarka*, the faculty by which we recognize logical relations.

Since reality is multi-faceted, none of the *pramanas* gives absolute or perfect knowledge (except *kevala*, which is enjoyed only by the perfected soul, and cannot be expressed in language). As a result, any item of knowledge gained is only tentative and provisional. This is expressed in Jain philosophy in the doctrine of *naya*, or partial predication (sometimes called the doctrine of perspectives or viewpoints). According to this doctrine, any judgment is true only from the viewpoint or perspective of the judge, and ought to be so expressed. Given the multifaceted nature of reality, no one should take his or her own judgments as the final truth about the matter, excluding all other judgments. This insight generates a sevenfold classification of predications. The seven categories of claim can be schematized as follows, where 'a' represents any arbitrarily selected object, and 'F' represents some predicate assertible of it:

1. Perhaps a is F.
2. Perhaps a is not-F.

3. Perhaps a is both F and not-F.
4. Perhaps a is indescribable.
5. Perhaps a is indescribable and F.
6. Perhaps a is indescribable and not-F.
7. Perhaps a is indescribable, and both F and not-F.

Each predication is preceded by a marker of uncertainty (*syat*), which I have rendered here as 'perhaps.' Some render it as ‘from a perspective,’ or ‘somehow.’ However it is translated, it is intended to mark respect for the multifaceted nature of reality by showing a lack of conclusive certainty.

Early Jain philosophical works (especially the *Tattvartha Sutra*) indicate that for any object and any predicate, all seven of these predications are true. That is to say, for every object a and every predicate F, there is some circumstance in which, or perspective from which, it is correct to make claims of each of these forms. These seven categories of predication are not to be understood as seven truth-values, since they are all seven thought to be true. Historically, this view has been criticized (by Sankara, among others) on the obvious ground of inconsistency. While both a proposition and its negation may well be assertible, it seems that the conjunction, being a contradiction, can never be even assertible, never mind true, and so the third and seventh forms of predication are never possible. This is precisely the kind of consideration that leads some commentators to understand the 'syat' operator to mean ‘from a perspective.’ Since it may well be that from one perspective, a is F, and from another, a is not-F, then one and the same person can appreciate those facts and assert them both together. Given the multifaceted nature of the real, every object is in one way F, and in another way not-F. An appreciation of the complexity of the real also can lead one to see that objects are, as they are in themselves, indescribable (as no description can capture their entirety). This yields the fourth form of predication, which can then be combined with other insights to yield the last three forms.

Perhaps the deepest problem with this doctrine is one that troubles all forms of skepticism and fallibilism to one degree or another; it seems to be self-defeating. After all, if reality is multifaceted, and that keeps us

from making absolute judgments (since my judgment and its negation will both be equally true), the doctrines that underlie Jain epistemology are themselves equally tentative. For example, take the doctrine of *anekantevada*. According to that doctrine, reality is so complex that any claim about it will necessarily fall short of complete accuracy. The doctrine itself must then fall short of complete accuracy. Therefore, we should say, "Perhaps (or “from a perspective") reality is multifaceted." At the same time, we have to grant the propriety, in some circumstances, of saying, "Perhaps reality is not multifaceted." Jain epistemology gains assertibility for its own doctrine, but at the cost of being unable to deny contradictory doctrines. What begins as a laudable fallibilism ends as an untenable relativism.

## 6.5 ETHICS

Given that the proper goal for a Jain is release from death and rebirth, and rebirth is caused by the accumulation of karma, all Jain ethics aims at purging karma that has been accumulated, and ceasing to accumulate new karma. Like Buddhists and Hindus, Jains believe that good karma leads to better circumstances in the next life, and bad karma to worse. However, since they conceive karma to be a material substance that draws the soul back into the body, all karma, both good and bad, leads to rebirth in the body. No karma can help a person achieve liberation from rebirth. Karma comes in different kinds, according to the kind of actions and intentions that attract it. In particular, it comes from four basic sources: (1) attachment to worldly things, (2) the passions, such as anger, greed, fear, pride, etc., (3) sensual enjoyment, and (4) ignorance, or false belief. Only the first three have a directly ethical or moral upshot, since ignorance is cured by knowledge, not by moral action.

The moral life, then, is in part the life devoted to breaking attachments to the world, including attachments to sensual enjoyment. Hence, the moral ideal in Jainism is an ascetic ideal. Monks (who, as in Buddhism, live by stricter rules than laymen) are constrained by five cardinal rules, the "five vows": (1) ahimsa, frequently translated "non-violence," or “non-harming,” satya, or truthfulness, asteya, not taking anything that is not given, brahmacharya, chastity, and aparigraha, detachment. This list

differs from the rules binding on Buddhists only in that Buddhism requires abstention from intoxicants, and has no separate rule against attachment to the things of the world. The cardinal rule of interaction with other jivas is the rule of ahimsa. This is because harming other jivas is caused by either passions like anger, or ignorance of their nature as living beings. Consequently, Jains are required to be vegetarians. According to the earliest Jain documents, plants both are and contain living beings, although one-sensed beings, so even a vegetarian life does harm. This is why the ideal way to end one's life, for a Jain, is to sit motionless and starve to death. Mahavira himself, and other great Jain saints, are said to have died this way. That is the only way to be sure you are doing no harm to any living being.

While it may seem that this code of behavior is not really moral, since it is aimed at a specific reward for the agent—and is therefore entirely self-interested—it should be noted that the same can be said of any religion-based moral code. Furthermore, like the Hindus and Buddhists, Jains believe that the only reason that personal advantage accrues to moral behavior is that the very structure of the universe, in the form of the law of karma, makes it so.

**Check Your Progress 1**

Note: i) Use the space given below for your answer.

ii) See the end of the unit for tips for your answer.

1. What do you know the Jain Philosophy?

   …………………………………………………………………
   …………………………………………………………………
   …………………………………………………………………

2. Discuss the Metaphysics.

   …………………………………………………………………
   …………………………………………………………………
   …………………………………………………………………

3. Discuss the Epistemology and Logic.

   …………………………………………………………………
   …………………………………………………………………
   …………………………………………………………………

Notes

4. What do you know about Ethics?

…………………………………………………………………………

…………………………………………………………………………

…………………………………………………………………………

## 6.6 LET US SUM UP

Though it is widely believed that Vardhamana Mahavira (? 599 B.C. – 527 B.C.?) founded Jainism, the Jain tradition maintains that he was the 24th Tirthankara of Jainism. Rishabhadeva was the first Tirthankara. Parshvanatha was the 23rd Tirthankara.

The two main sects of Jainism are: (1) Digambara (2) Shwetambara.

The Digambaras believe that a monk must give up all property including clothes and then only they get moksha. They also deny the right of women to moksha.

Jainism is both a philosophy and a religion. It is a heterodox philosophy in the sense that it does not uphold the authority of the Vedas. It is atheist and does not accept the existence of God. Jainism rejects the concept of a Supreme Being or the Brahman as the creator of the world. The Tirthankaras are the liberated souls. The followers offer prayers to the Tirthankaras.

Jainism believes that the universe is eternal and boundless (infinite).

The Jains classify all the things into two groups: 'jiva' and 'ajiva'. Jiva is what is known as the soul or the 'atman' or the 'purusha' in other systems. Jiva can be considered as 'the composite unit of body and soul.' The soul manifests itself in a material body. Its essential character is consciousness. The jivas or the souls are innumerable and are divided into many grades or categories depending on the sense-organs they possess. The jiva is not permanent. Its magnitude keeps on changing from body to body. The soul of an elephant is bigger than that of an insect.

While the Hindu philosophies maintain that the karma is immaterial, Jainism advances the material form of karma. According to Jainism, karma is "paudgolik"; it is constituted of subtle particles of matter.

## 6.7 KEY WORDS

Metaphysics: Metaphysics is the branch of philosophy that examines the fundamental nature of reality, including the relationship between mind and matter, between substance and attribute, and between potentiality and actuality.

Ethics: Ethics or moral philosophy is a branch of philosophy that involves systematizing, defending, and recommending concepts of right and wrong conduct. The field of ethics, along with aesthetics, concerns matters of value, and thus comprises the branch of philosophy called axiology

## 6.8 QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

1. What do you know the Jain Philosophy?
2. Discuss the Metaphysics
3. Discuss the Epistemology and Logic
4. What do you know about Ethics?

## 6.9 SUGGESTED READINGS AND REFERENCES


- Battacharya, Hari Mohan. Jaina Logic and Epistemology. Calcutta: K. P. Gagchi and Company, 1994.
- Battacharya, Narendra Nath. Jain Philosophy: Historical Outline. Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers, 1976.
- Benesch, Walter. An Introduction to Comparative Philosophy. London: Macmillan Press, 1997.
- Jacobi, Herman, trans. Jaina Sutras. Sacred Books of the East, vols 22 and 45. London: Oxford University Press, 1884.
- Sharma, Arvind. A Jaina Perspective on the Philosophy of Religion. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas, 2001.
- Tatia, Nathmal, trans. That Which Is: Tattvartha Sutra. San Francisco: HarperCollins Publishers, 1994.

## 6.10 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

**Check Your Progress 1**

1. See Section 6.2
2. See Section 6.3
3. See Section 6.4
4. See Section 6.5

# UNIT 7: BUDDHISM

**STRUCTURE**

7.0 Objectives

7.1 Introduction

7.2 Four Noble Truths

7.3 The Eightfold Path in Buddhism

7.4 Doctrine of Dependent Origination (Pratitya-samutpada)

7.5 Doctrine of Momentoriness (Kshanika-vada)

7.6 Doctrine of Karma

7.7 Doctrine of Non-soul (anatta)

7.8 Philosophical Schools of Buddhism

7.9 Let us sum up

7.10 Key Words

7.11 Questions for Review

7.12 Suggested readings and references

7.13 Answers to Check Your Progress

## 7.0 OBJECTIVES

This unit, the philosophy of Buddhism, introduces the main philosophical notions of Buddhism. It gives a brief and comprehensive view about the central teachings of Lord Buddha and the rich philosophical implications applied on it by his followers. This study may help the students to develop a genuine taste for Buddhism and its philosophy, which would enable them to carry out more researches and study on it. Since Buddhist philosophy gives practical suggestions for a virtuous life, this study will help one to improve the quality of his or her life and the attitude towards his or her life.

After this unit 7, we can able to know:

- To know the Four Noble Truths
- To discuss the Eightfold Path in Buddhism
- To know the Doctrine of Dependent Origination (Pratitya-samutpada)

- To describe Doctrine of Momentoriness (Kshanika-vada)
- To know the Doctrine of Karma
- To highlight Doctrine of Non-soul (anatta)
- To understand the Philosophical Schools of Buddhism

## 7.1 INTRODUCTION

Buddhism is not what we call a 'top-down religion', one in which a deity reveals religious and spiritual truths to humanity. It is a 'bottom-up religion' created by humans as an attempt to express spiritual concepts. Buddhism does not deny the existence of gods or of other worlds, and indeed the devotional practices of many Buddhist traditions involve the veneration and invocation of special beings. Buddhism is a non-theistic religion, and unlike other world religions, Buddhism is not a doctrine of revelation. The Buddha did not claim to be the bearer of a message from high. He made it clear that whatever he taught, he had discovered for himself through his own efforts.

Buddhist philosophy and doctrines, based on the teachings of Gautama Buddha, give meaningful insights about reality and human existence. Buddha was primarily an ethical teacher rather than a philosopher. His central concern was to show man the way out of suffering and not one of constructing a philosophical theory. Therefore, Buddha's teaching lays great emphasis on the practical matters of conduct which lead to liberation. For Buddha, the root cause of suffering is ignorance and in order to eliminate suffering we need to know the nature of existence. Also, Buddha insisted that all those who accept his doctrines must accept it only after rigorous reflections and only after all doubts and perplexities are overcome. Here, the philosophical implications of Buddha's teaching must be taken into serious consideration. The philosophical system of Buddhism does not assume a systematic form. We cannot make a sharp distinction between the philosophical, religious, and ethical notions of Buddhism. The reason behind it is that the philosophical notions were developed in the background of ethical and religious notions. We may find many overlapping ideas from the previous chapter 'Buddhism as Religion', such as the noble truths, the eightfold path, the doctrines of

soul, the doctrine of karma, etc. All these imply profound philosophical insights as they imply great religious insights.

Buddhism originated as an alternative tradition to the excessive importance given to rituals and sacrifices in Vedic tradition. It was also a reaction to the gross neglect of the social problems of the time, as well as a revolt against the hegemony of the Brahmins in the society. The main causes for the emergence of Buddhism are: Social: A Brahmin centered, caste based, hierarchical set up was prevalent in the society. The authority to interpret the scriptures was vested with the Brahmin. Temples, which were the centres of social life, were controlled by them. Laws of pollution were strictly imposed upon the people of the lower caste. Tribes and Dravidians were out of the caste structure. Economic: Agriculture and cattle rearing were the main source of wealth and livelihood for the people. Brahmins found out ways and means to exploit the lower sections in the society. Kings were made to perform yagas, yajnas, and digvijayas through which the Brahmins benefited a lot. The ordinary people had to contribute a major portion of their income to the kings, Brahmins, and temples. Religious: Mode of worship, rituals, and religious ceremonies were interpreted by the Brahmins to suit their interest. The Vedas, Aranyakas, Mimamsas and Upanishads were written to perpetuate the hegemony of the Brahmins. Metaphysical speculations were at their zenith, which was the prerogative of the educated class. Exploitation by the higher castes and the suffering of the ordinary people continued unabated.

It was a time of two extremes: the Vedic, Upanisadic belief in the Absolute supported by sacrifices, rituals (yajnas) and the materialistic philosophy of the Charvaka. Buddha avoided and negated the extremes, and at the same time integrated the positive elements of these two systems. He negated the existence of the soul and the Absolute, but he accepted the belief in the law of karma and the possibility of attaining liberation. His main concern was the welfare of the ordinary people. Though Buddha himself wrote nothing, the early writings were in the Pali and Sanskrit languages. Buddhist scripture is known as Tripitaka (Sanskrit) or Tipitaka (Pali), Three Baskets or Three Traditions. They are vinaya (Disciple), Sutta (Discourse), and Abhidhamma (Doctrinal

Elaboration). Buddha was not interested in speculative or theoretical analysis of phenomena, but he was concerned about finding out practical solutions to problems in life. The influence of the early Upanishads is clear in the teachings of Buddha. Compassion and love were the predominant characteristics of Buddha. Charity was the basis of the Buddhist religion. Buddhist spirituality has four stages ahimsa (not harming), maitre (loving kindness), dana (giving), and karuna (compassion).

**Life of Buddha**

Gautama or Siddhartha (566-486 B.C), who later came to be known as the Buddha or 'The Enlightened One', was born into a wealthy Kshatriya family, in Lumbini, at the foothills of Nepal. Gautama's father Shudhodana, a Kshatriya of the Sakya clan, was the king of Kapilavastu (present day Nepal), and his mother was Mahamaya. She had a dream, while on her way to her parents' home, that a white elephant entered her womb, and later Gautama was born at Lumbini. A white elephant is an important symbol for Buddhists even today. On the fifth day of the child's birth, 108 Brahmins were invited for the naming ceremony, and he was given the name Siddhartha (Siddha- achieved, artha- goal; one who achieved his goal). Many predicted that Siddhartha would become either a great king or a great sage. On the seventh day his mother died, and his father married his mother's sister, named Mahaprajapati Gautami. She brought up Siddhartha with love and affection. Gradually, he was called after his step-mother, 'Gautamiputra' (son of Gautami) or 'Gautama' (go-cow/bull, tema-the best; the best cow or bull). The child was delicately nurtured and brought up in palatial luxury. At the age of sixteen, Siddhartha married his cousin, Yasodhara. At the age of twenty nine, while he was travelling out of the palace, he had four encounters which left a lasting impact on him. He saw an old decrepit man, a sick man, a corpse in a funeral procession, and a peaceful and serene ascetic wandering alone. The first three sights disturbed him, whereas the fourth one gave him hope and peace. After a son, named Rahula (meaning rope or fetter) was born to him, one night he left home and wandered around for many years. He studied yoga and meditation from two hermits -

Udraka Ramaputhra and Alara Kalama. For some time he practised severe asceticism, but soon realized that it did not help him. Finally, he sat down at the bottom of the Bodhi tree. At the age of 35, during meditation under the Bodhi tree (the tree of wisdom), on the bank of the river Neranjara at Bodh-Gaya (near Gaya in modern Bihar), Gotama (Gautama) attained Enlightenment. In the beginning, he was reluctant to share his experiences with any one for fear of being misunderstood. Gradually, he changed his mind and delivered his first sermon to a group of five ascetics (who were old colleagues) in the Deer Park at Lsipatana, near Varanasi. After this, he taught all kinds of people till the end of his life, irrespective of their caste, religion, or status in society. After preaching and teaching for many years, Buddha attained Nirvana at the age of eighty at Kushinagara in eastern Uttar Pradesh. 3 Buddha was the only religious founder who did not make any super natural claim. He was simple and humane. Whatever he achieved could be attained by any human person. Every person has the inner potency to become an enlightened one, through constant meditation and a disciplined life. He founded the religion of Buddhism after he attained true wisdom under the Bodhi tree at Bodhgaya. In his first public address at the Sarnath Deer Park in Benares, Buddha spoke of the four noble truths, which are, (i) the world is full of suffering (ii) suffering is caused by desire (iii) suffering can be removed (iv) in order to remove suffering one has to overcome desire.

## 7.2 FOUR NOBLE TRUTHS

The four noble truths are the most important principles of Buddhism. We need to take into serious account these principles, whether we speak about Buddhism as a religion, or Buddhist philosophy, or any other serious study on Buddhism. Here, only a brief description of the four noble truths is given, to start our study on the 'Philosophy of Buddhism.' The Buddha was least interested in metaphysical discourses or dogmas. He was concerned about ethical living, applicable to all sections of people - kings, princes, Brahmans, people of low caste, masters, servants, monks, ordinary people, etc. He taught about the nobility of a religion.

The four Noble Truths are the essence of the Buddha's teachings, which he explained in his first sermon to his old colleagues at Isipattana. These noble truths are explained in detail later, in other early Buddhist scriptures. 1. Dukkha: there is 'Suffering' in the world. 2. Samudaya: the arising or origin of 'Suffering'. 3. Nirodha: the cessation of 'Suffering'. 4. Magga: there is a path leading to the end of 'Suffering'.

The four noble truths are explained in detail in the chapter 'Buddhism as a Religion.' We may have to refer back to the portion there for more details. The four noble truths of Buddhism are as follows:

**Life is Full of Suffering (Dukkha):**

According to the first noble truth all forms of existence are subject to suffering. For Buddha it is a universal truth. All known and unknown facts and forms of life are associated with suffering. Birth, sickness, old age, death, anxiety, desire, and despair, all such happenings and feelings are based on suffering. Buddhism recognizes suffering at three levels, such as the suffering we experience in our daily life, like, birth, sickness, old age, death, despair, pain, desire, etc. (duhkah-duhkhatta), suffering caused by the internal mental conditions and the activities of the sense organs (samkara-duhkhatta), and the suffering caused by the impermanence of objects and our relation to them (viparinama-duhkhatta).

The First Noble Truth: Dukkha The term Dukkha, usually translated as 'suffering', does not communicate the full implication of the word as used in the Buddhist scriptures. Because of the misleading and unsatisfactory translation of the term, many people consider Buddhism as pessimistic. But in fact, Buddhism objectively regards a world of reality (yathabhutam), and suggests ways and means to attain peace, happiness, and tranquility. The word dukkha has a deeper meaning like 'imperfection', 'impermanence', and 'emptiness', in addition to the ordinary meanings of suffering, pain, sorrow, misery, etc. Though the Buddha presented dukkha as one of the four noble truths, he did not negate happiness in life. He accepted both material and spiritual happiness. Three factors are important with regard to life and enjoyment of sense pleasures; they are attraction or attachment, dissatisfaction, and

freedom or liberation. Desire is the cause of suffering; desire leads to the means for satisfaction; and satisfaction leads to pleasure or pain, and disappointment. The cycle of birth and death is a necessary outcome of desire. The concept of dukkha can be understood from three aspects: 1. dukkha as ordinary suffering (dukkha-dukkha): birth, sickness, old age, death, separation from the beloved, grief, distress, etc., 2. dukkha as produced by change (viparinama-dukkha): vicissitudes in life, a happy or a pleasant feeling that will change sooner or later and then produces pain, suffering or unhappiness. 3. dukkha as conditioned states (samkhara-dukkha): A being or an individual has five aggregates of attachments. The five aggregates are the following: a) The aggregates of matter (rupakkhandha) are the first aggregate. The four basic elements of the universe, their derivates, the sense organs and their corresponding objects in the external world are included in the aggregate matter. b) The second one is the aggregate of sensations (vedanakkhandha) and is six in number. The sensation we obtain through our senses and mind are included in this category. In Buddhism, unlike in other traditions, the mind is considered as a sense faculty or organ and not as spirit. c) The third one is aggregate of perceptions (sannakkhandha) and is six in number in relation to the six internal faculties. d) The fourth one is the aggregate of mental formations (sankharakkhandha) which include all volitional activities, both good and bad. e) The fifth is the aggregate of consciousness (vinnanakkhanda), based on the six internal faculties and their corresponding objects in the world. Consciousness is not spirit in Buddhist philosophy. These five aggregates together constitute the being; there is no other realist behind these aggregates to experience dukkha. Though the first noble truth is dukkha, statues of the Buddha always present a serene, calm, compassionate, and smiling face.

**Suffering has a Cause (Dukkha samudaya)**:

Everything in this cosmos has a cause, and nothing exists and happens without a cause. If this is the case, suffering should also have a cause. Buddhism explains suffering through a chain of twelve causes and effects, commonly known as the Doctrine of Dependent Origination (pratityasamutpada). In the final analysis, the root of all miseries is desire

(Tanha). Desire is all pervasive. Desire for possession, enjoyment, and a separate individual existence are some of the virulent forms of desire.

The oft repeated explanation of the second noble truth is: 'It is 'thirst' which produces reexistence and re-becoming, and which is bound with passionate greed. It finds fresh delight, now here and now there, namely,

1. Thirst for sense-pleasures,
2. Thirst for existence and becoming and
3. Thirst for non-existence.

The 'thirst', desire, or craving manifested in different forms in human life give rise to suffering and continuity of life. But desire, though the immediate and allpervading cause, cannot be considered as the first cause, because everything is relative and interdependent. 'Thirst' (tanha) depends on sensation, and sensation depends on contract for its origination; hence it is a circle that goes on and on, which is known as 'dependent origination' (paticca-sammupaada). Most of the economic, political, social, and ethnic problems are rooted in the interest of a person or a group or a nation.

Thirst as a cause for re-existence, and re-becoming is closely connected with the theory of Karma and rebirth. Four factors are involved in the existence and continuity of being. They are, i) ordinary material food, ii) contact of the sense organs with the external world, iii) consciousness, and iv) mental volition or will. Mental volition is karma; it is the root cause of existence. Mental volition (centan) is the desire to love, to re-exist, to continue, to become more and more. This comes under one of the five aggregates which are called mental formations. Both, the case of the arising of dukkha as well as the destruction of dukkha, are within us. Whatever has the nature of arising within dukkha has the nature of cessation within. There is a basic difference between the kamma (Pali) and karma (Sanskrit) as generally understood in Buddhist tradition. The theory of karma in Buddhist philosophy means 'volitional action'; it means neither the action nor the result of the action. Volitional acts can be good or bad. Thirst, volition, or karma produces either good or bad effects; the result of these actions is to continue in the good or bad direction within the cycle of continuity (samsara). The result of the

action will continue to manifest in the life after death. But an Arhant is free from impurities and defilements, thus he/she has no rebirth. Volition, thirst, or the desire to exist, to continue, to be reborn is a tremendous force in each living being. A human person is a combination of the five aggregates, which is a combination of physical and mental energies. These energies arise, decay, and die in a person each moment. These energies once produced will continue in a series, even after death. Buddhists do not believe in a permanent substance like a soul, which takes a new life after death. But the volitional actions give rise to energy which will give rise to another act, and so it goes on and on. As long as there is the 'thirst' to exist, the cycle of continuity (samsara) continues.

**Cessation of Suffering (Dukkha nirodha):**

If suffering has a cause, the seeker has to destroy this cause to stop suffering. So desire has to be extinguished to stop suffering. Nirvana is the state of being without suffering. It is a state of supreme happiness and bliss.

There is emancipation or liberation from suffering, which is known as the third noble truth (dukkhanirodha ariyasacca.) Liberation is popularly known as Nirvana (in Pali- Nibbana). Nirvana is the total 'extinction of thirst'. How can we understand Nirvana? Nirvana is the absolute, supra-mundane experience; hence language is not sufficient to explain it. Like the neti, neti approach in Advaita Vedanta, Nirvana is also explained in negative terms like, Tanhakkhaya or extinction of thirst, Asamkhata or uncompounded or unconditioned, Viraga or absence of desire, Nirodha or cessation, Nibbana or blowing out or extinction. The cessation of continuity and becoming is Nibbana. Extinction of the 'thirst' does not mean self-annihilation, because there is no self in Buddhism. Nibbana is the annihilation of the false idea of the self; it is the annihilation of ignorance (avijja). Nibbana is not a negative experience but is the 'absolute truth', which is beyond duality and relativity. Truth is that nothing is permanent; everything is dependent on the other. The realization of this is 'to see things as they are' (yathabhatam). Once the wisdom dawns, the continuity of samsara is broken and the mental formulations are no more capable of producing any more illusions.

Nirvana can be attained during one's life time itself, one need not die. Nirvana is the highest state of experience one can attain; it is 'happiness without sensation'.

**Ways to Destroy Suffering (Dukkha-nirodha-marga):**

The ways to destroy suffering consists of the practice of the eightfold virtue ,such as, Right View, Right Aspiration, Right Speech, Right Conduct, Right Livelihood, Right Effort, Right Awareness, and Right Concentration. In the practice of all these virtues one has to avoid extremes and follow the middle path.

This is also known as the 'middle path' because it avoids the extremes - happiness through sense pleasures and happiness through severe asceticism. The entire teaching of Buddha can be summarized into the eight fold noble path. They are the following: a) right understanding, b) right attitude of mind, c) right speech, d) right action, e) right conduct, f) right effort, g) right attention, and h) right meditation. The eight divisions will help a person to grow in ethical conduct (sila), mental discipline (samadhi), and wisdom (panna). Ethical conduct consists of right speech, right action, and right livelihood. Similarly right effort, right mindfulness, and right concentration form mental discipline. Compassion (karuna) and wisdom are the two essential factors for a person to be perfect. Wisdom is the quality of the mind or intellect, while compassion is the quality of the heart. An integrated development of the two aspects will enable a person to understand things as they are. Understanding, in Buddhism, is of two kinds. They are, grasping a thing based on the given data, which is called 'knowing accordingly' (anubodha), and seeing a thing in its true nature, which is called penetration (patvedha). Everyone who follows these can be liberated from the bondage of matter and suffering.

# 7.3 THE EIGHTFOLD PATH IN BUDDHISM

The eightfold path is the practical application of the four noble truths. They are also closely connected to the fourth noble truth as a means to

destroy suffering. Following are components of the eightfold path of Buddhism.

Right View (Samyak-dristi): It consists of the grasp and acceptance of the four noble truths, rejection of the fault doctrines, and avoidance of immorality resulting from covetousness, lying, violence, etc.

Right Aspirations (Samyka-sankalpa): It implies thought on renunciation, thought on friendship and good will, and thoughts on non-harming.

Right Speech (Samyak-vac): It inspires one to speak truth primarily, and to speak gentle and soothing words for the benefit and wellbeing of others. It also promulgates one to avoid falsehood, slander, harsh words and gossip.

Right Conduct (Samyak-karma): The Buddha intends by right conduct the practice of five moral vows namely, non-violence (ahimsa), truthfulness (satya), non-stealing (asteya),

Right Livelihood (Samyag ajiva): It consists of the avoidance of a luxurious life and the acceptance of occupations which do not involve cruelty and injury to other living beings. The Buddha exhorts to avoid occupations like sale of alcohol, making and selling weapons, profession of the soldier, butcher, fisherman, etc.

Right Effort (Samyak vyayama): It includes the effort to avoid the rise of evil and false ideas in the mind, the effort to overcome evil and evil tendencies, the effort to acquire positive values like attention, energy, tranquility, equanimity, and concentration, and the effort to maintain the right conditions for a meritorious life.

Right Awareness (Samyak Smrti ): It represents the awareness of the body (breathing positions, movements, impurities of the body, etc.), awareness of sensations (attentive to the feelings of oneself and of the other), awareness of thought and the awareness of the internal functions of the mind.

Right Concentration (Samyak Samadhi): The practice of one pointed contemplation leads the seeker to go beyond all sensations of pain and pleasure, and finally to full enlightenment. It happens in four levels. In the first level, through intense meditation the seeker concentrates the mind on truth and thereby enjoys great bliss. In the second level the seeker enters into supreme internal peace and tranquility. In the third

level, the seeker becomes detached even from the inner bliss and tranquility. In the fourth level, the seeker is liberated even from this sensation of bliss and tranquility.

The first two of the eight-fold path, namely, right view and right resolve, are together called Prajna, because they are related to consciousness and knowledge. The third, fourth, and fifth, namely, right speech, right conduct, and right livelihood, are collectively known as Sila, because they deal with the correct and morally right way of living. The last three, namely, right effort, right awareness, and right concentration are collectively known as Samadhi, because they deal with meditation and contemplation.

## 7.4 DOCTRINE OF DEPENDENT ORIGINATION (PRATITYA-SAMUTPADA)

The doctrine of dependent origination is central to Buddhist philosophy and is connected to the second noble truth - suffering has a cause (Dukkha Samudaya). According to Buddhism everything in this world has a cause. There is a cycle of twelve such causes and corresponding effects which governs the entire life of human beings. It is called Bhavacakra, the cycle of existence. This universal law works automatically without the help of any conscious guide. This doctrine is the main principle in Buddha's teachings. Other notions, such as the doctrine of karma, the theory of momentoriness, and the theory of non-soul are based on this doctrine. Pratitya-samutpada is a middle path between sasvatvada (the principle of eternity) and uchedvada (the principle of annihilation). According to sasvatvada, some things are eternal, uncaused, and independent. According to uchedvada, nothing remains after the destruction of things. By maintaining a middle way between both these principles, pratitya-samutpada holds that things have existence but they are not eternal and they are not annihilated completely. The twelve links of pratitya-samutpada are as follows:

Ignorance (Avidya): Ignorance is caused by desire. It is the substratum of action and the basis of ego (jivahood). Ignorance causes the individual to

think of himself as separate from the entire world. This leads to attachment to life and thus to suffering.

Predisposition (Samskara): Samskara is caused by ignorance. Predisposition means a disposition preceding to or preparing to certain activity. Also, it can be understood as the attitude and aptitude of the past Karma. Samskara is also known as fabrication. There are three types of fabrications namely bodily fabrications, verbal fabrications, and mental fabrications.

Consciousness (Vijnana): Consciousness is caused by predispositions. There are six types of consciousness, namely, eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness, nose-consciousness, tongueconsciousness, body-consciousness, and intellect-consciousness.

Name and Form (Namarupa): It is the psycho-physical body in the womb of the mother caused by consciousness.

Sense Organs (Sadayatana): The sense organs are caused by name and form. There are six sense organs such as the eyes, the ears, the nose, the tongue, the skin, and the mind.

Contact (Sparsa): Contact with the object of enjoyment is caused by sense organs. Sometimes it is said that the eye is due to seeing and not that seeing is due to the eye, and similarly in the case of every organ.

Feeling or Sensation (Vedana): Feeling or sensation is caused by contact with the objects of enjoyment. Feeling or sensation is of six forms, such as, vision, hearing, olfactory (sensation), gustatory sensation, tactile sensation, and intellectual sensation (thought).

Craving (Trsna): The craving or thirst for enjoyment is caused by the actual experience or sensation of enjoyment. It is due to craving that a person blindly longs for worldly attachments. There are six forms of cravings, such as, cravings with respect to forms, sounds, smells, tastes, touch, and ideas.

Attachment or Clinging (Upadana): The clinging to sensory enjoyment is caused by the craving for such enjoyment. There are four types of clinging, namely, sensual clinging, view clinging, practice clinging, and self clinging.

Becoming (Bhava): It is the will to be born caused by clinging or attachment. It includes thoughts and actions which are responsible for rebirth. There are three kinds of becoming, such as sensual becoming, form becoming, and formless becoming.

Birth (Jati): Birth (also rebirth) is caused by becoming (bhava). The jiva is caught up in the wheel of the world and remains in it till it attains nirvana. It refers not just to birth at the beginning of a lifetime, but to birth as a new person, which is the acquisition of a new status or position.

Old Age and Death (Jaramarana): Old age and death are caused by birth. Rebirth causes the whole chain of the worldly sufferings. After a man is caught in the wheel of the world, diseases, old age, suffering, death, etc. recur.

The twelve links of the doctrine of dependent origination can be divided into three classes, namely, the past, the future, and the present. Ignorance and predisposition are due to the past life. Consciousness, name and form, sense organs, contact, feeling, craving, and clinging are connected to the present life. Finally, becoming, birth, and old age and death are of future life.

**Check Your Progress 1**

Note: i) Use the space given below for your answer.

ii) See the end of the unit for tips for your answer.

1. How do you know the Four Noble Truths?

…………………………………………………………………………

…………………………………………………………………………

…………………………………………………………………………

2. Discuss the Eightfold Path in Buddhism.

…………………………………………………………………………

…………………………………………………………………………

……………………………………………………

3. What do you know about the Doctrine of Dependent Origination (Pratitya-samutpada)?

……………………………………………………………………………

……………………………………………………………………………

……………………………………………………………………………

## 7.5 DOCTRINE OF MOMENTORINESS (KSHANIKA-VADA)

According to kshanika-vada, everything is momentary, relative, conditional, and dependent. It is also known as the doctrine of impermanence (anityavada). Buddhism teaches that the world and its objects are not permanent, but momentary. The universe is a constant chain of change. The basis of the Doctrine of Momentoriness is the Doctrine of the Dependent Origination. Every object comes into existence from an antecedent condition and gives rise to a consequent object. It is comparable to the flame of a lamp, where the flame is merely the continuity of successive flames. A flame exists only for a moment, but it gives rise to the next flame. For Buddhists, the material world and its objects are not merely impermanent and transient, but they also exist only for a moment. This doctrine is ultimately to dissuade people from placing confidence in the world and persuade them to renounce it for the permanent status of Nirvana. It avoids two extremes: eternalism and nihilism. Thus, it is a middle path where the world is neither a being nor a non-being. The Buddhist philosophers have given several arguments in support of the doctrine of momentoriness. Of these, the most important argument is known as Arthakriyakaritra, the argument from the power of generating action. According to this principle, whatever can produce an effect has existence, and whatever cannot produce an effect has no existence. It means that as long as a thing has the power to produce an effect it has existence, and when it ceases to produce an effect, its existence also ceases. Again, one thing can produce only one effect. If at one time a thing produces an effect and at the next moment another effect or no effect, then the former thing ceases to exist.

## 7.6 DOCTRINE OF KARMA

The law of karma is that every event produces its effects, which in turn become causes for other effects, generating the karmic chain. The doctrine of dependent origination links karmic impressions from past existence and rebirth. These two links signify the proposition that the present existence of a man is dependent upon his past existence - the effect of his thoughts, words, and actions in the past life. Similarly the future existence is dependent on the present existence. According to the law of karma, our present and future are neither capricious nor unconditional, but are conditioned by our past and present.

## 7.7 DOCTRINE OF NON-SOUL (ANATTA)

The doctrine of non-soul (anatta) is another important philosophical notion of Buddhism which is a consequence of the doctrine of dependent origination. There is a belief in almost all the cultures and religions that there exists in man an eternal and permanent entity, variously known as the 'soul,' the 'self,' or the 'spirit.' According to Buddhism, one cannot become aware of an unchanging entity called 'soul' and all one can become aware of when one thinks of one's self or soul is a sensation, an impression, a perception, an image, a feeling, or an impulse. The Buddha analyses men into five groups (skandhas), namely, form (matter), feeling (pleasant, unpleasant, and neutral), perceptions (sight, smell, etc.), impulses (hate, greed, etc.) and consciousness. Anything a man thinks he is or he has, fall under one of these groups. The self or soul is simply an abbreviation for the aggregate of these skandhas, and not some entity over and above the aggregate. Thus there is no distinct substance known as the 'self' or 'soul.' There is a mistaken understanding that through the doctrine of anatta the Buddha denies man as a self or a soul. What he denies is the belief that there exists behind and beyond the skandhas a self or a soul which is permanent and unchanging. Buddha acknowledges the changing self, but rejects the unchanging substantial self. (For details refer to the title 'The Doctrine of No Soul (Anatta)' in the chapter 'Buddhism as a Religion')

## 7.8 PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOLS OF BUDDHISM

Since Buddha did not give answers to many of the vital philosophical issues, his followers tried to find answers to such questions. These attempts, in turn, gave rise to different philosophical directions and schools. The differences of opinion and doctrines emerged immediately after the death of Buddha. It is believed that there existed thirty such Buddhist philosophical schools. But only four of them survived and are traditionally known. They are as follows:

The Vaibhasika School: The Vaibhasika derives its name from its exclusive emphasis on a particular commentary, the abhidhammamahavaibhasa of Abhidhamma. In the true spirit of the doctrine of dependent origination, the Vaibhasika holds that reality is pure flux and change. This school belongs to Hinayana. The Vaibhasika speaks about the existence of the mental and the non-mental realities. It teaches that we can really know the external entities and the world outside. This notion is known as bahya-pratyeka-vada. This school holds onto pluralism, realism, and nominalism. According to Vaibhasika, the world is in reality as it appears to us. The ultimate constituents (dharma) of reality are the same as those which make up the world of our empirical experience. Since they hold that the dharma is ultimate and independent of our consciousness, Vaibhasika is realism. Vaibhasika is pluralism as it asserts dharma as distinct and irreducible. For Vaibhasika, the reality is particular and is devoid of any universal unchanging entities. Thus Vaibhasika can be considered as nominalism too.

The Sautrantika School: The name Sautrantika, derived from the fact that it gives greater importance to the authority of the sutra-pitaka of the Pali Canon. This school also belongs to Hinayana Buddhism. The Sautrantika subscribes both the mental and the non-mental reality. The important difference between both these schools is that while the Vaibhasika maintains direct perception of the external objects, the Sautrantika holds the inference from the perceptions which are representations of external objects. The second important difference between the Sautrantika and Vaibhasika is that unlike the Vaibhasika, the Sautrantika distinguishes between the world as it appears to us (phenomena) and the world as it is

in itself (nomena). Here Sautrantika denies the absolute, ultimate, and independent ontological status of dharma. Another point of disagreement between the Sautrantika and the Vaibhasika is concerned with the nature of the relation between successive point-instants of existence. For the Vaibhasika the past, present and future are equally real. The reason is that the present, which is admittedly real, cannot be the effect of an unreal past and the cause of an unreal future. Contrary to this, the Vaibhasika's point is that the point-instant which 8 has no duration cannot causally bring about its succeeding point-instant. For, the cause and effect cannot be simultaneous.

The Yogacara School: This school belongs to Mahayana Buddhism. There are two different accounts of the origin of the name Yogacara of this school. According to one account, the followers of this school emphasized yoga (critical enquiry) along with acara (conduct). According to the other, the adherents of this school practiced yoga for the realization of the truth, that reality is of the nature of consciousness. The core of the doctrine of the Yogacara is that consciousness (mind) alone is ultimately real. Thus, external objects are regarded as unreal. For Yogacara, all internal and external objects are ideas of the mind. Thus, it is impossible to demonstrate the independent existence of external objects. The philosophers of this school are known as the advocates of consciousness (vijnanavada). Yogacara offers another argument to deny the independent existence of the external object, which seems to be a criticism to the Sautrantika and the Vaibhasika. It argues that if there is an object outside, it must be indivisible, partless, and atomic, or divisible and composite. If it is the former, it cannot be perceived since atoms are too minute. If it is composite, we cannot perceive all the parts and the sides of the object simultaneously. Thus, in either case the existence of the external objects is denied. Another important argument against the existence of the external objects is based on the doctrine of momentoriness. The Yogacara points out that, since objects are not substances but durationless point instants, it is difficult to understand how a momentary object can be the cause of consciousness. If it is the cause of consciousness, there must be a time lapse between the arising of the object and our consciousness of it.

The Madhaymika School: This school also belongs to Mahayana Buddhism. The literal meaning of the term Madhaymika is ‘the farer of the Middle Way’. The Madhaymika avoids all the extremes, such as, eternalism and annihilationism, self and non-self, matter and spirit, unity and plurality, and identity and difference. The founder of this school is supposed to be Nagarjuna of the second century CE. Aryadeva, Candrakirti, Kumarajiva, and Santideva are the other prominent figures of this school. One of the most important insights of Nagarjuna is the origin and nature of philosophy and philosophical conflicts. For him, knowledge is the means by which man seeks to unite the self and the other. Knowledge is propositional, and propositions are constituted of concepts, and concepts refer names (nama) and forms (rupa). Hence, the reality which philosophers create in their knowledge is the reality of names and forms, and not reality as it is in itself. The Madhaymika claims that concepts and conceptual systems are relative to each other. They cannot stand by themselves and generate truths. Consequently, no system can claim absolute truth and validity. The truth of each system can be relative and partial. Nagarjuna teaches that it is absurd to speak about reality as true or false. Reality simply is. The emptiness (Sunyata) of concepts does not entail the emptiness of the reality. What he means by Sunyata is not that reality is nonexistent or illusory, but only that it is devoid of any entities which we think. The Madhaymika claim that unlike the other three schools, their philosophy is very close to the teachings of Buddha. The notion of relativity and sunyata (emptiness) are none other than the doctrine of dependent origination which Buddha emphasized. Nagarjuna brings the notion of two types of truths: the lower truth and higher truth. He calls the phenomenal truths as lower truth, since we cannot find any absolute truth in this world. All phenomenal truths are relative, conditioned, and valid within particular domains of our perceptual-conceptual experience. The higher truth is beyond percepts and concepts, ineffable and defying all descriptions. It is absolute, supramundane, and unconditional. It is grasped through intuitive insights.

**Check Your Progress 2**

Note: i) Use the space given below for your answer.

ii) See the end of the unit for tips for your answer.

1. Describe Doctrine of Momentoriness (Kshanika-vada).

…………………………………………………………………………

…………………………………………………………………………

…………………………………………………

2. What do you know the Doctrine of Karma?

…………………………………………………………………………

…………………………………………………………………………

…………………………………………………………………………

3. Highlight Doctrine of Non-soul (anatta).

…………………………………………………………………………

…………………………………………………………………………

…………………………………………………………………………

4. What do you understand by the Philosophical Schools of Buddhism?

…………………………………………………………………………

…………………………………………………………………………

…………………………………………………

## 7.9 LET US SUM UP

The aim of philosophy is to ultimately lead man to find the meaning of his life and existence. It is true to its core in the case of the philosophy of Buddhism. The four noble truths that Buddha proposes touch the very existence of humans, which leads one to understanding the sufferings and miseries of life, and to go beyond to attain nirvana, a perfect state of happiness and bliss. The eightfold path of Buddhism is moreover a daily guide for everyone to lead a virtuous life. The doctrine of pratityasamutpada is a reasonable description about the cycle of human life. The doctrine of momentoriness has profound philosophical implications in the present scenario, where people chase the momentary pleasures of the world without realizing its impermanence. The doctrine of non-soul or more precisely the denial of a permanent soul would be a unique notion of Buddhist philosophy. Apart from all these, we find a logical sequence in the entire philosophy, where different ideas are mutually connected and related. The four noble truths are the basis of

Buddha's teachings and from this follow all other notions such as the eightfold path, the doctrine of dependent origination, the doctrine of momentoriness, the theories of karma, nonsoul, rebirth, etc. The various theories of the different philosophical schools are a direct evidence to understand the richness of Buddhist philosophy, and how seriously the study on the teachings of Buddha is carried out. Even today, deeper and wider study is done on the various themes of this philosophy to explore the new horizons of the meaning it contains.

## 7.10 KEY WORDS

Anatta – The Buddhist doctrine of non-soul.

Duhkha – The Sanskrit term dukkha is almost translated as suffering. According to Buddha, life is full of suffering and the goal of human life is to get out of suffering by removing ignorance. The four noble truths of Buddhism are closely linked to the concept of dukkha.

Karma - Karma is categorized within the groups of causes in the chain of cause and effect, where it comprises the elements of action. Buddhism links karma directly to the motives behind an action.

Kshanika-vada – The Buddhist Doctrine of Momentoriness.

Nirvana – The Buddha describes nirvana as the perfect peace of the state of mind that is free from craving, anger, and other afflicting states.

Skandhas - The aggregates or components that come together to make an individual.

Sunyata – Often translated as emptiness or void. According to Nagarjuna "The greatest wisdom is the so-called Sunyata."

Pratitya-samutpada –The Buddhist doctrine of dependent origination

## 7.11 QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

1. How do you know the Four Noble Truths?
2. Discuss the Eightfold Path in Buddhism
3. What do you know about the Doctrine of Dependent Origination (Pratitya-samutpada)?
4. Describe Doctrine of Momentoriness (Kshanika-vada)
5. What do you know the Doctrine of Karma?

6. Highlight Doctrine of Non-soul (anatta).
7. What do you understand by the Philosophical Schools of Buddhism?

## 7.12 SUGGESTED READINGS AND REFERENCES


- Bhattacharya, N. N. Buddhism in the History of Indian Ideas. Delhi: Manohar, 1993.
- Burrt, Edwin A. The Teaching of the Compassionate Buddha The New American Library,1955.
- Chiatterjee, Satischandra. An Introduction to Indian Philosophy. Culcutta: University of Culcutta, 1984.
- Conze, Edward. Thirty Years of Buddhist Studies. Oxford: Bruno Cassirer Ltd. 1967.
- Getthin, Rupert. The Foundations of Buddhism. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.
- Humphreys, Christmas Ed.. The Wisdom of Buddhism. New York: Harper Colophon Book, 1970.
- -----------. The Buddhist Way of Action. London: Unwin Paperbacks, 1977.
- Kalupahana, David Ed.. Buddhist Thought and Rituals. New York: Paragon House, 1990.
- Kalupahana, David J. Ethics in Early Buddhism, Delhi: Motilal Banarsiddass Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 2008.
- Murti, T. R. V. The Central Philosophy of Buddhism. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd. 1955.
- Puligandla, R. Fundamentals of Indian Philosophy. New York: Abingdon Press, 1975.


## 7.13 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

**Check Your Progress 1**

1. See Section 7.2

2. See Section 7.3
3. See Section 7.4

**Check Your Progress 2**

1. See Section 7.5
2. See Section 7.6
3. See Section 7.7
4. See Section 7.8